



# PARLIAMENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

## AD HOC COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS MADE BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL NHLANHLA MKHWANAZI

### WITNESS STATEMENT OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLICE, MR CASSEL MATHALE



**AD HOC COMMITTEE ENQUIRY ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE WIDE-  
RANGING ALLEGATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS MADE BY KWAZULU-  
NATAL PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL NHLANHLA  
MKHWANAZI IN A MEDIA BRIEFING ON 6 JULY 2025**

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**WITNESS STATEMENT OF  
DEPUTY MINISTER MATHALE**

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I, the undersigned,

**CASSEL CHARLIE MATHALE**

hereby make oath and state that:

1. I am the Deputy Minister of Police in the Republic of South Africa, appointed as such by the President of the Republic in terms of section 93 of the Constitution since 2 July 2024. I previously served as Deputy Minister of Police to Former Minister of Police, Mr Bhekokwakhe Hamilton Cele (“Bheki Cele”) from 29 May 2019 to 19 June 2024.
2. In my aforementioned capacity, I have been involved in the implementation of various responsibilities falling within the constitutional mandate of the Ministry as delegated or assigned to me by the Minister. Therefore, the facts set out in this statement are within my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated or indicated from the context; *alternatively*, obtained through reports made to me in the course of my duties, or gleaned from records under my control or to which I have authorised access.
3. I consulted with the evidence leaders on 8 September 2025 and provided information the basis on which this statement has been prepared. This statement is made at the invitation of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee Inquiry (“the Committee”) established to investigate allegations made on 6 July 2025 by Lieutenant General Mkhwanazi, the Provincial Commissioner of KwaZulu-Natal, implicating certain individuals for involvement in criminality, political interference and corruption in the criminal justice system.

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## INTRODUCTION

4. I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Having read and followed its proceedings, I am confident that the outcome of this parliamentary process will enhance our collective goals of safeguarding our national security by ensuring that the SAPS's primary constitutional mission in section 205 of the Constitution are guaranteed. It is therefore my obligation to, not only answer as candidly and truthfully as I must, the questions that have been raised in the Committee's terms of reference, but to give the Honourable Members, the assurance of my commitment as Deputy Minister to provide whatever information that is at my disposal in order to strengthen the constitutional governance of the SAPS. My evidence or testimony is therefore not only of a Deputy Minister but a patriot who loves his country and wants to see it succeed in preventing the collapse of strategic institutions such as the SAPS.
  
5. My submissions are intended to assist the Committee in fulfilling its oversight mandate by providing:
  - 5.1 further institutional insight into the governance and constitutional architecture of the South African Police Service ("SAPS");
  - 5.2 my observations on the exercise of executive authority and its lawful limits;  
and
  - 5.3 a considered response to the grave systemic allegations disclosed by **Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi** in his public briefing on 6 July 2025 and his witness statement submitted to this Committee.

6. In particular, I aim to support the Committee's functions under paragraphs **3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5** of the **Terms of Reference**, which direct this Inquiry to investigate the veracity and implications of the allegations and propose institutional reforms responsive to the threats identified.
  
7. I want to begin by offering a view about the role of the Deputy Minister of the SAPS so that we can responsibly manage the expectations of the Members of the Public. As the process in the Committee progressed and various allegations made about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the SAPS to advance its primary constitutional mission, I have been deeply concerned that as we dig into what is wrong about the SAPS, we do so with a view to building a stronger SAPS rather than to leave it entirely weakened and paralysed. I therefore attempt to make proposals of how the constitutional governance of the SAPS could be improved to ensure that we do not experience what we are currently experiencing as a country. The wounds inflicted on the SAPS by criminals ultimately be repaired and healed through appropriate constitutional measures.
  
8. The governance and operational structure of the South African Police Service ("SAPS") is grounded in Chapter 11 of the Constitution, particularly sections 205 to 207, and further regulated by the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. In terms of section 207(1) of the Constitution, the **President** appoints a **National Commissioner**, who exercises control and manages the police service. The Minister of Police, in turn, is responsible for determining national policing policy, after consultation with provincial governments and with due regard to provincial priorities, as contemplated in **sections 206(1)–(3)** of the Constitution.

9. The role of the Deputy Minister of Police is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is shaped by delegated authority from the Minister. The Deputy Minister is constitutionally accountable to Parliament under **section 93(2)**, which provides that “Deputy Ministers appointed in terms of subsection (1)(b), are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions”, However a Deputy Minister does not possess independent executive or operational command. Accordingly, the Deputy Minister’s primary responsibility is to support the Minister in the development and implementation of lawful policy, oversight functions, and strategic alignment across the policing sector and therefore their specific roles are left for determination and delegations by the respective Ministers. The Minister of Police therefore determines the scope and role of the Deputy Ministers who are appointed by the President.
10. The Deputy Ministers are therefore accountable to Parliament for the exercise of their powers as “delegated” to them by the Minister and the performance of those delegated functions. I am advised that the Constitution envisages that Deputy Ministers must therefore have “powers” and “perform functions” over which they could be held to account by Parliament. This means that the President as the appointing authority or / and the Minister, to whom a deputy minister has been assigned, must specify the powers and functions of the Deputy Ministers.
11. The interface between executive oversight and operational autonomy within SAPS is constitutionally significant and institutionally delicate. While the Minister may determine policing policy in terms of **section 206(1)** of the Constitution, such authority does not extend to directing or interfering with specific investigations, operational deployments, or case management functions that

reside exclusively with the National Commissioner, under **section 207(2)**. The courts have repeatedly affirmed that operational independence is a constitutional imperative, necessary to ensure both the actual and perceived impartiality of law enforcement functions.

12. When I was a Deputy Minister to former Minister Cele, he delegated to me specific functions and powers. I attach a copy of his delegation as "**CCM1**".
13. During my time as Deputy Minister to Former Minister Bheki Cele in 2019, I was responsible for the SAPS Administration division (Programme 1), the Civilian Secretariat for the Police (CSPS), the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), and the Private Security Industry Regulation Authority (PSIRA). I further worked with Maj-General Rabi and the Secretariat to monitor the implementation of decisions that were taken in relation to policing. At the time I also addressed the issue of the backlog that was experienced in the courts in so far as it relates to the involvement of the SAPS and as such, worked with the Former Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development, who was Mr John Jeffrey at the time.
14. The delegation of powers by the Former Minister of Police to the Deputy Minister was effective because there was essentially shared responsibility of tasks. I believe that members have been informed that SAPS has various units through which various policing tasks are performed and conducted. The national Department is fairly big and performs complex functions that are key to the national security goals.
15. I believe that due to the strategic importance of policing in the protection of constitutional governance, policing and the prevention of crime is a cross-cutting

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constitutional terrain in that it engages all our collective interests. A country cannot properly achieve its national goals without an effective police. Policing impacts on social and political stability. It also impacts on economic growth. The Minister of Police has therefore weighty constitutional duties to 'determine national policing policy' after consulting provincial governments and taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by the provincial executives.'

16. The key in the management of this complex and strategic organisation is consultation and coordination. In my assessment of what has created challenges in the effective management of SAPS is the lack of a predictable pattern and practice of open communication between the various interests groups.

#### **CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLICE**

17. The Deputy Ministers currently do not have any specific functions delegated to them by the Minister. As a new Minister we understood that he first had to familiarise himself with the current SAPS organisational structure and appreciate operational functions of the SAPS.
18. When Minister Mchunu came into office, Deputy Minister Boshielo and I first had to afford Minister Mchunu an opportunity to familiarise himself with his new role as the newly appointed Minister of Police and to await his decisions on the delegation of responsibilities. As stated above, The Ministry of Police is a big portfolio, which comprises of the various SAPS divisions and units, as well as other entities such as the CSPS, the IPID, and PSIRA.

19. The Minister, as the Executive Authority and the National Commissioner as the Accounting Officer, have their responsibilities set out in the Constitution. Despite the absence of specific delegated powers, the current role and functions of the Deputy Ministers include engaging from time to time with the Minister in relation to policing issues and receiving briefings from the respective units within the police ministry portfolio, such as SAPS, IPID, on PSIRA and the CSPA.
20. Minister Mchunu's approach was to allocate tasks as and when issues arise. This ad hoc approach has its benefits and disadvantages. What I can point out is that Minister Mchunu would be required in terms of his performance agreement to indicate what the respective responsibilities of the Deputy Ministers are. I believe he was going to do this when he was ready.
21. We further participated in the review of the current organisational structures and processes within SAPS with the view of making recommendations on police issues.
22. The new structure of visible policing is slightly different from the structure that was in place under Former Minister Cele. The police participated and put forward their proposals which was extensively discussed and out of those discussions, it was agreed that we need to develop a structure that speaks to the challenges of the day. The development of the organisational structure was an administrative process which was mainly led by the team responsible for organisational design within the SAPS.

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## THE CHALLENGES

23. I do not intend to deal in great detail with the institutional and administrative challenges in the SAPS. There is on-going review of the SAPS's administrative capacity to discharge its functions effectively and efficiently. What I want to deal with is an issue that has concerned members of this community which is the view that the paralysis in the SAPS is fuelled by factionalism.

### Factionalism

24. I am not aware of any factionalism in the police services. Members might not share the same and / or similar sentiment on some issues but I would not describe that as factionalism. I am of the view that difference in opinion is prevalent in any organisation and SAPS is no different and / or immune to such as an organisation.

25. Members all agree that the work needs to be done and that service needs to be delivered, they may however differ in the manner in which tasks are to be approached or services delivered. I have noticed that members appear to struggle to work together. I do not know what the reason for that is.

26. I personally would work with anybody and I always find ways to work with someone even if I do not agree with them.

27. I am of the view that it is relatively easy to identify when there is factionalism within an organisation. Factionalism in organisation can be seen when those involved are in conflict with each other on every issue regardless of whether the issue is valid.

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Factions generally tend to deal with things in very destructive manner. They would deliberately reject the truth.

28. Despite the workload that currently exists in SAPS, the police do their work. I am of the view that members have not reached a stage where it can be said that the police are unable to do their work because of factionalism or internal conflict.

29. I am of the view that there is room for improvement in the delivery of services but I cannot say that members are not doing their work. Everyone in the police is serving the same cause. There are criminal elements in SAPS but I do not believe that it can be categorized as factionalism. It is criminal elements that must be dealt with.

30. The South African Police Service as an institution, in my own observation, is that when 1994 came the changes that were implemented did not resolve the problems of the South African police. That's why there are outstanding matters that we are still dealing with today. For instance, we have what we call the non-statutory forces, which are people who came into the police and the army from Umkhonto we Sizwe, from APLA, operatives from the anti-apartheid movement. These individuals have not been fully integrated in SAPS. Thus, I do not think there is factionalism but rather, SAPS is an institution that still needs to be transformed. There are elements in the South African Police who defended the apartheid system which did not die. These elements are still operational and they obviously sabotage the democratic project.

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31. These are elements that we should work hard to ensure that we overcome and build a police force that would serve the democratic dispensation. So these elements are sabotaging the democratic project. There are also elements who are promoting criminality and who work with different criminal syndicates within the police. I would not characterize them as a faction.
32. On 6 July 2025, the Provincial Commissioner of Police for Kwazulu-Natal, Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi ("Lt-General Mkhwanazi"), held a media briefing and made serious allegations regarding the existence and operation of a sophisticated criminal syndicate that has allegedly infiltrated law enforcement and intelligence structures in South Africa. I regard his report as serious enough to justify the intervention by this ad hoc Committee.

#### **THE AD HOC COMMITTEE AND ITS MANDATE**

33. I understand from the Terms of Reference ("the TOR") that on 23 July 2025, the National Assembly ("the NA") passed a resolution in terms of which an *Ad Hoc* Committee ("the Committee") was established to probe into the allegations of Lt- General Mkhwanazi in terms of Rule 253 of the Rules of the NA.
34. The Committee is tasked to conduct the enquiry into the allegations of Lt-General Mkhwanazi and report to the NA, with a view to improving policing, and enhancing governance across SAPS, the NPA, judiciary, Correctional Services, and metro police divisions.

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## ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AS SET OUT IN TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE (“the TOR”)

35. The TOR identified the following key areas of investigation for purposes of the report to the NA:

- “4.1.1 *Political interference within SAPS: Executive oversight versus operational interference by Minister Mchunu (including the directive by the Minister contained in the letter, dated 31 December 2024, to disband the PKTT and the moratorium on filling vacancies in the crime intelligence component of SAPS).*
- 4.1.2 *Any related claim regarding corruption (financial or otherwise), bribery, or misuse of public resources within SAPS, or any other relevant institution.*
- 4.1.3 *Evaluating the extent of misconduct and unethical behaviour by members of SAPS and any other relevant individuals or institutions.*
- 4.1.4 *Evaluating the effectiveness of the PKTT and the official status thereof.*
- 4.1.5 *The status of the 121 case dockets allegedly removed from the PKTT as directed by the Deputy National Commissioner for Crime Detection, Lt Gen. S Sibiya, acting on the instruction of Minister Mchunu to disband the PKTT.*
- 4.1.6 *Instability within the Crime Intelligence component of SAPS.*
- 4.1.7 *The alleged corrupt relationship between Minister Mchunu and Mr. Brown Mogotsi, and between Mr. Mogotsi and Mr. Vusimuzi ‘Cat’ Matlala.*
- 4.1.8 *Internal oversight and accountability mechanisms: Reviewing the effectiveness of SAPS’s internal oversight systems in detecting and addressing corruption and misconduct.*
- 4.1.9 *Leadership failures: Investigating whether the SAPS leadership, including Lt. Gen. Mkhwanazi, took appropriate action to address concerns, and the role of senior management in enabling or preventing the issues.*
- 4.1.10 *Possible procurement irregularities at SAPS regarding the R360 million SAPS healthcare contract, specifically whether the tender awarded to Mr. Vusimuzi Matlala’s company contravened procurement laws, with reference to concerns previously flagged*

*by Babita Deokaran. Bearing in mind that these flagged concerns or this particular contract does not limit the scope of the Committee.*

- 4.1.11 Alleged existence of an organised crime syndicate controlled by drug cartels, as well as businesspeople and its infiltration of key criminal justice system role-players involving politicians, law enforcement from SAPS and the Metro Police Division, Correctional Services, the NPA, and the judiciary.*
- 4.1.12 Prosecutorial conduct and the relationship between the Independent Directorate Against Corruption "IDAC" and the PKTT, including whether IDAC or any of its officials unlawfully interfered in police investigations or exceeded its mandate.*
- 4.1.13 Alleged failure of any organ of State or member of the executive to comply with their legal obligations, and if so, recommend appropriate action to address such failure.*
- 4.1.14 Allegations against Members of Parliament with regard to the classified information released to them, specifically the reference to Members of Parliament who are allegedly linked to criminal syndicates.*
- 4.1.15 Impact on public trust and safety: Examining the broader impact of these issues on public trust in the SAPS, Correctional Services, the NPA, the Criminal Justice System, the judiciary and national security.*
- 4.1.16 Evaluate chain-of-custody, data-integrity, and record-keeping processes, including digital evidence management.*
- 4.1.17 Identify conflicts of interest (political, financial, or personal) impacting decisions relating to the PKTT, Crime Intelligence, procurement, and case allocation.*
- 4.1.18 Scrutinise inter-agency coordination among SAPS, Crime Intelligence, IDAC/NPA, Correctional Services, and Metro Police, and the legal basis for directives affecting the PKTT."*

36. In this statement I intend to only deal with those terms of reference on which I have evidence and experience. Let me begin with my experience.

## **RELEVANT EXPERIENCE**

37. I was appointed by the President as Deputy Minister of Police to Former Minister Cele in 2019 and I am currently serving as Deputy Minister to the current Minister of Police, Minister Mchunu.

38. My previous experience include the following:

38.1 Deputy Minister of Small Business Development from 26 February 2018 to 7 May 2019;

38.2 Chairperson of Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition (NA Committees) from June 2014 to February 2018;

38.3 Member of Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (NA Committees) from August 2016 to 23 October 2017;

38.4 Member of Portfolio Committee on Science and Technology from June 2014 to October 2017;

38.5 Premier of Limpopo Province from May 2009 to July 2013.

39. I gathered experience in police services through my work as the Premier of Limpopo Province. I worked with the police during my time as Premier because Provincial Commissioners basically account to Provinces and the Executive Council. The Provincial Commissioners are appointed in consultation with the Executive Council and they account to the Provincial Executive. As Premier of the Province, I had regular interaction with the Provincial Commissioner of Police.

40. As started above, when I was appointed as Deputy Minister of Police in 2019, General Bheki Cele was the Minister of Police. I was very fortunate to have been

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appointed as Deputy Minister to Former Minister Bheki Cele because he had extensive experience in police services. Former Minister Cele was a police officer himself, and he further served as the National Police Commissioner before he was appointed Minister of Police.

#### **THE POLITICAL KILLINGS TASK TEAM (the PKTT) AND MINISTER'S DIRECTIVE ISSUED ON 31 DECEMBER 2024**

41. The directive issued by the Minister on 31 December 2024, which instructed the disbandment of the Political Killings Task Team (PKTT) and imposed a moratorium on appointments within the Crime Intelligence Division, has been a focal point of concern. In my view, the manner of its issuance without interdepartmental consultation, procedural safeguards, or parliamentary notification placed the SAPS leadership in a position of institutional uncertainty.
42. I do, however, believe that the rationale for the PKTT was sound. I also believe that the PKTT's work was important to combating a particularly troubling pattern of criminal conduct. Whether the PKTT was adding and value to overall policing goals may be subjective and a value judgment.
43. A task team in my understanding is not a permanent structure. It must be allowed to do its work to completion. I understand from what is in the letter of the Minister why he decided to disband the PKTT and on what terms. I do not necessarily agree with the reasons for disbandment.
44. We had discussions with the Minister on re-establishing and strengthening crime intelligence. It was acknowledged during those discussions on its restructuring

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that CI needed to be strengthened in order to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently.

45. Lt-General Jacobs had been the head of CI but when he was moved elsewhere, a vacuum was created prior to the appointment of Lt-General Khumalo. Lt-General Khumalo was the head of the PKTT at the same time as he now headed CI.
46. A decision was taken that Lt-General Khumalo should focus on rebuilding crime intelligence because it is at the centre of our ability to fight crime. He was accordingly relieved from the PKTT. The National Commissioner was assigned the duty of ensuring that the activities of the PKTT were being wound down.

#### **CONCLUSIONS ON THE PKTT**

47. I believe that the Minister could have handled the disbandment decision through a process involving adequate or reasonable consultation. Given that the Deputy Ministers are a strategic infrastructure of support to the Minister, I believe that the Minister could have engaged them prior to taking the decision. At the very least, I expected the Minister, as a matter of courtesy, to have made us aware of what his plans were in relation to the issues addressed in the Directive.
48. Whether the Minister was wrong or not from a legal perspective I am not sure, but I believe that a decision of this magnitude requires reasonable or adequate levels of engagements with the people who are within the Ministry and senior echelons of SAPS.



49. When I refer to engagement between the National Commissioner and the Minister, I am not suggesting that there is a joint decision making process. The Minister exercises executive authority and the National Commissioner is an accounting officer. I only suggest that there must be a constructive interface between the two which is aimed at enriching the quality of the policing .
50. I am of the view that the executive authority and the accounting officer have an interdependent constitutional relationship. The respective offices do not function in a vacuum but within a complex environment whose primary mission is the prevention and elimination of crime. To avoid destructive engagements, an open and honest system of consultation and engagement between the executive authority and accounting authority is necessary.
51. Whether the Minister overstepped the exercise of his powers when he unilaterally disbanded the PKTT is a matter I believe should be decided by those with the requisite competences.
52. I believe the Minister could have handled the issue of the disbandment differently.

**Minister's knowledge in relation to the issues addressed in the Directive**

53. As far as I am aware, there were discussions in relation to the issues addressed in the Minister's Directive. I do not recall the date of the discussions and whether presentations were made during the discussions.
54. In respect of the discussions on the PKTT it was noted that the head of Crime Intelligence is also the head of the PKTT. It was further noted that we need the head of Crime Intelligence to focus on Crime Intelligence and to release him of his responsibilities as head of the PKTT. We were of the view that you cannot

have the head of a Task Team who is also the head of Crime Intelligence, yet we are in the process of restructuring and strengthening Crime Intelligence. Those were discussions that we had.

55. The role of Crime Intelligence in the PKTT was not going to be removed because Lt-General Khumalo is no longer tasked with the responsibility to lead the PKTT. Crime Intelligence was going to be there, like it has been there in all operations within SAPS. Visible policing for instance, when they do work, either raiding or engaging in action to prevent crime, is intelligence-led. The detectives, when they do their detective work, is intelligence-led. In fact, intelligence support SAPS to carry out its responsibilities on any matter.
56. In the main, the discussions that we had were with the National Commissioner. The National Commissioner invited relevant members from the respective divisions which were discussed. For instance, if it was a human resource related issue, the National Commissioner would invite someone from human resource and if the issue related to detectives, a member from the detectives unit was invited, and so on. If the discussions affected a specific province or provinces, the provincial commissioners were informed.
57. The discussions happened before the Minister's Directive. I however do not know what informed the Minister's decision to issue the Directive in the December. We had engagements before the Directive as well as after the Directive.
58. The letter was issued at the time when there were discussions in relation to the establishment of a Murder and Robbery Unit. In the past there was a unit called the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit which was dealing with the issues of murder and robbery and it was doing very well. There were also discussions in relation

the establishment of a unit dedicated to deal with the killing of traditional leaders and the high murder rate in the country and how the issue needs to be addressed and how our capacity to deal with the issues need to be strengthened.

#### **MEETING OF 5 MARCH BEFORE THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE OF POLICE**

59. I was concerned about the allegations that were made by Lt-General Mkhwanazi before the Portfolio Committee as these were serious allegations that the Minister was acting to protect certain individuals. The Minister denied the allegations. I personally do not believe that the Minister would protect criminals, it would be most unfortunate if he did. I do not know whether the allegations made by Lt-General Mkhwanazi are true or not.
60. We had a discussion with the Minister in relation to what was discussed before the Portfolio Committee on 5 March 2025. The Minister indicated during the discussions that there is no such a thing that he was protecting certain individuals and that we must continue to do what is right.
61. I believe that the Minister discussed the press briefing with the President. I was not at that meeting and cannot say what was discussed. What I know about this briefing is what the Minister has disclosed in the public.

#### **ALLEGATIONS MADE BY GENERAL MKHWANAZI IN RELATION TO POLITICAL INTERFERENCE**

62. I am of the view that what Lt-General Mkhwanazi was referring to does not have anything to do with the structure of the organisation.

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63. The allegations presented by Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi both in his 6 July 2025 public briefing and in his witness statement to this Committee paint a deeply troubling picture of organised criminal infiltration into the structures of law enforcement, intelligence, and the broader justice system. The claim that drug cartels, politically connected business actors, and public officials are actively subverting SAPS's operations, particularly in politically sensitive investigations, if substantiated, constitutes not merely criminal conduct but a constitutional and security crisis.
64. Such allegations implicate a systemic erosion of the rule of law, the capture of state institutions, and the possible repurposing of security organs for factional or criminal ends.
65. My view is that what Lt-General Mkhwanazi was referring to was interference in relation to the manner in which people do their work.
66. I am of the view that we have one of the best Constitutions. I think lack of understanding of what the Constitution says is often a problem, because the roles and responsibilities of the Minister and the National Commissioner are clearly defined in the Constitution. There is the executive authority and an accounting officer and the Constitution is very clear that these are two different offices but interrelated and interdependent. The one cannot function without the other.

  
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## FORWARD LOOKING POLICY TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES

67. In my view what could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing is a common understanding by all role-players of the strategic importance of the SAPS to safeguard our constitutional democratic order.
68. The constitutional requirement to “control and manage” the SAPS must be exercised via strategic consultations with the relevant role-players. There should always be an open platform of engagement between the Minister, Deputy Ministers and the Commissions at all levels.
69. The introduction of technology in SAPS should be considered as an urgent matter that must be prioritised, and if need be, additional resources must be made available to facilitate the introduction of technology. This would include the use of body cameras by members, the use of technology to take statements, to gather all the necessary data on a crime scene, and to also do dockets electronically. This will assist to curb any interference and manipulation by any person.
70. If dockets are captured electronically, it would not get lost or stolen nor would one be able to change the content.
71. Technology would prevent dockets from disappearing and cases will be able to move through court process smoothly. Technology will be able to assist a great deal, and that is an area which has been very challenging to manage.
72. The manner in which technology is currently procured by the administration is problematic. SETA was introduced to procure technology over the years which I believe was a wrong choice, which needs to be reviewed. Even if we don't move

away from SETA, we must review the manner in which procurement is currently done.

73. Institutions resist change, and the police is no exception. You will find people who do not want to introduce change because they think it will take their job away, but we need technology. It will assist us to deal with the problems relating to interference.
74. Further, we are in a process to amend the SAPS Act which will assist a great deal. The process took a very long time. There is also new policy changes which were made recently which will also go a long way to assist
75. Lastly, the nature and scale of the alleged criminal infiltration into SAPS and associated state institutions demands a response that is both systemic and constitutional in character. While individual misconduct may be addressed through internal disciplinary or criminal processes, these are wholly inadequate where institutional structures themselves are compromised. The effectiveness, independence, and operational capacity of oversight entities such as the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service, and the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) must be critically reassessed.

## **CONCLUSION**

76. The Ad Hoc Committee is an important process that must help us to reimagine a new SAPS that is organised to achieve its primary constitutional mission. I am hopeful that the Committee's eventual recommendations will be met with a national resolve to renew SAPS, so that its name evokes confidence among

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Hon. Deputy Minister of Police  
 Mr CC Mathale, MP  
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 0001

Dear Deputy Minister,

**DELEGATION OF POWERS FOR THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLICE: MR CC MATHALE**

In terms of the Powers vested to the Minister of Police by any Act and Regulations of Parliament and other relevant policy prescripts, I hereby delegate the following Powers to the Deputy Minister of Police:

- Programme 1: Police Administration
- Public Entities coordination reporting to the Minister of Police
- Establishment of the Detective Training Academy
- Educational, and Rural Safety Programmes
- Women and Youth Development Programmes

We trust your good office will find the above in order.

Kind Regards

MINISTER OF POLICE  
 GENERAL B.H CELE

DATE: 02/08/2017.

**ACCEPT THE DELEGATIONS / NOT ACCEPTANCE OF THE DELEGATIONS**

DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLICE  
 MR CC MATHALE

DATE: 02/08/2019

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