HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF KEY LEGISLATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

DIAGNOSTIC REPORT ON SOCIAL COHESION AND NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

1. Executive Summary

This is a draft Diagnostic Report on social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Given the fact that this is the first draft of the Report to be developed by the HSRC team, it should be considered as a scoping exercise highlighting the major issues, trends and legislative challenges identified thus far. Further research and deliberations with the Working Group are expected to produce a more comprehensive Report. The report draws largely on secondary sources, and primary research data generated by the South African Social Attitudes team of the HSRC and other organisations, including Statistics South Africa.

The Report begins with a discussion of the concepts 'social cohesion' and 'nation-building', and how these are dealt with in South African policy documents. Social cohesion has been identified as a key national priority in a number of policy and strategic documents since 2004. But several documents identify the impediments to social cohesion in particular. These impediments are largely rooted in the country's colonial and apartheid past. Consequently, chapter 2 of the Report traces the evolution of the key lines of fracture impacting on social cohesion and nation-building in the country's recent colonial and apartheid past. The chapter includes a discussion of relevant discriminatory and oppressive legislation under apartheid and colonialism. This is followed by a chapter on our current situation, focusing on the key fault lines during the democratic era. It concludes that, despite significant effort to resolve many of the challenges inherited from the apartheid era, very little progress has been made in fostering social cohesion in South Africa. The final chapter in the report reviews various action plans to achieve social cohesion before setting out a vision of a socially cohesive society and people, and how to achieve this vision.

2. Problematising social cohesion

The concept of social cohesion has become an increasingly significant part of South African policy discourse over the past ten years. This discourse on the one hand reflects the imperative of building a democratic post-apartheid nation-state as well as increasing anxieties regarding current fragmentation along the lines of race, class, gender, ethnicity, etc. Social cohesion is increasingly being seen as critical to the objectives of the developmental state, which, it is argued, requires a 'social compact' to rally all sectors of society together around a common national vision of transformation. Nevertheless, as many of these policy documents note, there is a significant gap between policy aspirations towards social cohesion and the actual state of social solidarity in the country. As the *Twenty*

Year Review states, 'Public opinions on race relations, pride in being South African, and identity based on self-description all show little improvement or a decline' (The Presidency, 2014a: 18).

Besides the cleavages that originate in the racial divide, other threats to social cohesion include high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment, high levels of crime, violence and substance abuse, service delivery failures, increasing levels of distrust in our democratic leaders and institutions, marginalisation/exclusion of certain sectors of society, and xenophobia. These issues were clearly captured in the Department of Arts And Culture's *National Strategy on Social Cohesion*, which stipulates that: 'the realities of poverty, inequality, unemployment, homelessness and landlessness remain stark', 'the phenomena of violent crime and abuse of women, children, the elderly and foreign nationals have taken on disturbing proportions', 'uneven and inadequate local government service delivery in historically neglected communities … is now an enormous strain on the social fabric and public order', and 'the long-standing exclusion of the majority of the population, on racist grounds, from participation in the nation-state' has led to 'the systematic alienation of the majority of the population from national and local state institutions' (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012).

Social cohesion is a complex concept. As indicated in the National Development Plan (NDP), social cohesion is seen as both an outcome, i.e. the type of society we would like to see, and a process. Definitions of social cohesion refer to a variety of factors that are seen to be important to creating social cohesion. As a result Paul Bernard (1999) has called social cohesion a *'quasi-concept'.* This means the concept is malleable and can be allied to shifting political projects. Beauvais and Jensen emphasise the implication of different definitional starting points of social cohesion and the consequences this has for 'what is analysed, what is measured, and what policy action is recommended' (Beauvais and Jensen, 2002: iii*).*

The concept of social cohesion was developed in an international policy environment in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the context of growing concern about the fragmenting effects of globalisation. It was allied to European discourses about a 'third way' form of politics, which would be 'consensus-based' and 'post-political'. The concept increasingly gained traction in organisations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the Club of Rome as well as the Canadian Federal government. This has meant there has been little empirical research on social cohesion in the global south. Academic literature tends to make theoretical generalisations based on the social and political context of Europe and America. It is therefore critical to give the concept a 'southern' and specifically African content. As the *National Strategy on Social Cohesion* argues: 'This strategy is oriented towards the South African meanings of social cohesion and nation building embedded as they happen to be in African social ideas and cultures and their dynamic interaction with other cultures' (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012: 6).

Thus far, South African policy documents have tended to emphasise consensus in the realm of values as critical to creating social cohesion. While this is an understandable response to the fragmentation and division in South African society, there is a danger that an overemphasis on consensus in the realm of values can undermine democratic pluralism. Pluralist democracy should ideally allow for contestation around values and provide the institutional mechanisms to mediate this contention. This tension between pluralism and unity in an emerging nation-state is in many senses the critical problematic that the country's motto 'Unity in Diversity' seeks to grapple with, and with which citizens themselves are negotiating. Survey data from the South African Reconciliation Barometer and the South African Social Attitudes Survey indicate that the majority of South Africans continue to primarily trust people of their own ethnic and language group. The majority identify themselves in terms of these ethnic, language and racial groups rather than in terms of a single South African identity. On the other hand, the majority of citizens appear to continue to feel relatively high levels of general national pride, although their trust in institutions is declining.

While the *Twenty Year Review* advocates 'multiculturalism' as the basis for the recognition of diversity, this concept is in fact deeply limited in terms of meaningfully engaging with difference in the South African context. The concept, developed in the context of immigration to European cities, refers to a superficial tolerance of difference in a society with a pre-established national identity. However, South Africa faces a far more significant challenge regarding the initial constitution of the nation, in which, ideally, the full range of identities in the country should shape the form and character of the nation-state.

This is compounded by the country's history, and the fact that South Africa is emerging slowly from a colonial and apartheid past that excluded the majority of its citizens in many ways. For instance, the national heritage landscape prior to 1994 was in all respects characteristic of a colonial and apartheid past. Politically, socially, culturally and economically, there is a drive and urgency to transform South African society such that we become a representative, equitable and racially inclusive nation. Museums, monuments, national symbols such as the coat of arms and national anthem, and the names of streets, cities/towns/municipalities and key buildings did not reflect the richness and diversity of the South African cultural heritage. However, the introduction of new museums, monuments, national symbols and names for geographical places have given rise to lines of fracture that appear to indicate the continued existence of divergent concepts of nationhood, and the consequent failure to achieve a common sense of South African-ness. Such controversy, which reveals the contested and constructed nature of nation-building in South Africa today, also raises questions about the basis on which a unified and inclusive post-apartheid identity can be built.

All these factors indicate that social cohesion is a deeply political question. At stake in the discourses around social cohesion are in fact the terms of citizenship in a political

community founded on the principle of solidarity, or 'fraternity', which has been one of the conditions of modern democracy since the time of the French Revolution. Modern democracy has been marked by the transformation of people simply living in a geographical territory to a People bound together by affective relations of solidarity in a nation. Thus the modern nation-state is not simply about the territorial and judicial, but also about the experiential and emotional; critically, it also becomes part of people's personal identity – part of the way in which they define who they are.

In South Africa, the task of creating social cohesion is complicated by the tension between individual and communitarian forms of agency and social life, which plays out in multiple ways through state and society and generates conflicting conceptions and experiences of the rights and duties of citizenship. The Presidency's *Fifteen Year Review* notes the 'tension between the values of a caring society and those generated by an economic system that rewards competitive behavior' (The Presidency, 2008: 106). Thus, on the one hand the South African constitution is shaped by a liberal conception of individual human rights supported by law and a neutral state. On the other hand, the constitution, state discourse and citizen's own values are shaped by the African conception of Ubuntu, which emphasises a communitarian ethic and mutual obligation to the community rather than individual rights and entitlements. Citizens are expected to negotiate and manage these contradictions between the individual and collective.

Thus, in South Africa there remains deep contestation about the 'common good' i.e. the shared values which policy documents on social cohesion refer to. The concept of the common good is in fact deeply complex and has been engaged with since the time of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In general, in its liberal version it is understood as being about creating the social conditions for individuals to realise a meaningful vision of the good *as they understand it* (Amartya Sen, own emphasis). However, in the South African context the common good, as reflected in the policy documents outlined above, is seen by the state as directly related to collective action by state and society to achieve the common good of transformation. Official discourse tends to take a normative approach, i.e. defining what the common good should be, and focuses on consensus, a collective vision and collective action to achieve that vision, led by the developmental state. The critical question we need to engage with is how citizens themselves understand the common good? What are the values and norms which they believe will allow them to lead a 'good life'. And how does this relate to or shape the state's vision of the common good?

The legacy of apartheid as a spatial construct creates a further challenge to social cohesion and the emergence of a shared South African identity. Ironically, the creation of spatially and racially segregated towns created parochial, or what Putnam has called 'bonding' forms of social cohesion across class lines in racially segregated communities. Apartheid-constructed urban communities were aimed, among other things, at bringing together seemingly homogenous individuals based on apartheid-defined racial classifications into 'Group'

residential areas. Individuals and families from diverse backgrounds and experiences were forced together into urban townships or suburbs where they lived, and were educated and socialised to forge an identity as a distinct community, the primary distinction being that they were different from people defined to be unlike them by the apartheid system. The result was the construction of racial enclaves, the forging of racial identities, the entrenchment of racially-defined educational and economic/job opportunities, and the growth of peculiar social problems. This has given rise to misunderstanding of the racial 'other' that is prevalent in racial stereotypes, which is evidence of a lack of knowledge of the racial 'other'. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to forge unity among a 'people' who view themselves as different, and who have no knowledge of other communities constituting the South African 'nation'.

3. Identification of social cohesion as a key national priority

Social cohesion has been identified as a key national priority in a number of policy and strategic documents, particularly since 2004. These include the *Social Cohesion and Social Justice in South Africa* study (2004) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), and the Presidency's Macro Social Report, *A nation in the making: Macrosocial trends in South Africa* (2006), which made a significant contribution to introducing the concepts of social cohesion, social capital and social justice into policy discourse. This was followed by the Presidency's *Fifteen Year Review* (2008), the National Planning Commission's *Diagnostic Overview* (2011), the *National Development Plan* (2011) and the Presidency's *Twenty Year Review* (2014). Efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to the challenges of social cohesion include the Department of Arts and Culture's briefings to parliament in 2010 in the wake of a conference on 'Building a Caring Nation (DAC, 2010a; 2010b), the Department's draft *National Strategy on Social Cohesion and Nation-Building* (2012), which was debated and discussed at a multi-stakeholder summit on social cohesion in 2012, and most recently the *Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014-19*, which includes nation-building and social cohesion as Outcome 14. Importantly for the HSRC, the Human and Social Dynamics Funding Instrument administered by the National Research Foundation (NRF) has recently identified social cohesion and identity as one of its thematic focus areas.

The first major policy study on social cohesion commissioned by the Social Cluster of Cabinet and conducted by the HSRC in 2004, *Social Cohesion and Social Justice in South Africa*, utilised the concepts of social cohesion, social capital and social justice to analyse the 'social health of the nation' It defined social cohesion essentially as a broadly positive outcome i.e. 'the extent to which a society is coherent, united and functional, providing an environment within which its citizens can flourish. In other words, social cohesion is what holds societies together' (The Presidency 2004: i).

The *Fifteen Year Review* defined social cohesion as '*what* gives a society the capacity to cooperate in a way that creates the possibility for positive change'. It emphasised the importance of a socially cohesive state to meet the goals of the developmental state, which, it argued, would require the loyalty of citizens, despite uncomfortable 'trade-offs'. The review argued that in a developmental state both state and society must be mobilised together 'for a big push based on *broad national consensus*' (The Presidency, 2008: 115, own emphasis). The 15 Year Review conceptualised social cohesion as having 'material' and 'spiritual' dimensions that should be addressed through human development and nation-building that, 'seeks to promote pride in being South African, a sense of belonging, values, caring for one another and solidarity among South Africans' (The Presidency, 2008: 42).

Both the Macro-Social Report (2006) and Fifteen Year Review (2008) express concern about the detrimental effect that persistently high income inequality and relative deprivation and the associated social challenges of unemployment, rapid migration and changing family structures have been having on networks of cohesion and trust between people that form the social fabric of our society. These, in turn, can lead to a range of social consequences such as violence and criminality, xenophobia and other forms of social and political intolerance, low levels of mutual respect and social solidarity, as well as other types of social fragmentation.

The Department of Arts and Culture, on the other hand, contended in 2010 that South Africans seek social cohesion in order to create a 'caring, compassionate, fair and equitable society' (DAC 2010a). Thus, the mission of resolving problems of crime and violence, xenophobia, racism and labour unrest are goals in themselves. But other statements about social cohesion suggest that these goals are only interim steps toward establishing a unified society that can then comply more effectively with government development planning. This latter reading is suggested in the definition of social cohesion, also provided by the Department of Arts and Culture, which earlier discussion should clarify is uniquely instrumental:

> Social cohesion refers to those factors that have an impact on the ability of a society to be united for the attainment of a common goal. It is the extent to which members of a society respond collectively in pursuit of these shared goals and how they deal with the political, socio-economic and environmental challenges that are facing them (DAC 2010b).

Racial, cultural, political, religious, class, gender or age divisions are not discussed as problems, but as 'factors impeding the building of a cohesive society', which must be solved in order to achieve the social unity necessary to attain the real goals of national development (DAC 2010b).

The National Planning Commission's *Diagnostic Overview* identified one of the key challenges facing South Africa as the fact that 'South Africa remains a divided society' (The

Presidency, 2011: 26). The *Diagnostic Overview* stated that these continuing divisions undermined the possibility of creating a social compact that would make social transformation possible. The document therefore argued that such a social compact could form the basis for 'meaningful consensus' in order realise the aspiration of healing the divisions of the past and achieving social justice (The Presidency, 2011a: 26).

The National Development Plan (NDP) identified 'Transforming society and uniting the nation' as a critical part of its vision for 2030 and as essential to reduce poverty and inequality. The plan noted that 'social cohesion and nation-building matter – both as an end-state and a facilitator' (The Presidency, 2011b: 413). The strategy to address the question of social cohesion incorporated three elements- reducing poverty and inequality; promoting mutual respect, inclusiveness and cohesion based on the Constitutional imperative that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, and that there is equality before the law. The third element referred to the notion of active citizenship i.e. citizens should have 'a deeper appreciation of their obligations and responsibilities to each other' (The Presidency, 2011b: 25). The overarching vision the NDP articulated for 2030 was that 'South Africans will be more conscious of the things they have in common than their differences' (The Presidency, 2011b: 414).

The NDP set out five long-term nation-building goals for South Africa. These goals were the following: Knowledge of the Constitution and fostering Constitutional values; Equalising opportunities, promoting inclusion and redress; Promoting social cohesion across society through increased interaction across race and class; Promoting active citizenry and broad-based leadership; and Achieving a social compact that will lay the basis for equity, inclusion and prosperity for all.

In the wake of the NDP a draft *Social Cohesion Strategy* was formulated by the Department of Arts and Culture, which was subsequently debated at a multi-stakeholder summit in 2012. The summit declaration stated that, 'we need as society to cohere around a vision of a better South Africa, the attainment of which would not be possible if we do not work together' (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012a: 3). The theme of the strategy, 'Creating a Caring and Proud Society', was based on the preamble to the Constitution which states the South Africa 'belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity', and the country's national motto, *!ke e:/xarra //ke*, which literally means *diverse people unite* (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012: 8). The *National Strategy for Social Cohesion* argues that one of the most important routes to social cohesion is through what it calls 'civic nationalism'. The Strategy states that: 'Making citizenship central to South African national identity means empowering South Africans to behave as citizens' on a number of levels.

The document differentiates between the related concepts of social cohesion and nation-building. It defines social cohesion as 'community based and located at a micro-social level', and defines it as related to 'the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression itself among

individuals and communities' (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012: 31). Nation-building is defined as a 'macro-social process',

> ...whereby a society of people with diverse origins, histories, languages, cultures and religions come together within the boundaries of a sovereign state with a unified constitutional and legal dispensation, a national public education system, an integrated national economy, shared symbols and values...to work towards eradicating the divisions and injustices of the past; to foster unity; and promote a countrywide conscious sense of being proudly South African (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012: 31).

The document identifies the following dimensions of social cohesion as being important: belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, legitimacy, shared values, co-operation and belief. It identifies a wide range of indicators to measure social cohesion: Slow Economic Growth and Transformation; Unemployment and Social Exclusion; Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion; Households, Land and Social Exclusion; Health and Social Exclusion; Uneven Access to Quality Education and Social Exclusion; Crime, Safety and Security; Gender Equity and Social Exclusion; Discrimination: Racism, Tribalism, Xenophobia and Social Exclusion; Youth Development and Social Inclusion, Perceptions of Corruption and Basic Service Delivery; Social Support, Active Citizenship and Identity.

Most recently the MTSF 2014-19 identified Outcome 14 as 'A Diverse socially cohesive society with a common national identity' (The Presidency, 2014b: 3). It states that the overarching objectives for the period until 2019 in relation to nation-building and social cohesion will be, 'reducing inequality of opportunity, redress, enabling the sharing of common space, awakening the populace to speak when things go wrong and to be active in their own development as well as engendering the knowledge of the Constitution and fostering the values contained therein' (The Presidency, 2014b: 3). It identifies the following sub-outcomes that will be measured on an ongoing basis based on the NDP's five nation-building goals, which are: Fostering Constitutional values; Equal opportunities, inclusion and redress; Promoting social cohesion across society through increased interaction across race and class; Promoting Active Citizenry and Leadership; Fostering a social compact.

4. Social cohesion and nation-building

The following section explores the concept of social cohesion and nation building. In South Africa, as in Canada and the European Union, social cohesion discourse crystallised at a time when the legitimacy of the political unit - the state, the union - was facing challenge. In Gramscian terms, the state's hegemony was struggling as popular consensus about the legitimacy of the system faltered (Rosell 1996:677; Jenson 1998:1; Chapman 2002:15). An obvious motive for all three governments to promote the abstract notion called 'social

cohesion' has therefore been to restore that hegemony: i.e., regain collective popular endorsement for the fundamental rightness and necessity of 'South Africa', 'Canada' and 'Europe' as geo-political units, based on the intrinsic social unity (or will to unity) of their territorial populations.

This onus of popular will is universal for governance in the modern world system. Given enhanced capacities for popular political action, governments can represent, lead and provide for a polity effectively only when the people agree to *be* a polity i.e., live under one government. Convening popular consensus about such unity was until recently analysed under the rubric of *nation-building.* In South Africa, this term persists in the rhetorical formula prevailing in government and ANC documents, 'social cohesion and nation-building'. Elsewhere, however, language about 'nation-building' has largely been replaced by discussion of 'social cohesion'. Since literature on nation-building enjoys several centuries of comparative study and philosophising from all parts of the globe, we might ask why a new term – social cohesion – has replaced it.

The most obvious reason is simply that nationalism, at least in the twentieth-century sense, has fallen out of favour and taken the term with it. In Europe especially, nationalism today is considered vaguely distasteful if not sordid, associated with chauvinism, racism, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, war and even genocide. The term 'society' seems to evade these negative connotations. In Canada, the term 'nationalism' is not so negatively associated but the concept of one Canadian 'nation' has been greatly complicated by French Quebecois ethno-nationalism and demands for autonomy by the country's many aboriginal peoples, who have collectively assumed the mantle 'First Nations'.[1] In both contexts, 'society' is a softer and more neutral term, eliding the entire question of multi-nationalism and suggesting a more inclusive and pluralistic social environment.

The effect of the semantic shift from 'nation' to 'society' is less sanguine, however, for it effectively imports the core assumptions and agendas of nationalism in new bottles while detaching them from the appropriate critique. The 'society' under consideration in social cohesion discourse is tacitly understood as the entire population within a state's territorial borders. Nothing in social cohesion literature interrogates whether these 'societies' actually make historical, social or political sense. As entities, they are merely accepted as the given units of analysis, dictated by the geography of the state as it emerged through a (usually war-pocked) history inherited by all. Hence the term 'society' in social cohesion discourse can usefully be read as a strategic discursive manoeuvre in importing the normative assumptions of nationalism without opening them to interrogation: i.e., that each country's territorial population *should* perceive itself as a social unit; that all its members *should* treasure their shared historical legacy and mission within a geographic state; that this inherited condition calls for solidarity in building a shared future; and that failure or refusal

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[1] Canada has some 630 registered aboriginal peoples that have prescribed rights and privileges under federal law.

to do so is aberrant, recidivist, politically purblind, anti-social, or some other problem to be corrected.

This focus on 'society' *cum* nation has led to another model for addressing social cohesion: interpreting it as *citizenship*. Here, citizenship is considered not just to involve civic behaviours, like voting, but to constitute a regime of rights and responsibilities: 'the institutionalisation of a political and cultural community and a partnership at the national level to solve problems that affect the whole country (e.g., defence, justice, health, the economy) ... the "willingness to cooperate" at the national level' (Jeannotte 2002). The special contribution of social cohesion discourse to concepts of citizenship is to recognise the shift from a *social rights* citizenship regime to a *social investment* citizenship regime, as discussed later.

In this nationalist mode, social cohesion discourse becomes concerned with collective identity: that is, what it means to be 'Canadian' or 'European' or 'South African'. Descriptors of social cohesion indeed correlate closely with standard descriptors of national identity: e.g., shared values and a collective vision of the future that ennoble the project of unity. In Canada, as noted earlier, these unifying values have centred on an enlightened concern for universal social welfare; in Europe, on progressive unification of a once-war-torn ethnic patchwork that will allow the region's economic fulfilment; in South Africa, on completing the transition from a regime of racial oppression to a pluralist non-racial democracy. Internal dissent about the flaws or wisdom of these unifying projects is acknowledged, but, again, such doubts are treated as obstacles to overcome, rather than a signal that the projects themselves may be flawed, unwise or at least questionable. Hence, social cohesion discourse is nationalistic in spirit and even urgently so, reflecting fears that fragmentation may wax bitter and evolve into centrifugal tendencies that will fragment the society and damage the entire polity, if not amended.

Since fragmentation in each case is likely to create trouble, and in the past has created bloody trouble, this nationalist subtext of social cohesion may well be welcomed as essential. But the semantic shift from 'nation' to 'society' changes the conceptual relationship of individuals to the larger unit. Studies of nation-building always recognised that the relationship between state and nation was actually problematic and that national unity must therefore build partly from romantic ideas that galvanised people's imaginations, fostered their cooperation with state imperatives (like war and taxes), and sustained their loyalty to the state through hard times. Given the vagaries of history, military service and tax compliance cannot be contingent on state services alone. Crises of any kind may require that citizens serve the state, and remain loyal to the *idea* of the state, even when the state cannot serve them and its demands may personally injure them: for example, when citizens are asked (or required) to risk their lives for the state's survival - recast in contemporary state rhetoric, of course, as the nation's survival, welfare, dignity and freedom. These old grim onuses of nationalism do not appear in social cohesion discourse, which invokes

normative and even romantic notions about solidarity but detaches that solidarity from the state's imperatives. Rather, the focus in social cohesion discourse is exclusively on society's imperatives on the material plane, mostly jobs, health, affordable housing and various public services.

This approach shifts responsibility away from the state, except as service provider, and onto society itself, as White observed of the Canadian government's Policy Research Initiative (PRI):

> If traditionally, social cohesion in Canada was promoted through a citizenship regime constituted, to an important extent, through the policies of the welfare state, these policies are now identified as having only a small, indirect influence on the production of social cohesion. The PRI model significantly broadens the perspective on cohesion, to include the roles played by institutions such as the market, the family, the justice system and public security, as well as the level and means of citizens' own social engagement in civil society. But in such a multi-faceted model, *social cohesion does not coalesce in a relation between citizens and the state*, as it traditionally did. Rather, it *flows from individuals in relation with each other*, whose behaviour is shaped by a multitude of social factors, many of them well beyond the reach of the state, and some, confined to the realm of individual responsibility. (2003:65, emphasis added)

This transfer of cohesion from state-society relations to intra-society relations has profound implications for democracy, if democratic institutions are no longer seen as the primary locus for citizens' engagement with social welfare and solutions to social problems effectively direct attention away from the state. Social cohesion discourse can even be a way to deflect responsibility from the state: e.g., the formulation of social cohesion as an 'ongoing policy issue' by Heritage Canada in 1996 correlated with major reductions in social spending (White 2003:63). In this light, efforts by Canada's Policy Research Initiative to restore withering state capacity through partnerships with non-state actors like universities and civic groups required 'social cohesion' to muster the requisite public spirit and commitment from the private sector. The same agenda calls for transfer of primary responsibility for social welfare to society itself. This orientation toward social self-help has inspired approaches to social cohesion as a form of social or human capital.

Chapter 2

Social cohesion and nation-building during the apartheid era

1. Introduction

It is widely held that the challenges South Africa currently experiences with regard to social cohesion and nation-building largely have their roots in the country's past. In its 1991 policy discussion document, *Ready to Govern*, which was subsequently adopted at the National Conference held in the middle of the year, the African National Congress (ANC) stipulated that:

> Our people remain divided. We do not know each other. We are prevented from developing a national vision in terms of which we would see our country through the eyes of all its citizens, and not just one group or the other. We live apart, physically separated, spiritually alienated, frightened of getting too close, knowing that we have different life-chances and different views of what change means. We are ruled by a multiplicity of fragmented departments, boards, councils and ministries. Apartheid has left us apart (ANC, 1991).

In a statement on nation-building, the ANC declared in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that: 'Central to the crisis in our country are the massive divisions and inequalities left behind by apartheid' (ANC, 1994). It is important, then, to begin with an analysis of these divisions and inequalities, which both undermined social cohesion and led to a situation in which opportunity was defined by race, gender and class.

Although these divisions and inequalities have a history much longer than the apartheid period in South Africa, our analysis proceeds from the point that, in our recent past, apartheid, by definition, institutionalised separateness and exclusion of the majority from the nation, and was characterised by the following key fault lines:

- **Lack of political and civil rights:** discrimination in the enjoyment of political and civil rights;
- **Segregation:** codification of racial segregation in residential areas, social spaces, education, etc.;
- **Racism:** widespread disrespect for the dignity of the 'other' and institutionalisation of discrimination;
- **Class divisions:** High levels of racial/class inequality and poverty;
- **Gender inequalities:** extreme gender disparities and marginalisation of women; and
- **Unequal access to socio-economic rights:** inequality in social spending for the different race groups
- **Liberation struggle:** the liberation struggle gives rise to racial divisions, armed conflict and widespread internal resistance;

- **Repression:** excessive repressive legislation giving rise to torture, detention without trial, imprisonment, etc.;

These fault lines are set out in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Key fault lines during the apartheid era

2. Lack of political and civil rights

Africa its electoral victory in 1948, the Nationalist Party moved rapidly to implement its policy of apartheid. Among the first acts to be passed was the Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950), which classified all South Africans into one of three categories: white, Native or coloured. Indians were classified as coloured at the time. The criteria used to determine the qualification into each of these categories was based on appearance, social acceptance and descent. The Act described a white person as one whose parents were both white, and was white in terms of his or her habits, speech, education, deportment and demeanour. Natives were defined as being members of an African race or tribe, and coloureds as people who were neither white nor Native.

At the time, Africans had already been denied or stripped of their voting rights through colonial subjugation which denied them all political rights, the Act of Union (the South Africa

Act passed by the British parliament in 1909), which only gave voting rights to a relatively small group of 'qualified' Africans in the Cape and denied voting rights to Africans in Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and the Representation of Natives Act (No. 16 of 1936), which stripped African people in the Cape of their voting rights and offered instead a limited form of parliamentary representation through special White representatives. By this time, only whites were allowed to be parliamentary representatives while blacks were denied any significant role in the executive and bureaucracy of the Union. The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation/Ghetto Act of 1946 granted Indians the right to elect three White (not Indian) representatives to the House of Assembly and one of two White senators to the Senate House. Among the first things the apartheid government did to extend the denial of political rights to black people was to pass the Separate Representation of Voters Act (No. 46 of 1951). This Act was designed to strip coloureds of their voting rights and remove them from the common voters roll. It provided for the creation of a separate voters' roll on which Coloureds would be able to elect White representatives.

In 1968, the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act (No. 50 of 1968) was passed, which provided for the establishment of the Coloured Persons Representative Council with forty elected and twenty nominated members. It had legislative powers to make laws affecting coloureds on finance, local government, education, community welfare and pensions, rural settlements and agriculture. No bill could be introduced without the approval of the Minister of Coloured Relations, nor could a bill be passed without the approval of the White Cabinet (Dugard, 1978: 98). The South African Indian Council Act (No. 31 of 1968) established the Council consisting of twenty-five members appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs. The number was increased to thirty members, of which fifteen were appointed by the Minister and fifteen indirectly through electoral colleges in the provinces (Dugard, 1978: 100). Unlike the Coloured Persons Representative Council, the South African Indian Council was not granted legislative powers.

The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (National States Citizenship Act) No 26 of 1970 obliged all Africans to become citizens of a self-governing territorial authority, making them aliens in 'white' South Africa. As such, they would henceforth only be able to occupy the houses bequeathed to them by their fathers in the urban areas by special permission of the Minister. African people were forced by residence in designated 'homelands' areas to be citizens of that homeland and denied South African nationality, the right to work in South Africa, etc. This was followed by the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (No. 21 of 1971) provided for the granting of increased powers to homeland governments, thus facilitating their eventual 'independence'. The Black Laws Amendment Act No 7 of 1973, which was designed to speed up the planning for partial consolidation of homelands, amended the 1927 Black Administration Act so that 'a removal order might be served on a Bantu Community as well as on a tribe or portion thereof' (Horrell, 1978: 205). Transkei became the first homeland to acquire 'independent' status in 1976, followed by Bophuthatswana in 1977. Other homelands became self-governing territories in subsequent years. The Republic

of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 established a tricameral Parliament with separate houses representing whites, coloureds and Indians. Africans remained unrepresented, and whites had overall authority.

The increasing erosion of voting and citizenship rights radically undermined social cohesion and the development of national unity in South Africa. These were to play a significant role in mobilising the black community in opposition to the colonial and apartheid authorities, giving rise to further divisions (see below).

In the meantime, a series of laws were in existence, dating from the late 19th century on, that denied various civil rights to black people. Included here are the Masters and Servants Acts of 1856, which illegalized strikes by unskilled workers (who were mainly black); the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No 21 of 1923, which led to restrictions on free movement of Africans into the urban areas of South Africa; the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 11 of 1924), which provided for, among other things, the exclusion of Africans from membership of registered trade unions, and prohibited registration of African trade unions; the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act No 19 of 1930, which authorised the Governor-General to prohibit the publication or other dissemination of any 'documentary information calculated to engender feelings of hostility between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand' (Dugard, 1978: 177); the Native Service Contracts Act of 1932, which extended existing controls over labour tenancy, allowing farmers to expel the entire tenant family if any one member defaulted on his or her labour obligation, to whip tenants, and compelled farm tenants to carry passes; the Industrial Conciliation Act No 36 of 1937, which extended the colour bar to trade unions; the Pegging Act of 1943which denied Indians the right to acquire or own property in an area reserved for the whites for a period of three years in order to protect white traders from competition from Indian businessmen; and the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation (Ghetto) Act of 1946, which replaced the Pegging Act and prohibited Indians from purchasing land from non-Indians except in specified areas and from occupying property in the exempted areas.

The apartheid government enacted a series of laws that impinged on the civil rights of their extra-parliamentary opponents in particular, such as the Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44 of 1950), which sanctioned the punishment of any group that did anything intended to bring about political, economic, industrial and social change through the promotion of disorder or disturbance, using unlawful acts or encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European races of the Union, to restrict or ban any person deemed to be pursuing communist activities. Under the terms of this Act, a banned person was confined to a particular district, was precluded from occupying an office in any trade union or political organisation, and prohibited from attending political gatherings. The Public Safety Act of 1953 granted the British governor general authority to set aside all laws and declare a state of emergency, thereby providing for the detention without trial for any

dissent. The Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 8 of 1953) which asserted that anyone accompanying a person found guilty of offences committed during protests or in support of any campaign for the cancellation or modification of any harsh law would also be presumed guilty and would have the responsibility to prove his or her innocence. The Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Amendment Act (No. 15 of 1954) empowered the Minister of Justice 'to prohibit listed persons from being members of specific organisations or from attending gatherings of any description without giving them the opportunity of making representations in their defence or furnishing reasons' and 'to prohibit any particular gathering or all gatherings, in any public place for specified periods'.

The Riotous Assemblies Act (No. 17 of 1956) allowed for the prohibition of gatherings in open-air public places if the Minister of Justice considered that they could endanger the public peace and for banishment as a form of punishment. The Unlawful Organisations Act (No. 34 of 1960) provided for organisations threatening public order or the safety of the public to be declared unlawful, leading to the subsequent banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The General Law Amendment Act (No. 39 of 1961) provided for twelve-day detention. The Indemnity Act (No. 61 of 1961) indemnified the government, its officers and all other persons acting under their authority in respect of acts done, orders given or information provided in good faith for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder, the maintenance or restoration of good order, public safety or essential services, or the preservation of life or property in any part of the Republic. This limited the rights of individuals who were victims of such acts. The General Law Amendment Act (Sabotage Act) (No. 76 of 1962) increased the State President's power to declare organisations unlawful and introduced further restrictions for banning orders. This Act created the offence of sabotage by providing that any person who committed any wrongful and willful act whereby he/she injured, obstructed, tampered with or destroyed the health or safety of the public, the maintenance of law and order, the supply of water, light, power, fuel or foodstuffs, sanitary, medical, or fire extinguishing services could be tried for sabotage (Horrell, 1978: 443). The Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1962) authorised indefinite detention without trial on the authority of a policeman of or above the rank of lieutenant colonel. It differed from the ninety-day and 180-day detention laws that came later in that the public was not entitled to information relating to the identity and number of people detained under the Terrorism Act (Dugard, 1978: 118).

The General Law Amendment Act (No. 37 of 1963) authorised any commissioned officer to detain – without a warrant – any person suspected of a political crime and to hold them for ninety days without access to a lawyer (Horrell, 1978: 469). The 'Sobukwe clause' allowed for a person convicted of political offences to be detained for a further twelve months. The Act also allowed for further declaration of unlawful organisations, which led to the proscription of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Poqo (Horrell, 1978: 416). The General Law Amendment Act No 80 of 1964 amended the 1963 General Law Amendment Act so that the operation of the Sobukwe clause could be extended in individual cases. Sobukwe was thus

imprisoned until 1969. The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (No. 96 of 1965), the so-called 180-day detention law, provided for 180-day detention and re-detention thereafter. The Suppression of Communism Act (No. 24 of 1967) prohibited certain persons from making or receiving donations for the benefit of certain organisations, prohibited others from practising as advocates, attorneys, notaries and conveyances, and extended the grounds for deporting people from the Republic.

The Indemnity Act, 1977 (No. 13 of 1977) indemnified the State, members of the Executive Council of the Republic, persons in the service of the State and persons acting under their authority in respect of acts, announcements, statements or information advised, commanded, ordered, directed, done, made or published in good faith for the prevention, suppression or termination of internal disorder or the maintenance or restoration of good order or public safety or essential services or the preservation of life or property in any part of the Republic. The Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act (No. 30 of 1974) redefined 'gathering' to comprise any number of persons. The Affected Organisations Act (No. 31 of 1974) provided for the declaration of Affected Organisations which were restricted from solicited foreign funds. The Second General Law Amendment Act (No. 94 of 1974) prohibited any words or acts intended to cause feelings of hostility between different population groups of the Republic. The Internal Security Amendment Act (No. 79 of 1976) removed the requirement that internment be linked with states of emergency, removed the 'Sobukwe' clause for indefinite detention, and included a new provision for indefinite preventive detention instead. The Internal Security Act (No. 32 of 1979) empowered the government to declare an organisation unlawful and to control the distribution of publications. Meetings of more than twenty persons were declared unlawful unless authorised by the magistrate. The Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act No. 74 of 1982) consolidated and replaced various earlier pieces of security legislation, but gave the apartheid government broad powers to ban or restrict organizations, publications, people and public gatherings, and to detain people without trial.

The civil rights of black people were restricted by other legislation. The Natives Laws Amendment Act of 1952 narrowed the definition of the category of Africans who had the right to permanent residence in towns in an effort to restrict their free movement into the urban areas. The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act (No. 67 of 1952) curbed African by introducing references book bearing photographs, details of place of origin, employment record, tax payments, fingerprints and encounters with the police. Africans could not leave a rural area for an urban one without a permit granted by the local authorities. The Natives Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 Act prohibited strikes by African workers. The Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act (No. 64 of 1956) deprived Africans of the right to apply to court for protection by means of an interdict or any legal process against any draconian laws imposed upon them by the government. The Industrial Conciliation Further Amendment Act (No. 61 of 1966) prohibited strikes and lock-outs for any purpose unconnected with the employee/employer relationship (Horrell, 1978:

279). The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No. 94 of 1979) permitted certain Blacks to join unions, but prohibited the existence of mixed trade unions.

3. Segregation

Segregation had a major impact on the conditions and factors that facilitate or obstruct people's ability to improve their lives. It led to significant social equalities in terms of race, gender and class, and consequent divisions along these lines that led to an absence of social cohesion. The consequence of spatial segregation in South Africa, for instance, has led to a situation where black people in general, and African people in particular, lived far from work, suffered long and expensive commutes; and lived in class-distinct black peripheries and inner cities characterised by poor and informal housing and environments. Spatial segregation also led to the development of local economies that are concentrated far from the poor majority (State of South African Cities Report, 2011, 47).

The cornerstone of spatial segregation during the apartheid era was the Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950), which restricted the African, Indian and coloured race groups to their own residential and trading areas. Members of these race groups were only allowed to acquire or occupy land or houses in areas specified for them under the Act. Scores of African, Indian and coloured households were forcibly removed and placed in racially-defined residential areas.

During apartheid, African people were forcibly removed from urban land and had no legal claim to land or property ownership rights outside of the homelands. Housing for African families was created on the periphery of cities, and access of African labourers to the city was limited. Transport services were designed to control access to urban areas, with commuter flows that brought people over the long distances in the morning and took them home in the evening. At the same time, the government invested heavily in road infrastructure for private vehicles and neglected public transport (State of South African Cities Report, 2011, 47). Very few economic opportunities existed in the African townships.

Spatial separation by race has also resulted in a large marginalized and impoverished rural population. The apartheid policy of segregation is also found in the homeland policy, introduced in 1951 with the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951). The intention was to restrict the entry of African people into the urban areas, while keeping South African citizens apart on a racial and ethnic basis. Eight ethnic homelands were established, and, after the passage of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, were to progressively move towards independence under the leadership of traditional leaders. Africans were expected to lose their citizenship and political rights in 'white' South Africa, and become full citizens of the 'independent' homelands.

The Natives Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and apartheid policies in subsequent decades resulted in widespread racially-based dispossession of land ownership rights. The Natives Land Act (No. 27 of 19 June 1913) had prohibited Africans from owning or renting land outside designated reserves (approximately 7 per cent of land in the country), while the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 integrated land identified by the 1913 Act into African reserves, and thereby formalised the separation of White and Black rural areas. Under the provisions of this Act areas in white South Africa where Africans owned land were declared 'Black spots', and the state began to implement measures to remove the owners of this land to the reserves. During the apartheid era about 3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their land to designated homelands. By 1994, African people in rural areas lived either on commercial farms (as farmworkers) or in communal areas under the communal tenure system. In 1994, 60 percent of South Africans were living in rural areas, while the migrant labour system resulted in the homelands having disproportionately large populations of women, children and pensioners (The Presidency, 2014a: 40).

The homeland policy allowed for the exclusion of a large proportion of South Africans from many social benefits that were given to Africans, whites, Indians and coloureds in 'white' South Africa. This is evident, for instance, in comparison of the poverty rates (or headcount ratio, i.e. the percentage of individuals living in the poorest 40 percent of households) in the 'independent' homelands, the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, with that of the rest of South Africa in 1993. Thus, while 92%, 73%, 67% and 63% of people living in the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, respectively, were living in the poorest 40 percent of households in 1993, 53 percent of individuals in 'white' South Africa were living in the poorest households (Budlender, 2003: 166).

Legislation was also introduced by the apartheid government to prohibit marriage between white and black people (the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Act No 55 of 1949), sexual relations between white and black people (the Immorality Amendment Act, Act No 21 of 1950), and use of amenities such as toilets, parks and beaches that are designated for use by members of a specific racial group by members of the other racial groups (the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, Act No 49 of 1953). Segregation was extended to the social realm. This was in line with prior legislation that was still in place, such as the Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act of 1941, which empowered the Labour Minister to instruct the Governor-General to require factory owners to allocate racially segregated work, recreation and eating areas for employees.

In the trade union sector, the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1956 ended recognition of trade unions with white, coloured and Indian membership. Trade unions with mixed membership had to cater exclusively for one racial group or split up into exclusive racial sections, each under the guidance of a white-controlled executive. The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45 of 1959) made provision for the establishment of separate tertiary institutions for Africans, Indians, coloureds and whites. Blacks were not allowed to

attend white universities unless with special permission by the government. The separation of these institutions was not only along racial lines, but also along ethnic lines. The University of Fort Hare was opened for Xhosa speaking students only, the University of the North in Turfloop was set up for the Sotho and Tswana students, the University of the Western Cape for coloureds in Bellville, while Indians and Zulus had their universities on Salisbury Island (later in Durban-Westville) and Ngoye respectively. Segregation in the political sphere was extended with the passage of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act (No. 51 of 1968), which prohibited non-racial political parties.

4. Racism

During apartheid, legislation was introduced to entrench the labour market system developed during the previous segregation era which restricted blacks in general and Africans in particular to low wage and low skill jobs, while whites had exclusive access to high-wage and high skill jobs. Africans in particular dominated the unskilled labourers, migrant and domestic labour sectors.

A series of laws were in existence, dating from early 20th century on, that restricted certain job opportunities to whites, including the Mines and Works Act (No. 12 of 1911), which permitted the granting of certificates of competency for a number of skilled mining occupations to whites and coloureds only; the Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 11 of 1924), which provided for, among other things; the Minimum Wages Act of 1925, which restricted certain jobs to whites; the Mines and Works Act (No. 25 of 1926), which excluded Indians from qualifying for certificates of competency for skilled jobs; and the Liquor Act of 1927, which denied employment of Africans and Indians by license holders by prohibiting them from serving liquor and driving liquor vans, and denied them access to licensed premises.

Job reservation was further entrenched during the apartheid era. For instance, the Native Building Workers Act (No. 2.7 of 1951) precluded whites from employing Africans in their homes to perform skilled jobs such as bricklaying and carpentry. In addition, unemployment was disproportionally high among the black population on general, and Africans in particular during the apartheid era.

Apartheid also entrenched a racial hierarchy, with whites at the top, enjoying the disproportionate share of political, social and economic rights, Indians below whites, coloureds below Indians, and Africans at the bottom. This, together with the restriction of Africans and other black people to the lower rungs of the labour, market, limited education and training opportunities for blacks in general, and Africans in particular, high levels of poverty and unemployment during the apartheid era among Africans in particular, etc., and notions of racial superiority prevalent among sectors of the white, Indian and coloured communities, gave rise to racial stereotypes and high levels of racism against Africans.

Nevertheless, racial stereotypes of all race groups developed during the apartheid era, but Africans were the major victims of racism. Stereotypes and racial abuse during the apartheid era further estranged communities from each other.

5. Class divisions

Race was probably the most significant feature of inequality in apartheid South Africa, with class corresponding closely to race. Blacks constituted the overwhelming majority of the working class, while the majority of whites were middle class or capitalist. Blacks constituted the overwhelming majority of the working class, while the majority of whites were middle class or capitalist. During apartheid, black South Africans in general and Africans in particular had been relegated to the bottom of the income and wealth distributions in the country.

One way to measure inequality is the Gini Coefficient, which ranges between 0, indicating complete equality, and 1, indicating total inequality. The closer the measure is to 0, the more there is equality in terms of the country's income. The closer it is to 1, the smaller the number of people who earn the bulk of the country's income. Table 1 below sets out South Africa's Gini Coefficient by race group between 1975 and 1991.

Table 1: South Africa's Gini Coefficient by race, 1975 and 1991

	1975	1991
African	0.47	0.62
Coloured	0.45	0.49
Indian	0.51	0.52
White	0.36	0.46
South Africa	0.68	0.67

Source: McGrath and Whiteford (1994), pp. 16-17.

Even during the apartheid era, South Africa's Gini Coefficient was among the highest in the world, dropping slightly from 0.68 in 1975 to 0.67 in 1991. When measured by race, however, the Gini coefficient increased dramatically for Africans between 1975 and 1991, and to some extent for whites. Thus, the most remarkable increase in inequality occurred between members of the African race group. There was a slight increase in inequality within the coloured and Indian race groups in the same period. Nevertheless, overall inequality in both periods was greater than inequality within race groups.

Another indicator of racial inequality during the apartheid era is per capita income for the various race groups during this period.

Table 2: Per capita income by race, 1970-1990

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Africans	R 3 134	R 4 479	R 5 107	R 5 423	R 6 008
Coloureds	R 8 184	R 8 630	R 8 822	R 9 855	R 11 404
Indians	R 9 595	R 11 244	R 13 296	R 15 113	R 17 637
Whites	R 39 217	R 44 242	R 46 670	R 48 370	R 51 951
TOTAL	R 9 936	R 11 626	R 12 125	R 12 385	R 12 903

Source: Van der Berg (2003), p. 11.

In 1970, the per capita income of whites was 12.5 times the per capita income of Africans. However, there was a progressive increase in the per capita income of Africans between 1970 and 1990. By 1990 the per capita income of whites was 8.6 times the per capita income of Africans.

Another measure of inequality is the share of national income of the different race groups. Table 3 below the share of income and the percentage of the population of the different race groups as a proportion of the total population of South Africa at various times.

Table 3: Income and population shares, 1970, 1980 and 1991

	Share of total income			Share of total population		
	1970	1980	1991	1970	1980	1991
African	19.8%	24.9%	29.9%	70.1%	72.4%	75.2%
Coloured	6.7%	7.2%	6.8%	9.4%	9.3%	8.7%
Indian	2.4%	3.0%	4.8%	2.9%	2.8%	2.6%
White	71.2%	65.0%	59.5%	17.0%	15.5%	13.5%
South Africa	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard (2007), p. 6.

In 1970, Africans constituted 70.1% of the total population of South Africa, but its share of the national income was only 19.8%. On the other hand, in the same year whites constituted 17% of the total population and held 71.2% of the national income. The African share of the national income grew to 29.9% in 1991, while that of whites dropped to 59.5% between 1970 and 1991. Nevertheless, the data in the table indicates that whites had a disproportionate share of income a few years before the first democratic elections in 1994.

The close link between race, class and inequality in South Africa during the apartheid era exacerbated other divisions that existed.

6.   Gender inequality

The ANC noted in the *Ready to Govern* policy document in 1991 that:

Gender discrimination has either excluded or subordinated women`s participation in all socio-economic and political institutions. Combined with apartheid, this has resulted in African women being the most exploited and poverty stricken section of the South African population (ANC, 1991).

The ANC also noted that the 'patriarchal system of law and land rights has deprived women of independent access to land and control over the product of their labour' (ANC, 1991). It added that: 'The provision of housing under the apartheid regime has doubly discriminated against women, with regard to allocation, systems of tenure and all the institutions controlling housing'.

Patriarchy and the oppression of women was encouraged by colonialism and cultural and religious practices, while apartheid further entrenched gender discrimination and introduced policies and laws that oppressed women. It is widely held that African women in particular experienced triple oppression in apartheid South Africa: they were oppressed as women, as Africans, and as workers. African women married under customary law were regarded as minors by the Black Administration Act of 1927 and placed under the tutelage of their husbands. They were denied contractual rights, direct property ownership and inheritance from their husbands and other family members, and also had no right to custody of their children. African women had few legal rights, little access to education and no right to own property (The Presidency, 2014a: 73). In addition, as women they had reproductive responsibilities and managed their homes if they were housewives (Hassim, 1991).

As Africans, such women were faced with the oppression that all African experienced under colonialism and apartheid – denial of political and civil rights, racism, living in segregated township dormitories, restriction to the homelands, low wages, etc. As such, the racial oppression that African women faced was similar to the racial oppression faced by African men. Thus, racial oppression became a rallying point to draw women into the liberation struggle, and from as early as 1918 African women began to play an important role in political organisations. Women became active as members of organisations constituting the broader liberation movement such as the ANC (Hassim, 1991: 68).

Many African women worked as domestic workers in mainly white suburbs, leaving families and children in townships and far away rural areas. Rural women mainly worked as agricultural farm workers or subsistence household gardeners in the homelands (The Presidency, 2014a: 73). A high proportion of women lived in the rural areas of the country, and constituted the bulk of the victims of poverty. In addition, female-headed households were more likely to experience poverty and be classified as poor. Gender inequity during apartheid was also reflected in income and unemployment levels. It was only through legislation introduced in 1985 and again in 1988 that rural African women were no longer legally considered minors in land related transactions in South Africa.

7. Unequal access to socio-economic rights

In its *Ready to Govern* document, the ANC stipulated that apartheid had led to a situation characterised by, among others:

> extreme levels of poverty and disease in the rural areas; the creation of urban ghettos where people have been denied even the most basic means of survival as a result of severely limited access to decent homes, electricity, water-borne sewerage, tarred roads, and recreational facilities; an education system preparing the majority of South Africans for lives of subordination and low wage jobs; a social security system geared almost entirely to fulfilling the needs of the white minority; [and] a health system that has seriously neglected the well-being of most South Africans (ANC, 1991).

Education was based on race during the apartheid era, and access to education and training determined in both racial and gender terms. The Bantu Education system in particular deliberately and explicitly aimed to ensure that Africans remained a source of unskilled labour for the economy. When it was introduced in 1953, it was premised on the statement made by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, that: 'The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour'. At the height of apartheid, white per capita funding on education was 10 times that of African learners. Just prior to the democratic elections in 1994 there were 19 different departments of education, each maintaining different standards and administrating its own examinations. There was also a huge backlog in public school infrastructure, with significant shortages of classrooms, libraries, laboratories, and sports fields at black schools, which also had shortages in access to water, electricity and sanitation. There were also very few opportunities for early childhood development for African children (The Presidency, 2014a: 40).

Table 4: Per capita education expenditure by race, 1953-1974

	Expenditure (white)	Expenditure (Africans)	Discriminatory ratio
1953	R100	R18	5.5:1
1963	R140	R12.50	11:1
1972	R220	R20	11:1
1974	R470	R29	16:1

Source: Phatlane, 2006.

During the apartheid era, the white and urban areas of South Africa had better healthcare services than blacks in general and the rural areas. Access to quality healthcare was especially limited in African and rural areas. Blacks in general and Africans In particular also bore the burden of disease, which mirrored racial and socio-economic inequalities. The life expectancy of white South Africans in 1990 was 69 years for men and 76 years for women.

By contrast, the life expectancy of Africans was 60 years for men and 67 years for women. There were 14 different health departments, including homeland administrations (The Presidency, 2014a: 40).

Table 5: Social spending on Africans and whites, 1949-1993

	1949	1959	1969	1975	1986	1990	1993
African share of social spending (%)	26	27	26	28	43	51	67
White share of social spending (%)	59	58	57	55	39	33	17
Per capita level: African % of white			11	15	29	37	59

Source: Van der Berg and Burger (2002), p. 9 and own calculations.

Whites enjoyed a disproportionate share of social spending between 1949 and 1975, while the amount spent on each African person was 11% of the amount spent on each white person in 1969, and 15% in 1975. The African share of social spending rose dramatically between 1975 and 1993, and the per capita expenditure on Africans also increased as a proportion of per capita expenditure on whites in the same period.

Social assistance (old age pensions, disability grants and child support grants) programmes during the apartheid era mirrored the racial inequalities in all other areas of inequality. Government pensions for the aged were introduced in the segregation era in 1928 for whites and coloureds, although the majority of whites benefitted from private pensions acquired on retirement from employment. In 1943, when about 40% of whites and 56% of coloureds were receiving government pensions, only 4 per cent of all social assistance spending was on Africans (mainly targeted relief and pensions for the blind), 1 per cent for Indians and 16 per cent for coloureds. The remaining 79% of social spending went to whites. Old age pensions were extended to Africans in 1944, a few years before the introduction of apartheid in 1948 (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2007: 31-2). However, African pensions were set at less than one-third of the maximum payable to White pensioners.

In 1958, Africans composed 60 per cent of the 347 000 social old-age pensioners, but received only 19 per cent of old-age pension spending. By 1978, Africans made up 70 per cent of the 770 000 pensioners and received 43 per cent of pensions. By 1990 this latter proportion had increased to 67 per cent (Van der Berg, 1999, cited in Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2007: 32). Discrimination in the provision of old age pensions was done away with through the 1992 Social Assistance Act. Disability grants, which had been introduced for whites and coloureds in 1936 and 1937, were extended to Indians and Africans in 1944. For a large part of the apartheid era social assistance was characterised by discrimination between the different race groups in terms of access to the grants and the levels of benefits (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2007: 32). Most importantly, virtually throughout the apartheid era very few African children and their caregivers qualified for the state maintenance grant. In 1990, only 0.2% of African children were in receipt of maintenance grants, while 1.5% of white children, 4.0% of Indian children and 4.8% of coloured children received the grant (Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2007: 33)

Another indication of exclusion during the apartheid era is found in the provision of basic services. In 1993, while 39% of all households in South Africa had access to piped water inside their dwellings, just under 100% of white households and 18% of African households had piped water in their dwellings. Similarly, while close to 100% of white households had flush toilets, this was the case for only 34% of African households. Almost 100% of white households had access to electricity in 1993, while only 37% of African households were connected to the electricity grid (Budlender, 2003; 176). The ANC noted in 1994 that about 12 million people had no reasonable access to water and about 21 million didn't have adequate sanitation. Only 36% of households were electrified, while about three million homes, 19,000 schools (86% of the total) and 4,000 clinics did not have electricity. About 17 million people were living below the poverty level, with about 11 million of these found in the rural areas (ANC, 1994).

Housing was delivered through a fragmented system of 14 race- and ethnicity-based administrations, while there were limited opportunities for black people to purchase and own land. By the 1980s, black people were living in overcrowded conditions, coupled with deteriorating municipal services and the growth of illegal informal settlements. The African townships had become increasingly dysfunctional and ungovernable due to civil protests and rent and service boycotts (The Presidency, 2014a: 40).

The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) noted that in 1990 there was a shortage of about 1.3 million homes, with about 200,000 households seeking a new home at the time (ANC, 1994). The ANC noted in 1991 that:

> The housing problems created by apartheid are many and varied. They include the racial fragmentation of our cities and the high correlation between housing poverty and race. A high proportion of the population has poor access to basic services such as water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity and there is a severe shortage of decent, safe and affordable housing. Much of the housing available to the poor is located in monotonous townships and under-serviced informal settlements far from places of work and poorly provided with community facilities, shops, affordable public transport and recreational facilities (ANC, 1991).

8. Liberation struggle

As indicated above, from 1910 the South African government enacted a series of laws to secure the economic prosperity of the white minority at the expense of the Africans' political and economic rights. The 1909 Constitution which led to the formation of the Union laid the foundations for these laws by institutionalising the status of black people as people with no political rights in South Africa. The laws included the 1913 Land Act, which stripped the African majority of the rights to land and thereby their livelihood, laws that further entrenched the economic deprivation of Africans by curtailing their right to free movement

to seek out a livelihood, the right to quality education and the right to seek political recourse in response to their unjust treatment. However, as the economic and political rights of the black majority in South Africa were increasingly eroded, they in turn intensified the struggle for economic and political freedom.

On 24-26 March 1909, the African Native Convention convened in Waaihoek location, Bloemfontein to discuss the draft Constitution adopted and published in February 1909 at the whites only National Convention. The Convention issued protests against the proposed colour bar in Parliament, demanded social respect and rights for Africans, Indians and coloureds and agreed to finance a delegation to England to garner support against the unjust Constitution (Marable, 1974: 405). In 1911, Pixley Ka I. Seme proposed the formation of the South African Native National Congress at a meeting of the African Native Convention, arguing that African should unite against the introduction of the unjust laws. The latter included the South Africa Act of 1990 and the Native Land Bill. The South African Native National Congress (later renamed the African National Congress) was formed on 8 January 1912.

The SANNC was the first organisation within South Africa to transcend ethnic divides reinforced by colonial domination and boundaries (Walshe, 1971: 34). In its early years it made several attempt to influence the colonial and Union authorities on matters affecting the African people. In March 1912, SANNC sent a delegation to Cape Town to meet with the Minister of Native Affairs and register their opposition to the Native Settlement and Squatter Registration Bill. In 1914, an SANNC delegation went to London to protest against the introduction of the Natives Land Bill. In December 1918, a petition was drawn up to be presented to King George that included numerous demands, including concern about the fate of British Protectorates considered for incorporation into South Africa, and a demand that such a decision not be taken without consultation with the inhabitants of these protectorates. Nothing came of these efforts, and this approach characterised the ANC's mode of operation until the late 1940s when it took a more militant stand.

By this time there were several other organisations taking up the struggle for the rights of the oppressed majority. Included here was the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), which had been formed in 1919 by the Natal Indian Congress (formed in 1894) and Transvaal British Indian Association (1903). The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA, later changed to the South African Communist Party in 1953) was launched in 1921. The All-African Convention (AAC), founded in 1935, was an organised body tasked with promoting African rights through boycotts that gave rise to the 'Trotskyite' Non-European Unity Movement in 1943. Like the ANC had done in 1926 when it called for the inclusion of equal rights in the Union's Constitution, the NEUM put forward a set of minimum demands for full democratic rights for the oppressed majority.

In 1949, a year after the Nationalist Party had come to power, the ANC adopted a radical Programme of Action, introduced by the Youth League, which called for direct action

through boycotts and strikes. This culminated in the 1952 Defiance Campaign (see below) that is reported to have resulted in the expansion of the ANC into a mass movement of 100,000 members. Later, in 1955, the Freedom Charter was adopted and became the ANC's policy document after the Congress Alliance was formed with Indian, coloured, and white progressives. This alliance later led to a split in the movement which gave rise to the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959.

The 1950s was a decade of increasing repression and erosion of the rights of the black majority. The latter responded with a wave of campaigns, including the Defiance Campaign, the Campaign against Bantu Education, the Campaign against the Pass Laws, etc. White and black were increasingly drawn into conflict with one another as a wave of militancy took root among participants in the campaigns. Matters came to a head in March 1960, when police fired on a crowd protesting against the pass laws outside a police station, killing 69 and injuring many more. On April 8, 1960, the apartheid government banned the ANC and PAC. Just over a year later, both organisations took up the armed struggle, as did other organisations such as the African Resistance Movement and the National Liberation Front. The ANC immediately embarked on a sabotage campaign, attacking government installations and buildings in a series of explosions, while the PAC engaged in several attacks on whites.

Repression forced leaders and members of both organisations into exile, and following the arrests of the leadership of the PAC during the 1960 anti-pass campaign and the ANC at Lillesleaf in Rivonia in 1963, the leadership of the struggle shifted to their missions-in-exile. Several leading figures of both the ANC and PAC were sentenced to imprisonment for decades. The thousands of young men who were forced into exile underwent military training in various African countries and countries in the Eastern Bloc, and attempts were made to return to fight in South Africa later in the decade. These were the Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns of the ANC, which were attempts to infiltrate through then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the PAC's Villa Piri operation through Mozambique.

The rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960s initiated growth in student, youth, community and women's organisations from the early 1970s and a growth in involvement in political activities. Similarly, the 1973 strike wave in Durban revived interest in the trade union movement and the growth of trade unions. The second half of the 1970s was shaped by the events and consequences of the 1976 Soweto uprising, which broke out on June 16 when African students protested against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. The uprising led to an exodus of young people from South Africa, and a growth in the refugee populations of Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia. Thousands of youths left the country to avoid arrest and persecution and to join the liberation movement in exile to contribute to the armed struggle. Many became active in the armed wings and other structures of the exiled organisations in the host countries. Their travels also took them to other parts of the continent, as well as to several countries in the Eastern Bloc, where they underwent military training.

By this time, there was a clear division and high level of mistrust between black and white, particularly since the white-led South African Police Force was at the forefront of defence of the apartheid regime against black 'terrorists'. By this time, as well, a rift had emerged between the traditional authorities and Black Consciousness Movement organisations, largely because of the role the authorities were assuming in the homeland system. Conflict between migrant workers and the youth in Cape Town in the wake of the Soweto uprising also heightened tensions between traditionalists and the youth. In addition, a rift developed between the ANC and the ethnic-based Inkatha cultural movement in 1979 that was to have dire consequences for unity of the oppressed during the 1980.

The events towards the end of the 1970s set the foundation for the escalation of the liberation struggle. The ANC also used these favourable conditions to re-assert its primacy in the liberation struggle, and increased the activity of its political underground and military wing during the early part of the 1980s. The efforts of underground members of the ANC, as well as thousands of other unaligned individuals, led to the emergence and growth of a large number of popular organisations, most notably student and youth organisations, civic organisations, women's organisations and trade unions. The introduction of a new political dispensation, which provided for political rights for Indians and coloureds, but not for the African population, stimulated resistance. The organisations which had emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s came together in 1983 to form the United Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum (NF). In the meantime, the expanding trade union movement also resulted in the formation of two large trade union federations by the mid-1980s: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). In the mid-1980s, violence broke out between supporters of ANC-aligned organisations and Inkatha in Natal, leading to 'black on black' violence that was to carry over into the next decade. The escalation of the internal struggle prompted a violent response by the state, and many of the actions of the popular and political organisations during the decade were met with violence. There was also a significant increase in armed actions of the liberation movements, the ANC in particular. By the end of the decade, it appeared that there was no possibility of any social cohesion emerging from members of groups fighting a liberation struggle, those defending apartheid, including the members of the South African Defence Force who were deployed in townships from the mid-1980s, and ethnic-based movements.

The 1990s began with the historic announcement on 2 February 1990 that the liberation movements were to be unbanned and Nelson Mandela to be released from prison. The period 1990-1994 was dominated by the negotiations for a new South Africa, the re-establishment of the liberation movements inside the country, and political violence. The latter included violence between Inkatha and ANC-aligned organisations on the Witwatersrand and in Natal, inter-organisational conflicts between civic organisations in the Western Cape, conflict between community organisations and local authorities, and conflict between vigilante groups and communities. At the same time, the ruling Nationalist Party

and ANC were competing for dominance in the negotiations process, further heightening mistrust between groups.

9. Repression

The apartheid era was characterised by intense repression, with the bulk of the victims being black and African in particular, and the bulk of the perpetrators white defenders of the apartheid regime, or the regime itself. Banning orders were used from the early 1950s to restrict many leaders of the liberation movement. Individuals banned during this period included Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, David Bopape, Ray Alexander, and Isaac Bongani (I.B.) Tabata. Banishment of leaders to remote areas was also used by the authorities to undermine political activity from the 1950s. Among those who were banished were Elizabeth Mafekeng, who was banished to Paarl in from Paarl to a remote government farm in the Kuruman district, Makwena Matlala, who was initially banished to Pretoria, was then sent to the Transkei, Kenneth Mosinyi, Nimrod Moagi, David and Boas Moiloa and Ramodidi Mokgatlhe, leaders of the 1957-58 Zeerust revolt, and Annie Silinga, who was banished to the Transkei.

Detention without trial became widely used from the 1960s, and in the early 1960s Basil February was imprisoned twice under the 90-day detention Act. Looksmart Khulile Ngudle was held in detention under this law from Monday 19 August 1963, while Imam Haron was in detention for 122 days in 1969. Deaths in detention also began in the early 1960s, with the first person to die in detention, MK commander Looksmart Khulile Ngudle, dying on the night of 4-5 September in Pretoria. The police claimed that he had hanged himself in his cell with the cord of his pajama trousers. Imam Haron, a respected leader in the Muslim community, was found dead on 27 September after 122 days in detention. Steve Biko died on 12 September 1977 as a result of brain injury after being beaten and tortured and then driven naked from Port Elizabeth to Pretoria. A further 18 people died while being held in police detention for political offences between April and November 1977, including Mapetla Mohapi and Wellington Tshazibane. Elijah Loza was held at the Victor Verster Prison and died at the Tygerberg Hospital in August 1977 after being taken there by the police. In July 1977, Phakamile Mabija died in detention in Kimberley's Transvaal Road police station. John Nchabeleng was killed by the police whilst in detention in 1986.

Torture became a key weapon of the security forces during the apartheid era. Both Looksmart Ngudle and Steve Biko died as a result of torture at the hands of the security police. Thenjiwe Mtintso was arrested in 1977 and tortured with a wet towel twisted round her neck. Elijah Loza died as a result of torture, as did Dr. Hoosen Mia Haffajee in March 1977. Walter Shandu died in detention in 1978 after being reportedly tortured in a South African police station.

From the early 1960s, as well, imprisonment on Robben Island was a fate that many members of the liberation movements were to face. Among these prisoners were Albert Shweni, a Poqo leader who was sentenced to 20 years on Robben Island, Nelson Mandela, Ahmed Kathrada and other members of the Rivonia Trialists, Elijah Loza, Christmas Mthinto and Mountain Qumbela, who were all active in SACTU during the 1950s, and Harry Gwala, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Stephen Dlamini, George Mbele, Albert Dhlomo, Frederick Dube, Msizi Dube and Griffiths Mxenge who were active in the 1960s.

Several members of the liberation movements were executed during the apartheid era. Included here were nine members of Poqo who were executed on 30 May 1967 for killing Morris Berger, a white shopkeeper in Wellington on 22 September 1962 during a march on Paarl, Vuyisile Mini, Zinakile Mkhaba, Jonas, Mpetse and Wilson Khayinga, the first MK soldiers to be executed by the apartheid regime, Washington Bongco, a senior member of MK who was executed in Pretoria on 10 December 1964, and Solomon Mahlangu, who was hanged in Pretoria in 1979.

Needless to say, repression had the effect of creating resentment against the apartheid system, as well as the perpetrators of the repressive actions. This worked against the development of social cohesion.

Chapter 3

THE CURRENT SITUATION

1. Introduction

Over the last two decades, concern has emerged about an apparent erosion of social cohesion in democratic South Africa. This 'crisis of legitimacy' perspective is indicated by diminishing public trust in government and the country in general. Public confidence in political institutions has become a subject of increasing interest for the HSRC in recent decades. Academic work in advanced democracies has shown the importance of understanding erosion of trust in politicians, political parties and central democratic institutions (see, for instance, Norris 1999; 2011). This scholarship research suggests that it is really critical to examine attitudinal trends over time to better understand how the corrosion of social cohesion unfolds. In this chapter we begin with the achievements of South Africa's democracy since 1994. This is followed by an analysis of the key fault lines during the democratic era with regard to social cohesion and nation-building. The chapter concludes with an analysis of social attitudes on issues that impact on social cohesion and nation-building.

2. The achievements of South Africa's democracy

South Africa's democracy is in its twenty-third year in 2017, and the nation has made several achievements since 1994.

South Africans have voted to elect their leaders every five years since April 1994, and all elections have been declared free and fair. The African National Congress (ANC) gained the majority vote in the first open elections of April 1994 and has been the ruling party in government since that time. The country's new constitution guarantees both basic freedoms and human dignity, and aimed to build an overarching national identity through common citizenship and equality before the law (The Presidency, 2014a: 78). The South African constitution is one of the few in the world that extensively enshrines second-generation socio-economic rights, including the obligation to improve the quality of life of all citizens through access to housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, and education (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 9). A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was convened in 1996 to investigate human rights abuses during the apartheid era. It has been stated that:

> This process of publicly acknowledging and confronting these details was a very necessary part of the process of healing the historic wounds. Together with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa and the Government of National Unity, the TRC helped ease South Africa into the reconstruction and nation-building process

and facilitated a smooth transition from apartheid rule to democracy (The Presidency, 2014a: 77).

The first years of democracy focused on creating unity in a country of great diversity. A national flag was enthusiastically adopted and the 'rainbow nation', a symbol of unity and social cohesion, was born. It has been noted that: 'In a diverse country that values its diversity, these symbols play a stronger role in forging an overarching national identity than in a country with a single cultural, religious or ethnic identity' (The Presidency, 2014a: 77).

When the common voters' roll was established for the first time just prior to the 1999 elections, equality before the law as envisioned in the 1996 Constitution became a reality. It has been argued that this was a major step in the country's nation-building project (The Presidency, 2014a: 78). Social cohesion and nation-building have both been encouraged by the introduction of 11 official languages, as well as policy and legislation to promote and develop these languages to ensure people are able to communicate in their language of choice (The Presidency, 2014a: 78).

South Africa has an independent judiciary, which has not hesitated to take decisions against the state. The country's Chapter 9 institutions, in particular the Office of the Public Protector, have also demonstrated independence as indicated by the latter's tackling of issues involving powerful individuals and organs of the state, such as the issue of the upgrades at President Zuma's complex at Nkandla and the recent *State Capture* report. South Africa has an independent media that is also not hesitant to deal with issues that involve powerful individuals and state organs (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 10).

Significant strides have also been made to address the key fault lines that existed in apartheid South Africa and impacted on social cohesion and nation-building. Living standards have improved dramatically since 1994 for a large sector of the population. Subsidised housing, electricity and piped water were rolled out to poor households under the ambitious Reconstruction and Development Programme. There has been significant growth in access to formal housing, clean water, electricity, sanitation services, and flush, chemical or pit toilets since 1994. Over 4 million subsidised housing opportunities have been delivered to more than 12.5 million South Africans by the government since 1994. The number of people living in formal housing increased from 64% in 1996 to 77.7% in 2011 (The Presidency, 2014a: 68).

Access to water (one stand pipe within 200 metres) increased from just over 60 percent of households in 1994/95 to over 95 percent of households in 2011/12, sanitation from just over 50 percent of households in 1994/95 to 83 percent of households in 2011/12, refuse removal from 55 percent of households in 2009 to 72 percent in 2013, electricity from just over 50 percent in 1994/95 to 86 percent in 2013/14 (The Presidency, 2014a: 71-2). In acknowledgement of a sea of poverty that persists in the democratic era, the government introduced free basic services for the indigent.

The government has implemented major policy reforms to redress past inequalities in education, transform the education system and increase the skills and life chances of all South Africans. A single education system has been created out of the nineteen different departments of education that had previously existed during the apartheid era. Race has been removed as the basis for attending school, and a new funding model was introduced to replace the race-based, inequitable funding model of the apartheid era. The government has also taken significant steps to increase access to early childhood development services, while access to Grade R (the pre-school year at primary schools) is almost universal (The Presidency, 2014a: 47). There have been significant increases in gross primary and secondary enrolment since 1994, as well as improvements in learner-to-teacher ratios, school infrastructure, and gender parity at schools. The government also introduced a no-fee schools policy, leading to 78% of learners (8 million) in 80% of public schools benefitting from this policy in 2012. In the same year, about 9 million learners were receiving a government-funded school lunch (The Presidency, 2014a: 48). The number of learners achieving university-entrance qualifications has increased dramatically since 1994, as well as the number of Africans adults who have completed Grade 12 (from 23% in 1994 to 64% in 2011). University enrolment has also doubled since 1994, and the government has increased access to universities by providing financial assistance (The Presidency, 2014a: 53-4).

Health reform since 1994 has made tremendous strides in eliminating inequality. The government has succeeded in establishing an integrated, comprehensive national service, driven by the need to redress historical inequities and provide essential healthcare to disadvantaged people. The new health system has the following features, among others:

- Primary healthcare, delivered through the district health system, instead of the earlier hospital-based curative approach;
- No user fees for primary healthcare, leading to an increase in access to primary healthcare, services, measured in terms of visits per year, increased from 67 million in 1998 to 129 million by the end of March 2013;
- An increase in the proportion of households using public-sector clinics from 44.5 percent in 2004 to 59.6 percent in 2012;
- A decrease in the proportion of people who go directly to public hospitals (without a referral from a clinic) from 24.6 percent in 2004 to 10 percent in 2012;
- A massive infrastructure programme that saw more than 1 500 health facility infrastructure projects being completed;
- The introduction of community healthcare workers organised into municipal ward based primary healthcare outreach teams and mid-level workers mainly for the benefit of under-resourced rural areas;
- The introduction of mandatory community service for healthcare professionals and improved remuneration levels for certain professional categories resulting in the deployment of over 44 000 community service health professionals to remote, rural and underserved areas since the introduction of community service in 1998; and

- The introduction of a number of measures to make drugs more affordable (The Presidency, 2014a: 54-6).

Land reform aimed at restitution and redistribution of land to black people was introduced. The democratic government enacted the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, which provided that a person, a deceased estate, a descendant or a community that had been dispossessed of land rights as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices after 19 June 1913 was entitled to lodge a claim for the restitution of such right by no later than 31 December 1998. About 80 000 claims for restitution were lodged before the cut-off date. A Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill was developed to extend the date for the lodging of claims for restitution to 31 December 2018 (The Presidency, 2014a: 63).

Affirmative action measures were introduced to accelerate black economic empowerment. Legislation such as the Employment Equity Act has seen a dramatic growth in the black middle class, with the highest Living Standard group (LSM 7-10) swelling by 4.7 million people between 2001 and 2010 alone (The Presidency, 2014: 43). The preamble of the Employment Equity Act stipulates apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices gave rise to disparities in employment, occupation and income within the national labour market. It is noted that those disparities create such pronounced disadvantages for Africans, Indians, coloureds, women and people with disabilities that they cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws. The EEA was therefore established to reverse the effects of discrimination of the past regimes, to eliminate unfair discrimination in employment and to achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative of the people of South Africa.

Macro-economic stability was achieved in the first years of democracy that reversed the negative growth of the last years of the apartheid era. The country was poised to reach 5% GDP growth that would absorb new entrants onto the labour market annually, when the global economic recession commenced in 2007.

The country's social grant system provides social protection for poor households and the unemployed. In 2014, some 16 million South Africans, including 12 million children, benefitted from government cash transfers. The social grant system is recognised as the government's largest and most effective mechanism of addressing vulnerability and poverty (Budlender, 2003: 183). Included here are the old-age pension, disability grants, and child-support grants. In addition to the removal of racial discrimination in benefits for old age pensions and disability grants, a child support grant was introduced in 1998 for indigent children and child-carers. By 2013, about 2.9 million people were receiving old-age grants, while 11.3 million were beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant and a further 1.1 million were people receiving disability grants, During the democratic era, the Unemployment Insurance Fund was extended to include domestic workers, seasonal farm labourers and other categories of workers that had been marginalised in earlier assistance schemes (The Presidency, 2014a: 45).

Public works programmes provide temporary work and life skills to alleviate poverty among the unemployed. In 2001-2, for instance, the Community Water Supply and Sanitation programme and Working for Water programmes each provided over one-million person-days of employment. The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism provided over 800,000 person-days of employment during the same period (Cited in Budlender, 2003: 183). The public works programmes were consolidated into the Extended Public Works Programme at the Growth and Development Summit of 2003. Upscaling of the EPWP resulted in more than 3 million work opportunities being created between 2009 and the end of March 2013 (The Presidency, 2014a: 46).

The country has made significant progress in reducing grinding poverty through a combination of social grants and improved incomes. The percentage of South Africans living below the poverty line has declined dramatically in the last decade (Statistics South Africa, 2014). The poverty rate decreased from 45 percent in 1993 to 38 percent in 2013, with social grants for the lower poverty line playing a significant role in this drop (The Presidency, 2014a: 43).

The ANC-led government has consistently sought to bring about gender equality in a number of ways (Weideman, 2004). In *Ready to Govern*, the ANC called for special emphasis to be given to the realisation of women's emancipation (ANC, 1991). The ANC's 1992 Land Policy document called for special procedures to ensure that women gain equal access to land and participate effectively in policy formulation and decision making (ANC, 1992). The Reconstruction and Development Programme stipulated that the envisaged 'land redistribution programme must therefore target women' (ANC, 1994). Included here was the need to review and amend tenure and matrimonial legislation and to provide support services and government assistance for agricultural production especially for women. The 1996 Green Paper on South African land reform expressed a clear commitment to end discrimination and ensure gender equity in land ownership. The Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution prohibits 'unfair discrimination' on several grounds, including gender. The 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy places considerable emphasis on gender equity in land access and effective participation of women in decision-making procedures (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).

The Constitution guarantees equal rights to women and men and requires the state and all persons to uphold the values of equality and to remedy the legacy of discrimination against women. The democratic government has also established the Office on the Status of Women (OSW) in 1997, the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), and the Ministry of Women, Children and People with Disabilities to promote gender equality. The amended Divorce Act protects women's property rights in cases of divorce and the amended Customary Marriage Act (2000) recognises customary marriages in favour of women, especially with regards to inheritance. Women are now also able to obtain a mortgage. The Employment Equity Act of 1998 has facilitated access to formal employment for women,

where employers are legally required to work towards more equitable representation based on gender, race and disability. Specific policies on maternity benefits and protection in the workplace have assisted women of child-bearing age to retain their jobs while supporting their reproductive roles. Violence against women and children has been regarded as a national priority since 1996 (The Presidency, 2014a: 74).

The ANC also took the step of promoting gender equity by guaranteeing 30% representation for women on its parliamentary lists. Women have been appointed to senior positions in the executive and the judiciary as well. In May 1996, Gender Focal Points were established within the South African government, and mainstreaming of women's issues became entrenched in state organs as a result of government policy on vulnerable groups. The ANC government also ratified the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in December 1995.

3. Lines of fracture

In the last decade there has been increasing reference to a range of perceived threats that potentially impede social cohesion. These include:

- **Racism**: sharp increase in acts of racism in recent years;
- **Class divisions**: increasing inequality and poverty;
- **Social fragmentation**: high levels of xenophobia and/or competition for resources with foreign migrants;
- **Language**: 11 languages associated with different race and ethnic groupings;
- **Exclusion**: growth in vulnerable and marginalised communities;
- **Gender**: women continue to be extremely marginalised;
- **Unemployment and poverty**: persistent high levels of unemployment creating an explosive situation; and
- **Unequal experiences of law**: members of vulnerable and marginalised communities and members of wealthy communities experience the law differently.

These lines of fracture are illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Key fault lines during the democratic era

3.1. Racism

There has been a surge in racist incidents in the past ten years. Included here are controversial Facebook and Twitter posts by Penny Sparrow, Justin van Vuuren, Velaphi Khumalo, Chris Hart, Gareth Cliff, and Andre Slade. The South African Human Rights Commission reported that from April 2015 to the end of the year it had received 470 equality-related complaints, and almost 270 of them were about racist statements. The commission received an average of 30 complaints of 'unfair discrimination based on race' a month for nearly a year. Gauteng people s ubmitted the most complaints at 121, followed by KwaZulu-Natal at 41, Western Cape 29 and Free State 25. Overall, the commission received 3 590 complaints from April to December 2015, the majority (13%) being equality-related.

The National Action Plan describes racism as:

> …an ideological construct that assigns a certain race and/or ethnic group to a position of power over others on the basis of physical and cultural attributes, as well as economic wealth, involving hierarchical relations where the ´superior´ race exercises domination and control over others. Racism is a denial of people´s basic human rights, dignity and respect. Its expression ranges from small, everyday acts of discrimination, through to barriers and omissions that may be inadvertently

established at an institutional level, to acts of threatening behaviour and violence (Department of Justice, 2015: 6-7).

Race is still one of the most salient lines of fracture largely because of the country's history of white minority rule and resistance to apartheid. The increasing number of racist hate crimes in the past few years illustrate this, and is indicative of the challenges the country still has in overcoming the legacy of its past. They also make it apparent that there are deep-seated feelings of inter-racial dislike and mistrust, which are often expressed privately and publicly in the form of harmful stereotypes. Besides the impact they have on race relations, racist hate crimes have a harmful effect on individuals and groups. Indeed, Mari Matsuda describes the impact on individual members of target groups when governments fail to do something about it as follows.

> To be hated, despised and alone is the ultimate fear of all human beings. … The aloneness comes not only from the hate message itself, but also from the government response of tolerance. … The government's denial of personhood by denying legal recourse may be even more painful than the initial act of hatred (Matsuda, 1989: 2338).

The development of a high degree of social cohesion so necessary to achieve prosperity and equity in South Africa requires that government gives legal recourse to victims of racism.

3.2. Class divisions

South Africa remains a highly unequal society, despite the efforts of the democratic government to reduce inequalities inherited from the apartheid era. The racial structure of inequality remains roughly the same as it was during that era, even though large numbers of blacks have progressed into the middle class.

Land reform was seen as one of the measures to bring about social justice in South Africa, both by returning land to those whose land had been seized by the apartheid state by 2005 and providing land to communities by redistributing 30% of white-owned commercial agricultural land to black South Africans by 2014. However, by 2014 all land claims had not been settled and less than 10% of the redistribution target has been achieved by the state. In addition, more than 90% of agricultural land transferred in terms of these two programmes was not being used productively (Kloppers and Pienaar, 2014: 678). Thus, this effort to take large numbers of African people out of poverty and unemployment has failed dismally, and no significant impact on the class structure has occurred because of land reform.

3.3. Social fragmentation

A wave of attacks on foreign nationals in May 2008 led to the deaths of more than 60 people and the displacement of thousands of foreign migrants in various parts of the country. During the course of the attacks shops owned by foreign nationals, mainly Africans

from other countries, were looted and many of their homes, properties and businesses destroyed. The reason given for these attacks was xenophobia on the part of South African nationals (Hadland et. al, 2008: 4). This was followed by another wave of 'xenophobic' violence in 2011, and almost every year thereafter there has been some incident in which foreign nationals are attacked by large groups. There is no reliable estimate of the number of foreign migrants in South Africa, because many are in the country illegally and are therefore undocumented. However, many put their numbers in the millions. Whatever the reason for the violence, which range from xenophobia based on dislike of African migrants, to competition between local residents and foreigners in the margins of formal society, the violence against foreign nationals is a serious threat to social cohesion in South Africa. It also undermines nation-building because many South Africans are disturbed by the perceptions of the country that it gives rise to.

Another sign of social fragmentation is seen in developments within the ruling party, the ANC, as well as between the ANC and its alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP. Beginning in the period that preceded the 2007 Polokwane National Conference of the ANC, sharp divisions within the ruling party became apparent. On the one side were the supporters of Jacob Zuma, the erstwhile former Deputy President who had been dismissed from his position by President Thabo Mbeki, whose supporters made up the other faction. President Mbeki was subsequently recalled from his position as President following the defeat of his faction at the Polokwane Conference. His supporters subsequently formed a new political party, the Congress of the People (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 11). Subsequent divisions in the ruling party led to the expulsion of the President of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema, and the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters. This, coupled with the intense competition for elected positions in local government structures that has led to the killing of many ANC leaders in KwaZulu-Natal in particular, are indications of fragmentation in an organisation which for many years found its strength in unity. More recently, opposition to the leadership of President Jacob Zuma – largely arising from charges of corruption – has led to a rift between the ANC and SACP, while COSATU has split because of opposing positions on Zuma's leadership.

Social fragmentation is also taking place at the local level, with members of coloured and Indian communities resisting changes in schools in their residential areas, members of communities in the townships and informal settlements competing for access to government-subsidised houses, and entire communities engaging in social protest due to poor service delivery and other issues. Other danger signs that could lead to greater social fragmentation are the recent calls by some politicians for landless South Africans to illegally occupy land belonging to white farmers (Kloppers and Pienaar, 2014: 678).

3.4. Language

The South African constitution (1996) recognises language diversity and the country therefore has 11 official languages. This approach to language is premised on the

recognition of the linguistic and cultural diversity of the country, and that equality extends to giving equal recognition to the languages and culture of all. In terms of the constitution, these 11 languages enjoy equal status, and:

> Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account— (a) equity; (b) practicability; and (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.

However, the language of instruction has become a major issue at several South African universities, particular former Afrikaans-medium universities such as Stellenbosch University and the University of Free State. At Stellenbosch University, for instance, the launching of the Open Stellenbosch movement in 2015 added impetus to the simmering debate about the language of instruction at the university. Language can be both a means of exclusion and inclusion. Those arguing for the introduction of English as a language of instruction stipulated that the exclusive use of Afrikaans excluded the increasing number of African, Indian and coloured students. Introducing English would be inclusive. Those opposing this position argued that this would lead to the increasing marginalisation of Afrikaans. The situation was extremely polarising.

At the school level, the main challenges lie in the partial compliance with legislation in force and the need for appropriate measures to guarantee language diversity in education. English is increasingly becoming the main language of instruction, to the detriment of African Languages and Afrikaans (Rio, nd). The African languages are further marginalized when it comes to the area of knowledge production, is carried out exclusively in either English or Afrikaans. The African languages do not feature in this area (Prah, 2007: 24).

Even in government departments there is a tendency to undermine the other languages. The language policy of the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), the government body responsible for the dissemination of government information and messages, stipulates the languages to be used when communicating with the public using different media and for different purposes. For instance, in cases of oral communication, including official proceedings, announcements, public speeches, conferences, etc., the GCIS will use English interchangeably with any of the official languages, depending on the purpose or the platform. However, all GCIS forms and annual reports and other strategic documents are published in English only (Government Communication and Information System, nd). This undermines the goal of establishing social cohesion through recognition of the country's diversity.

3.5. Exclusion

The 2008 global economic crisis had a major impact in South Africa, particularly on the poor and vulnerable sectors of society. In 2009, the country's economy shed over one million jobs, bringing the employment rate down from 45% to 43% (Westaway, 2012: 117). This had the significant effect of increasing the number of vulnerable and marginalised communities. One major vulnerable community is the rural community in the former homelands. In a study conducted on poverty in the former Transkei and Ciskei (Westaway, 2012), it was found that 73% of the rural people in the Eastern Cape were living on less than R300 per month in 2005/06, and more than half of them on less than R220 per month. 84% of this population were either unemployed or 'not economically active' in 2006/7, and were reliant on social grants. The average rural household does not have a single member who is employed, nor do they continue to benefit from the remittance of migrant wages earned in a city. Only 5% of the population of the Ciskei and Transkei are currently active migrants, and 60% of these do not remit money to their homes. Only 1% of rural households derive an income from crop production and only 4% from livestock production. 33% of adults are functionally illiterate. Two-thirds of rural households do not have access to RDP-standard5 water provision, while nearly half use dam, river or spring water, and another 15% have to walk more than 200 metres to communal taps. 52% of households relying on unventilated basic pit latrines and 34% have no toilet facilities at all.

Perhaps the most vulnerable group in South Africa are child-headed households. It is assumed that the HIV/Aids epidemic has given rise to many child-headed houses in situations where both parents have died and relatives are unable or unwilling to take care of the orphaned children. However, most children living in child-headed households have two living parents (61%) and 80% have a living mother. Only 8% are double orphans. Most double orphans live in households with adults, suggesting that kinship networks continue to provide care for these children. Only 1.5% of children who are double orphans live in child-headed households (Meintjies et.al, 2009).

In child-headed households, the household is led by the eldest, who is nevertheless a minor, and all the members of the household are younger than eighteen years. An analysis of the 2006 General Household Survey found 0.67% of children (122 000 children out of 18.2 million) living in child-headed households. Almost half (44%) of child-headed households consisted of only one child, while the majority had between one and three members. Over half (55%) of the children living in child-headed households were 14 or older. In the vast majority (88%) of child-headed households there was at least one child who was 15 or older. Twenty nationally representative surveys spanning the period 2000-2007 indicate no increase in the proportion of children living in child-headed households (Meintjies et.al, 2009).

Children in child-headed households live in conditions that are on average worse than those in mixed-generation households. Child-headed households are less likely to live in formal

dwellings, or to have access to adequate sanitation and water on site. This is partly because they are disproportionately located outside of cities, where better services are available. Very few children in child-headed households are working to earn income (6% of child-headed households have an employed household member over 15 years). Social grants are an important source of income for millions of people in South Africa (Meintjies et.al, 2009).

Almost half (49,7%) of households headed by younger youth (aged 15–24) did not have any employed members compared to 18,9% of households headed by older youth (Statistics South Africa, 2014a: 1). As children in child-headed households are older, on average, than in mixed-generation households, fewer children fall within the eligible age threshold for child support grants (up to 14 years). In addition, there are no pensioners living in these households. This means that child-headed households will have less access to income support through social grants. Remittances – money sent by family members or other adults living elsewhere – are the main source of income for child-headed households (77%). This suggests that the majority of children living in these circumstances are not forced into self-sufficiency and do have some kind of support. However, the reliance on remittances in the absence of earnings and grants means income may be unreliable. The vast majority of children in child-headed households attend school (95%). This is the same attendance rate as reported for children in mixed-generation households. Child-headed households are at risk of having to cope not only without adults, but also with poorer living conditions than other children. They lack regular income from earnings and social grants, and are disproportionately located in non-urban areas, where service delivery is poor (Meintjies et.al, 2009).

Another vulnerable group that is largely excluded are lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons who have historically faced and continue to face discrimination and violence around the world. South African LGBT youth face homophobia in their daily lives. Cultural norms and mores strongly influenced by conservative traditionalism and male patriarchy are a peculiar challenge that African LGBT youth have to face. Traditional beliefs combined with homophobic stereotypes have resulted in traumatic experiences for lesbian and gay youth in South Africa. Young lesbians have been raped by males claiming to be 'teaching' them to be real women or 'curing' them of lesbianism. Several have been murdered. Young gay men are beaten by other males in order to make them 'real men'. Isolation is thus a key issue confronting many LGBT youth, resulting in mental health ramifications such as internalized homophobia, suicidal ideation, and lowered self-esteem. LGBT youth experience deeply entrenched homophobia within their school contexts. Curriculum content also does not explicitly address LGBT issues or the particular needs of queer youth. Literature written by and for black LGBT youth in the black languages of South Africa does not exist (Butler and Astbury, 2005).

3.6.   Gender

The ANC acknowledged in 2012 that there are several challenges in its efforts to institutionalise gender equity since 1994. It noted that the gender machinery that has been established inside government has been unable to adequately address women's issues because the gender machinery framework has not been legally binding and because gender programmes in Government Departments are often not properly institutionalized in terms of location, level of authority, influence, accountability, integration, allocation of resources and perceived importance (ANC, 2012: 4). The consequence is that women continue to bear the burden of inequality, because there has not been a 'redistribution of resources and power in ways that change the structural forces on which women's oppression rests'. Women continue to be under-represented as a percentage of the employed (43.6% compared to 56.4% for men in 2011), and bear the burden of unemployment (28% unemployed compared to 22.5% for men in 2011). A high percentage of women undertake low-skilled, low wage employment, mainly in domestic labour and home-based care. They remain consistently under-represented in high-skills, high-wage employment (ANC, 2012).

A large proportion of women operate in the informal sector, with 57% of them found in this sector. Female headed household are generally much poorer than men, particularly in the rural areas. Many women continue to rely on their spouses, immediate family members, relatives or friends for survival. This often leads to a loss of independence, dignity and being forced to remain in abusive relationships. Almost half of women over the age of 60 years of age are widowed compared to less than 15% of men, with many female pensioners responsible for raising families. Female-headed households continue to be disproportionately affected by poverty. There has not been an increase in men's participation in unpaid work, and women continue to spend too many hours on domestic work. Women-owned businesses remain weaker than male-owned businesses because they are usually smaller, less formal and operate in more vulnerable sectors, especially in trade, catering and accommodation. Women continue to be marginalized and discriminated against in terms of economic opportunities, the labour market as well as access to land, credit, and finance. They continue to have ownership of a very minute percentage of agricultural land (ANC, 2012).

A major challenge to gender equality was the Traditional Courts Bill, which was introduced in 2008 and in 2012, but lapsed in Parliament in 2014. The Bill would have made it an offence for people not to appear before a traditional court when summoned by a traditional leader, denied people living under traditional councils the option of using state courts, and given decisions of the traditional courts the legal status of rulings by the magistrates' courts (Thipe, 2014: 2). This would have made rural women in particular vulnerable to this male dominated structure.

3.7. Unemployment and poverty

South Africa continues to experience high levels of unemployment. Africans are the most affected by the country's low rate of employment. 38% of African households in 1999 contained no employed people, an increase of 6% in 1996, leaving 3.1 million households workerless. In 2003, 56% of the unemployed were aged 30 years or younger; whilst 15-24 year olds comprised 30% of the total unemployed. Only 29% of new African labour market entrants between 1995 and 1999 were able to find work, compared to 50% of Indians, 70% of coloureds, and 75% of whites (Akoojee and McGrath, 2005: 13). South Africa's unemployment rate fell to 26.5% in the last three months of 2016. 48% of youth between the ages of 15 and 35 were unemployed in 2016, which is worse than the situation in 2003.

In the first quarter of 2016, the share of unemployed Africans with less than matric was 58.1%, with a matric was 33.7%, with other tertiary 6.2% and who were graduates it was 1.6%. By contrast, the share of unemployed whites with less than matric was 34.2%, with a matric was 40.4%, with other tertiary was 15.7% and who were graduates was 8%. The unemployment rate for Africans in 2016 was 30.1%, compared to the national employment rate of 26.7%. The employment rate for coloureds was 23.6%, for whites 7.2%, and Indians 12.5%. The unemployment rate for youths between the age of 15 and 24 was 54.5%, and for 25 to 34 years it was 31.2% (Statistics South Africa, 2016).

Poverty remains prevalent in South Africa, with it disproportionally prevalent in the African community. Approximately half (48.5%) of all South Africans live in households that has a per capita income of less than R570 per person per month (ANC, 2012: 16). In 2002/3, it was generally agreed that between 45 and 55% of the South African population was poor and between 20 and 25% were living in extreme poverty. 95% of poor people were African in 1999, while the poverty rate amongst female-headed households in 1995 was 60%, double that for male-headed households (Akoojee and McGrath, 2005: 11).

In 2011, there were 23 million poor people in South Africa, 10 million of which are living in extreme poverty. 45% of South Africans were deemed to be poor. The majority of those living in poverty are black, at 54%, followed by coloureds at 27%, Indians at 3.4%, and whites at 0.8%.

3.8. Unequal experiences of law

Access to justice in South Africa is based on the principle that all people should enjoy equality before the law. However, high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality lead to a situation where many people are vulnerable, and their 'socio-economic and historical conditions … affect their ability to bring a case before a court or another independent and impartial tribunal or forum established to resolve disputes' (Nyenti, 2013: 912). Nyenti identifies the following barriers to access to justice for vulnerable people:

…poverty; geographic location of adjudication institutions; physical inaccessibility of adjudication institutions; lack of knowledge of rights (also due to illiteracy); inappropriate dispute resolution institutions and mechanisms; procedural hurdles; and delay in the resolution of disputes (Nyenti, 2013: 913).

Poverty renders recourse to legal representation prohibitive for most African people. In addition, courts are often located far from where most African people reside, making access to justice difficult for many. Many South Africans do not have knowledge of the law and their rights, which is a prerequisite to approaching a court or tribunal to seek redress. The absence of alternative avenues for dispute resolution for cases that most poor people require legal recourse, cases related to their socio-economic rights, has an adverse impact on the right of access to justice (Nyenti, 2013).

By contrast, those South Africans with means are able to access justice more readily than vulnerable South Africans, because they are able to afford legal representation, travel to courts, and have more knowledge of the law and their rights. It is also much easier for a middle-class victim of crime to get to a police station to report their case to the police, insist that it be investigated, and follow up to ensure that the case receives attention. This is more readily the case with white South Africans than with the overwhelming majority of black South Africans, and Africans in particular. In addition, those communities on the margins of society are serviced by notoriously under-resourced police stations or by no police stations at all. By contrast, middle class communities have historically been serviced by well-resourced police stations. The consequence is that poor people are less likely to experience success in criminal investigations on their cases than would be the case of members of the middle class.

These unequal experiences of the law have eroded trust in the criminal justice institutions, including the police. This is largely a consequence of the daily experience of citizens in their interactions with the criminal justice system (Gould, 2014). In addition, vulnerable communities have increasingly become victims of policing techniques characteristic of the apartheid era. Despite legal provisions against such practices, there has been an increase in police using violence during interrogations and conducting searches of people and their property without probable cause (Pruit, 2010).

4. Measuring Social Cohesion

This section builds on a preliminary review of the literature on social cohesion, as well as findings from our South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series and interactions with policymakers on existing social cohesion programmes. The HSRC has conducted several studies on social cohesion and this section in particular draw on findings from these reports as well as other data sources (Struwig et al. 2011). Based on this research on social cohesion

we present a conceptual framework for a multidimensional tool for understanding and measuring social cohesion. Using the conceptual framework as a guide we present preliminary findings on key social cohesion indicators. A more comprehensive set of results will be included in the First Draft Report on Social Cohesion.

Our preliminary review of the literature is briefly summarized in the introductory chapter. This review showed that there is very little agreement about what social cohesion is. Kearns and Forrest (2000) also found that the definition and measurement of social cohesion differs among disciplines and research topics and is often considered to be vague and abstract. It was established that Jenson (1998) was the first to elaborate on five dimension measuring social cohesion namely: (1) affiliation/isolation (the sharing of common values, feelings of belonging); (2) insertion/exclusion (opportunities to share in the labour market); (3) participation/passivity (involvement and participation in public affairs); (4) acceptance/rejection (tolerance regarding differences); (5) legitimacy/illegitimacy (how adequately the various institutions represent the people and their interests).

Figure 3: Social Cohesion Barometer Conceptual Approach

Bernard (1999) build on Jenson's work and constructed a framework based on the domains of activity (economic, political and socio-cultural) and on the formal/attitudinal or substantial/behaviour characteristic of the dimensions. The conceptual framework presented here adopted Bernard's conceptualisation, identifying three domains to be considered when researching or analysing social cohesion (Figure 1). The first domain discusses issues of economic development and fosters strategies to reduce wealth disparities. The second domain, the socio-cultural domain incorporates issues of social capital, trust, tolerance and shared identities. The third domain, the political or civic domain, discusses issues relating to common values and a lively civic culture. It also refers to a society in which social disorder is absent and social control mechanisms are established. The

conceptual framework also distinguishes between passive relationships (attitudinal) and active relationships (behavioural) which evolves to social integration (or inclusion).

Economic Domain

Based on an extensive literature review, our previous study (Struwig et. al., 2011) employed the Turok et al. (2006) model for the Economic Domain to investigate economic realities and the perceptions of redress measures on social cohesion (Appendix A). Turok et al. (2006) considered employment, income, education and housing as preconditions of social cohesion. These indicators were therefore included as the Economic Domain indicators (variables). In addition, questions on redress of basic services, labour market redress action, and affirmative action were also included as part of the Economic Domain indicators. It was expected that the Economic Domain indicators would be influenced by the demographic variables (such as the gender and race group of the respondent).

In this section we only highlight findings from some of the economic domain indicators. It should be emphasized that we are not reporting the results of all the identified economic domain indicators in Appendix A. However, we only highlight results for one or two key economic social cohesion indicators. In specific, we provide public opinion data on South Africans perceptions with regards to 1) their household circumstances, and 2) access to basic services such as water and electricity.

Civic Domain

Over the last two decades, a groundswell of concern in the international political sciences community about an apparent erosion of the foundations of citizenship and democracy has emerged. This 'crisis of democratic legitimacy' perspective is typically underpinned by a raft of indicators suggesting diminishing electoral participation, declining public trust in government, a loss of social capital, weakening interpersonal trust, and mounting public discontent and disaffection (Dionne, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Franklin, 2004; Wattenberg, 2002; Macedo et al., 2005; Torcal & Montero, 2006; Van Deth et al., 2007). This has resulted in a broad ranging set of initiatives and reforms directed at rebuilding the relationship between citizens and the state. These have included measures focused on promoting greater opportunities for the direct engagement of citizens in decision-making processes, and the strengthening of state accountability and transparency (Norris, 2011).

Drawing on our conceptual model in addition to the emerging international consensus around multidimensional social cohesion (Jensen, 1998; Bernard, 1999; Duhaime et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006;), two broad distinctions in our approach to measuring civic cohesion are retained and employed, namely the dichotomies between (i) political legitimacy and illegitimacy, which focuses primarily on public confidence in public and private institutions;

and (ii) participation and passivity, which includes indicators of involvement in different forms of political activities and membership of organisations

The first component measuring civic cohesion, national identities, represents the most general set of attitudes towards belonging or attachment to the state, with common survey-based measures and indicators including national pride, patriotism and feelings of national identity (Appendix B). These indicators also form part of the development indicators for social cohesion that are being used for monitoring purposes by the South African Presidency. The second dimension of support - approval of regime principles and values - addresses support for fundamental democratic principles and values. The third level is evaluations of regime performance, and is conceived as the views of citizens towards the democratic performance of the government, as well as assessments of decision-making processes, policies and policy outcomes. Fourthly, confidence in regime institutions refers to trust in public sector institutions, most notably in Norris' view the levels of public support for the government legislature, executive, the judiciary and courts, the security forces, the different tiers of government (national, provincial, local), civil service, in addition to political parties. The last level of support recognised by Norris (2011) is the approval of incumbent office-holders, which entails public attitudes towards the president, ministers, party leaders and elected representatives. Coverage in pre-existing surveys in South Africa is mixed on this component. Both Afrobarometer and the World Values Survey ask about confidence in the President, while SASAS asks about politicians, but very few other variables are commonly available.

These largely behavioural components have been effectively integrated and supplemented with attitudinal indicators by Hoskins & Mascherini (2009: 468-469) in their framework for measuring active citizenship, which includes four principal dimensions, specifically (i) protest and social change, (ii) community life, (iii) representative democracy, and (iv) democratic values. The protest and social change dimension entails protest activities (signing a petition, participating in a lawful demonstration, product boycotts and ethical consumption) alongside membership, participation, volunteering and/or donations in respect of human rights organisations, environmental organisation or trade unions. Secondly, the community life dimension is conceived as consisting primarily of membership, participation, volunteer work and/or donations with reference to different types of community organisations (religious, business, cultural, social, sport and parent-teacher organisations). Thirdly, representative democracy focuses mainly on engagement in political parties (membership, participation, donating money or voluntary work), as well as electoral turnout. Lastly, the democratic values pillar has at its core citizenship norms, which include the importance that citizens attach to different attributes of what it means to be a 'good citizen', and tap into aspects of participation, autonomy, social order and solidarity (Pattie et al., 2004; Dalton, 2006a, 2008a; Coffé & van der Lippe, 2010). Apart from citizen norms, the authors also include inter-cultural understanding and human rights values as notable aspects.

It is beyond the scope of this report to present the results of all the above listed indicators (see Appendix B). We therefore only present some key civic indicators such as 1) Public Satisfaction of their Government in the Performance of Selected Basic Services; 2) Public Trust in Selected Political and Judicial Institutions in South Africa; and 3) Public Confidence in Traditional Authorities/leaders in South Af1rica; 4).

Socio-cultural domain

In the South African context cohesion within the socio cultural domain must be conceptualised in a broad, democratic and progressive way and should include principles of unity, non-racialism, and non-sexism, which formed the core of the national liberation struggle and are now central to the Constitution (Dexter, 2004). The common purpose should be to unite around a progressive, non-racial, non-sexist and pro-poor society. Although these principles should prevail in any democratic dispensation, it is particularly challenging to uphold in South Africa, partly because of a history that promoted social exclusivity, social antagonism and social isolation. As people tried to adapt to forced segregation during the Apartheid era, institutions such as the family, communities, cultural life, values and attitudes were forcibly changed. Practices of community (Pillay, 2008) showed tendencies of increased fragmentation rather than unification', i.e. the ways in which people cohered were not necessarily 'positive' or inclusive. Insular forms of cohesion were common, with people defining themselves in defensive relation to an 'other'. Social ills such as the breakdown of authority of parents and caretakers, domestic violence and abuse, low performance, high crime rate, violence, alcohol and drug abuse were some of the social ills resulting from families that were torn apart by apartheid policies. Both proponents and opponents of apartheid were shaped by these forces, which still dominate our society today where patterns of racism, inequality, underdevelopment and distrust remain evident. Social cleavages based on race, gender, class and geography linger as a reality. In our previous study we have used a number of indicators to measure Social Cultural Cohesion (Struwig et. al. 2011) (see Appendix C). The first measure of social cohesion included in the socio-cultural domain is a measure of social networks.

> *Theorists Putnan (1993), Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Kingdon and Knight (2001) suggest that by measuring the membership of voluntary organisations, social capital or consecutiveness can be determined. Social solidarity or social connectedness is produced in and through voluntary associations that generates mutual obligations and trust between members.*

Where many citizens are involved in civic bodies, social trust and neighbourliness is good; where the density of voluntary associations was low, so was the amount of social capital (*Chipkin, 2010)*. Other indicators included in this domain were questions on discrimination and tolerance. Tolerant societies where discriminatory practices are minimal are generally seen as progressive and generally cohesive. Questions measuring levels of discrimination and tolerance were thus included in the measurement of the socio-cultural domain. In addition to measuring attitudes on discrimination and tolerance, a measure measuring intergroup contact, more specifically contact between different race groups and contact with

foreigners was also included. These questions were included since one of the most cited and agreed upon suggestions of overcoming hostilities between groups is regular interaction among the groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Given that literature is clear that crime, or specifically fear of crime, impacts severely on social cohesion (Jackson, 2004, Roberts, 2011, Ross and Jang, 2000) a fear of crime measure (consisting of a set of questions) was also included in the socio-cultural domain. In addition, the personal well-being index was also included. The personal well-being index (PWI) gives a good overview of satisfaction with life in terms of financial security, achievements in life, safety, standard of living, life as a whole, feeling part of a community, health, personal relationships and religion.

As in the case of the Economic Domain we do not report the results of all the Social Cultural Domain indicators listed in Appendix C. In the results section we only report on public perception with regards to levels of trust between people and between the different major racial groups. This section also examines perceptions of foreigners and traditional authorities.

Methodological and Measurement Approach

Data utilised

In the previous section we indicated that we will examine a few social cohesion indicators for each of the Social Cohesion Domains. To examine public opinion with regards to the identified social cohesion indicators we analysed the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data from 2003 to 2015. The SASAS survey is conducted annually and covers a wide range of topics, such as attitudes about democracy and governance, service delivery, race relations, crime, moral issues, and poverty. The survey is designed to yield a representative sample of adults 16 years and older and when weighted represents the views of all South Africans 16 years and older.


SASAS Fieldworkers

Our analysis of the social cohesion indicators in this chapter is based on basic descriptive statistics such as cross-tabulating the domain indicators with socio-demographic background variables. In other words, the indicators were cross-tabulated with the categories of the demographic variables (race, age, gender, and geographic location).

Key Social Cohesion findings

Economic Domain

Since poverty is likely a reflection of multiple forms of deprivation in an individual's life, it is important to explore multidimensional subjective poverty measures. The measure proposed by Alkire and Foster (2011) involves identifying a subjective deprivation cut-off for different dimensions of poverty and then these cut-off points can be used to determine subjective poverty. The different domains are: food consumption, housing, clothing, health care and children's schooling. The Alkire and Foster method, therefore, requires asking if the respondent's household has less than adequate access to each of these domains. This method was employed by Statistics South Africa (2012) in a recent study using the Living Conditions Survey 2008/2009. The subjective multidimensional poverty measures suggested by Alkire and Foster were included in the South African Social Attitudes Survey 2015 round, allowing an updated version of multidimensional subjective poverty to be displayed **Figure 3**.

Figure 3: Multidimensional Subjective Poverty in South Africa by Gender, 2015

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey 2015

The data presented in the figure showcases how South Africans self-assess their own needs and suggests the general sense of deprivation felt by many in the country. The results show

Figure 4: Attitudes towards Economic and Class Conflict amongst Economic Subgroups

Poor people and rich people

The working class and the middle class

Management and workers

People at the top of society and people at the bottom

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2009

that the highest level of deprivation is access to housing, followed by transport and food. Only about half of the adult population lived in a household that did not identify a domain in which they felt deprived and a fifth of the adult population lived in a household that identified three or more. It was interesting to note that women were more likely to live in food insecure households. In terms of other noteworthy subgroup differences, we found that Black Africans, those in rural areas and the less educated are, on average, more likely to identify multiple domains of deprivation.

In recent years, certain political elements in South African society have called for radical economic transformation. For these reformers, radical transformation is the only way to prevent socio-economic class warfare. Conflict between socio-economic groups can be a central problem in a highly uneven economic society. In order to better comprehend the perceived level of conflict between different socio-economic groups, we asked people about their views on such conflicts in SASAS 2009. Individual responses are presented in **Figure 4** by LSM group[2]. As can be observed, about half of all LSM groups perceive conflict between rich and poor people. An even greater share identified strong conflicts between management and workers. Interestingly, regardless of economic ranking, people were less likely to recognise strife between the working and middle class. A noteworthy difference between LSM groups was on whether there was conflict between people at the top of society and people at the bottom. The Low LSM group was less likely to identify discord between the top and bottom than the Middle or the High LSM group. The results described here demonstrate that many South Africans are gravely concerned about the level of conflict between different socio-economic clusters in the country.

To reduce socio-economic inequality, the South African government has implemented a number of programmes to improve service delivery as well as access to education and housing. In order to better understand how South Africans viewed the execution of these government initiatives, SASAS respondents were asked how satisfied they were with specific aspects of government performance. Identical questions were included in the SASAS since 2003, allowing us to examine trends in public ratings over the last decade. The survey results reveal a considerable pattern of variance in the way the public perceived government performance across the dimensions examined. First, let us examine attitudes towards the government's handling of affordable housing amongst urban and rural residents. Respondents were asked if they were satisfied with the state's performance on this important issue in their area and the results are displayed for the period 2003-2015 (

Figure 5).

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[2] The Living Standard Measure (LSM) is used by South African Advertising Research Forum to measure economic status in South Africa. Respondents are asked more than thirty questions about their asset ownership access and to services to segment the market. LSM traditionally divides the population into 10 groups (1 = lowest to 10 = highest) but the LSM categorisation used in this chapter is Low (1-3), Medium (4-6) and High (7-10).

Figure 5: Attitudes towards Government's Handling of Affordable Housing amongst Rural and Urban Residents, 2003-2015

Indicate the extent to which you satisfied with the government's handling of affordable housing in their area?


Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

The data depicted in the figure above clearly demonstrates that many people in the country, both urban and rural, are unhappy with government performance on affordable housing. It is evident that at the start of the period, urban residents were more satisfied with the government's provision of low-cost housing than their rural counterparts. However, rural residents' satisfaction with housing grew and after 2010 the difference between urban and rural residents has been marginal. Urban levels of satisfaction with affordable housing, on the other hand, have remained stagnant for the period under review. Housing is one of the main challenges facing our post-apartheid society but it is not the only challenge. In SASAS, respondents were asked about a range of other services provided by the state in their local area. In late 2015, South Africans were most satisfied with the provision of social grants (74%) and education (67%). Slightly lower shares offered their approval of state efforts in relation to access health care (59%). The areas of greatest public dissatisfaction were job creation and crime reduction.

Figure 6 takes a closer look at public evaluations of the government's performance in four key poverty reduction efforts: (i) social grants; (ii) education; (iii) health care and (iv) HIV/AIDS prevention. Data is provided on public satisfaction on the government's handling of each of these for the period 2003-2015. A high level of public satisfaction with the provision of social grants was noted for the entire period. Likewise, it can be observed that there was broad public contentment with education provision for the period under review. We did note modest signs of slippage on this indicator, however, between 2013 and 2015. An improvement in access to health care was also evident, increasing from 43% in 2013 to 59% in 2015. This positive change is probably a result of the government's current work in improving the health sector. One of the most dramatic improvements in the service delivery evaluations depicted in the figure is the public's assessments of the fight against HIV/AIDS between 2003 and 2015. The share of adults satisfied with HIV/AIDS interventions has more

Figure 6: Public Satisfaction of their Government in the Performance of Selected Basic Services, 2003-2015


Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

than doubling over this interval (from 27% to 61%). This is likely to be related to the increased rollout of antiretroviral treatment and prevention initiatives during the recent period.

Civic Cohesion

Over the last two decades, concern has emerged about an apparent erosion of civic cohesion in democratic South Africa. This 'crisis of legitimacy' perspective is indicated by diminishing public trust in government and the country in general. Public confidence in political institutions has become a subject of increasing interest for the HSRC in recent decades. Academic work in advanced democracies has shown the importance of understanding erosion of trust in politicians, political parties and central democratic institutions (see, for instance, Norris 1999; 2011). This scholarship research suggests that it is really critical to examine attitudinal trends over time to better understand how the corrosion of social cohesion unfolds. This section will present public attitudes on civic or political cohesion in South Africa, to understand how individuals view the important political institutions that govern the country.

Figure 7: General Perceptions of the Direction that South Africa is heading, 2010-2015

Generally speaking, do you think that things in this country are going in the <u>right</u> direction or going in the <u>wrong</u> direction?

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2010-2015

One mechanism to understand public attitudes towards South Africa is to look at how the public views the country's future. Beginning in 2010, SASAS respondents were required to evaluate whether they felt that things in this country were going in the right or the wrong direction. Less than two fifths indicated that the nation was heading in the right direction

while a majority reported believing that the country was heading in the wrong direction. Young people tend to be more optimistic about the country than their older counterparts. In 2015, for example, we found that 39% of those in the 16-19 age cohort thought that the country was heading in the right direction. This can be compared, unfavourably, with 26%, 29% and 31% in the 45-54, 55-64 and 65 and older age cohorts respectively.

Investigating public responses to this question further, we noted a substantiate disparity in how people of different races answered the question. **Figure 7** displays how the Black African majority felt about the overall performance of the country compared with racial minorities during the period 2010-2015. The Black African majority was found to be more optimistic about the country than members of the racial minority groups. As can be seen, racial minorities became more negative about the country's direction over the period. In 2010, 33% of this group felt the country was heading in the right direction compared with 12% in 2015. A similar, if less dramatic, drop can also be observed amongst the Black African majority. Amongst the different racial minority groups in South Africa, pessimism was highest amongst the White adult population. However, the observed differences in attitudes between the white population and their Coloured and Indian counterparts were not considerable.

Alongside public attitudes towards the country's general direction, public confidence in elected leaders must be investigated. In studies of democratic performance in recent decades the public's approval of the elected leaders' job performance has become a variable of increasing interest. This has largely been precipitated by a considerable, long-term trend in many advanced democracies across Europe and the USA towards increased scepticism and erosion of trust in politicians and holders of political office (Norris 2011). With indicators such as job performance, it is really critical to examine attitudes within a defined time period in order to understand how the differential levels of confidence emerge. The Afrobarometer 2014/2015 survey included questions on the public's assessment of elected Presidents and their local elected councillor for twelve months prior to interviewing. Results are displayed in **Figure 8** for the President and in **Figure 9** for elected councillors for more than two dozen African countries.

When Afrobarometer conducted its survey in the 2014/15 period, adult Liberians were identified as the general population which was the most disapproving of their President's job performance in the last twelve months. This may reflect the trouble that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has had in rebuilding her country following decades of brutal civil war. Of the thirty-three countries in **Figure 8**, South Africa was ranked 2nd in terms of levels of public disapproval with the President's job performance. A majority (62%) of South Africans reported disapproving of the performance of President Jacob Zuma in 2014/15. The results for South Africa's neighbour, Namibia can be contrasted sharply with this result. Only a small minority (11%) disapproved of the job done by Namibian President Hage Gottfried Geingob

Figure 8: Public Approval of 33 African Countries' President's Job Performance over the Past Twelve Months

Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the President have performed their job over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Source: Afrobarometer 2014/2015

Figure 9: Public Approval of 29 African Countries' Elected Councillor's Job Performance over the Past Twelve Months

Do you approve or disapprove of the way that your elected councillor have performed their job over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

Legend: ■ Strongly disapprove ▨ Disapprove ▨ Approve ■ Strongly approve ■ (Don't Know/Refused)

Source: Afrobarometer 2014/2015

in 2014/15. This is perhaps unsurprising as President Geingob was elected in November 2014 with an overwhelming margin after running as a champion of the poor.

Local government is the coalface of the state and the democratic institution that the average citizen has the most contact with. The elected official that represents this coalface is the local councillor and, consequently, it is important to look at public evaluations of this important office holder. In **Figure 9** we can compare South Africa with twenty-nine other African countries. It could be observed that many on the continent disapproved of the job being done by their local councillor in 2014/15. Levels of disapproval were highest in the following countries: (i) Sierra Leone; (ii) Nigeria; and (iii) South Africa. In each of these nations, more than three-fifths of the general public disapproves of the job performed by their local councillor in the last twelve months of 2014/2015. The high level of public disillusionment observed in Sierra Leone may be related to the difficulty that local officials had in responding to the Ebola virus epidemic in that period in 2014/15.

In **Figure 10** we look at public trust in four key political and judicial institutions in South Africa for the period 1998-2015. Of all the institutions depicted in the figure, local government was trusted the least by the general public. In 2015, only 36% of the adult population trusted their local government, down from 55% in 2004. Given the results of **Figure 9**, this result is not unanticipated and suggests serious problems with the "coalface" of democratic governance in the country. In the case of the national government we can observe a decline in public confidence over the period. The overall decline in public trust in national government may reflect a general reaction to the government's response to the macro-economic situation. The financial crisis of 2008/9 led the country into the recession and the recovery has been slow and faltering during the 2010-2015 period. Failure to adequately respond to the financial crisis of 2009 could have led to declining levels of trust.

Reviewing the results of **Figure 10**, it is apparent that the adult population has become progressively less willing to trust the National Parliament over the last ten years. While in 2004 65% of all adult South Africans said that they trusted the Parliament, in 2015 only 38% reported that they trusted this important democratic institution. This steep decline may reflect the growing tension within the Parliament between the country's different political parties. The decision to use police in riot gear to prevent disruptions to Parliament in the last three years may have impacted public confidence. These disturbances have continued beyond the period under review. Consider that Parliamentary service officers and members of the Economic Freedom Fighters exchanged blows during President Jacob Zuma's State of the Nation Address in February 2017. The judicial courts were the most trusted of the institutions under review in **Figure 10**. Although there was some decline in the public's confidence in the courts, this drop was marginal as compared to what was observed for other institutions.

Figure 10: Public Trust in Selected Political and Judicial Institutions in South Africa, 1998-2015

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

Figure 11: Public Confidence in Traditional Authorities/leaders in South Africa, 2010-2015

Indicate the extent to which you trust or distrust Traditional authorities/leaders in South Africa at present?

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2010-2015

Traditional leaders fulfil an important governmental function in South Africa and it would be instructive to look at public confidence in this important institution. **Figure 11** presents data on public trust in traditional leaders in the country for the period 2010-2015. The data is disaggregated by whether an individual lives in a traditional authority area or an urban area. People living on commercial farms are excluded. About two-fifths of people tended to report trusting traditional leaders during our period. Unlike what has been observed in **Figure 11**, public confidence in traditional authorities did not decline following 2010. In all survey rounds displayed in Figure **11** people in traditional authority areas were found to be more trusting of traditional leaders than their urban counterparts. This disparity could be explained by the fact that people living in rural areas have greater contact with (and experience of) traditional leaders. Looking at both urban and rural dwellers it was interesting to note that we observed no gender differences on levels of trust in traditional authorities.

Social Cultural Cohesion

One of the central questions that continue to preoccupy South African society concerns cultural identities. Since all national identities rest on a common cultural core, this question ultimately involves concerns about who 'we' are and what 'we' are becoming. Chipkin (2007) has argued that the idea of a 'South African "people"' is only a product forged of various

political struggles and movements. There is a need, therefore, to investigate how define their own identities rather than relying on top-down interpretations (also see Cachalia 2012). In order to adequate understanding the question of national identity in the country, we turn to the SASAS data on self-reported identity markers. SASAS respondents were asked to identify from a list of markers what three were most important to them in describing who they are. Results for the period 2003, 2009 and 2015 are displayed in Table 6.

Table 6: Multiple Response Table of Self-Reported National Markers by Gender, 2003, 2009, 2015

|	2003		2009		2015	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Current or previous occupation	33	34	24	21	24	22
Race/ethnic background	47	43	36	38	43	37
Gender	29	28	29	28	34	38
Age group	16	21	23	21	22	21
Religion (or being agnostic or atheist)	24	31	29	33	27	35
Preferred political party, group, or movement	13	11	10	8	9	8
Nationality	27	26	32	33	34	33
Family or marital status	48	45	71	72	62	66
Social class	15	12	18	18	14	13
Part of South Africa that you live in	20	21	25	25	29	24

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey 2003; 2009; 2015

The results of the table clearly show discrete patterns that have been in evidence since the opening of the period. The most identified marker was family or marital status and it can be observed that the more people mentioned this marker in 2009 than in the previous two years. This may be a reaction to the economic hardship of the 2009 financial crisis –during periods of economic downturn, people turn to family for support and familial relationships, therefore, seem more important. Other popular markers were: (i) religion; (ii) age group; (iii) nationality and (iv) gender. It is noteworthy that there was no significant difference to the frequency with which men and women mentioned gender as a top three identity marker. It is clear that race and ethnic backgrounds continue to occupy a salient position in the minds of many South Africans. In 2015, for instance, 43% of men and 38% of women identified race and ethnic backgrounds as one of their top three identity markers. This showcases the continued importance of racial identity in the country.

As can be observed, family is a central identity marker in South Africa and consequently, it is important to understand how cohesive families in South Africa are. One way to look at familial cohesion is to look at intergenerational cohesion in the country's families. Consequently many scholars are interested in consensual solidarity. Motivated by Durkheim theories on social organisations, we can understand *consensual solidarity* as the similarity of opinions and values between children and parents (Bengtson 2001). To the extent that consensus in terms of ideas and opinions between older parents and their children can strengthen families and result in deeper levels of familial intergenerational relationships,

consensus solidarity has been identified as an essential part of intergenerational family cohesion (also see Bengtson and Roberts 1991).

Figure 12: Similarity in Opinions between the Individuals and their Parents/Guardians

*Source*: Calculated from Roberts et al. (2013)

One of the ways of measuring *consensual solidarity* is to ask if people hold the same opinions as their parents or guardians. This question was asked in the 2012 South African Social Attitude Survey and this chapter draws largely on this question to explore differentials in consensual solidarity. Responds to this question are presented by age cohort in Figure 12. The youngest cohort (those born in 1990 and after) was less likely than those born during other periods to say their views were either somewhat or very similar to the people that raised them. Less than half (52%) of this birth cohort said their views were very similar to their parents or guardians compared to about three-fifths (58%) of those born in the 1959-1950 period. But even amongst those born in 1990 and after, the results suggest high levels of perceived consensual solidarity. Only a small minority (16%) of this cohort said that their views were somewhat or very dissimilar to those of the people who raised them. Despite rapid change in the post-apartheid period, there is a little evidence to suggest that age is a determinant of shared values between familial generations.

For the South Africans, family social networks can provide assistance with domestic work and ease the burden of housework. Moreover, family networks can diffuse knowledge and values that can involve behaviour and encourage progressive family unity, health and strengthening. There is a need to identify a measure that will allow us to look at what type of support adult South Africans give and receive from non-household family members. SASAS data from 2012 will allow us to understand what sorts of help South Africans are

receiving from non-household family members and which groups amongst the adult public lack support from non-household family members. Figure 13 we look at the level of support that people in South Africa either received or gave to their non-household family members in the last three months of 2012. This allows us to better understand the role played by the family as a social security system for many South Africans.

As can be observed in the figure below, almost two-thirds (67%) of the adult public helped family members outside the household in some or other way. More than three-fifths (61%) indicated that they had received some form of assistance during the period under review. It would appear that a majority of people use family networks outside the household as a source of material and social assistance. Most South African adults gave or received only one form of aid with only a small minority giving and even less receiving multiple forms of assistance. The most common form of assistance given/received by South Africans was non-monetary. Only a fifth of the population gave financial assistance to non-household family members. An even lower segment of the adult population received financial support.

Figure 13: Forms of Intergenerational Assistance that Adults have Received/Given in the Last Three Months

Source: Calculated from Roberts et al. (2013)

Work can intrude on family life, forcing household members to make difficult decision about household management and undermine familial cohesion. Indeed, the strains of employment can create work-family conflict which can lead to negative outcomes for families, particularly if there are children involved. Although work-family conflict may inhibit men's capacity to be immersed in family structures, the pressures and stresses of this type of conflict have unfailingly been revealed to be especially high for women. In spite of their growing admission into the labour market employment, South African women remain the primarily caregiver in most households and often responsible for household's general

management. South African women have traditionally assumed most of the burden childcare as well as care for elderly household members. Consequently, work-family conflict can impede women's access to labour market and constrain working women's capacity to maximise labour market opportunities.

Table 7: Selected Indicators of Work-Family Fit amongst Working Men and Women

	Male	Female	Total
I have come home from work too tired to do the chores which need to be done			
Several times a week	22.6	17.8	20.3
Several times a month	15.8	20.4	18.0
Once or twice	23.4	28.1	25.6
Never	38.3	33.7	36.1
It has been difficult for me to fulfil my family responsibilities because of the amount of time, I spent on my job			
Several times a week	10.6	10.7	10.7
Several times a month	18.4	21.9	20.1
Once or twice	22.2	21.7	21.9
Never	48.9	45.7	47.3
I have arrived at work too tired to function well because of the household work I had done			
Several times a week	5.6	9.4	7.4
Several times a month	11.7	12.9	12.3
Once or twice	23.5	22.2	22.9
Never	59.1	55.5	57.4
I have found it difficult to concentrate at work because of my family responsibilities			
Several times a week	5.3	7.3	6.2
Several times a month	10.6	14.6	12.5
Once or twice	20.2	19.1	19.7
Never	63.9	59.0	61.6

Note: Those without a job are excluded.
Source: Calculated from Roberts et al. (2013).

In an effort to better comprehend the extent of work-family conflict in South Africa, SASAS data from 2012 is used. **Table 7** shows selected indicators of work-family fit for those of the adult population who are employed in the labour market. In general the table shows that some working people suffer from work-family conflict. Consider that 31% of working South Africans find it difficult to fulfil their family responsibilities because of the amount of time they spent on my job on a weekly or monthly basis. Consistent with what we expect, our finding seem to suggest that working women are more likely than working men to report conflict between handling work and family responsibilities. Concerns about work-life family balances suggest a need to look more closely at gender roles in the household as it regards childcare. In SASAS 2012, respondents were asked about the best and worst way for a hypothetical family with a child younger than 5 years to organise their family and work life. The results are displayed in **Table 8** and tend to demonstrate rather conservative views of how gender relations in a household should be organised.

Table 8: Public Attitudes towards the Best and Worst Work-Family Organisation for a Hypothetical Family with a Child Younger than 5 Years

Question	Male	Female	Total
Best work split in families with a child under the age of five			
The mother stays at home and the father works full-time	48	47	47
The mother works part-time and the father works full-time	26	28	27
Both the mother and father work full-time	19	21	20
Both the mother and father work part-time	4	2	3
The father works part-time and the mother works full-time	1	1	1
The father stays at home and the mother works full-time	1	0	1
(Do not know)	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100
Least desirable work split in families with a child under the age of five			
The mother stays at home and the father works full-time	25	24	25
The mother works part-time and the father works full-time	16	18	17
Both the mother and father work full-time	20	17	18
Both the mother and father works part-time	4	4	4
The father works part-time and the mother works full-time	5	4	4
The father stays at home and the mother works full time	26	30	28
(Do not know)	4	2	3
Total	100	100	100

Source: Calculated from Roberts et al. (2013).

About half (48%) of the general population thought that the best way to split work and family responsibilities would be for the mother to stay at home and for the father to work full-time. A smaller share (27%) believed that the mother should work part-time and the father should work full-time. Only a small minority (1%) felt that it would be best for the father to stay at home and the mother to work full-time. Indeed, it would appear that for a sizeable share (28%) of the adult population, the father staying at home and the mother working full-time was the least desirable way to organise the hypothetical household. Interesting, about a quarter of the adult public reported that the mother staying at home and the father working full-time was the least desirable scenario. As can be observed in the table, there were no substantial gender differences in responses to these questions. The results depicted in **Table 8** attitudes towards work-family balance in families with a young child seem to speak to common South African norms about gender roles in family and work.

Trust is a central component of an individual's ability to form social relationships and reject harmful stereotypes, and is considered indicative of social cohesion. Trust acts as a foundation for cooperation, contributes to social integration and harmony among people, leads to life satisfaction and ultimately to democratic stability and development. Social trust is, therefore, at the centre of issues pertaining to practical daily life, including happiness, optimism, well-being, health, economic prosperity, education, welfare, and participation in community and civil society. It is imperative, therefore, that we understand attitudes towards interpersonal trust in the post-apartheid nation. This section will now present data

Figure 14: 'Must be very careful' versus 'Most people can be trusted' in Africa

Do you think that most people can be trusted or must you be very careful when trusting people?

Source: Afrobarometer2011/2012

Figure 15: Share of the Group who Agreed that People of Different Racial Groups Will Never Trust Each Other, 2003-2015

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

on interpersonal and interracial trust. **Figure 14** represents a comparative overview of levels of social capital in South Africa using data from the Afrobarometer 2011/2012 survey.

Participants in the Afrobarometer 2011/2012 survey were asked if they trusted people. Using a two-item measure, researchers at the Afrobarometer found social distrust was particularly high in thirty-three countries surveyed in 2011/2012. It is apparent that South Africa had a low level of social trust, only a small minority (17%) of adult South Africans believed that most people could be trusted. Despite those characteristics that make her unique, observed levels of social trust in South Africa are not remarkably distinct from what has been observed elsewhere on the African continent. The country's level of social trust was comparable to Nigeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Cameroon. Levels of social trust reported in **Figure 14** are lower than what has been observed in Europe (Rodríguez-Pose & von Berlepsch 2013).

An important contributor to social cohesion in South Africa is a sense of good intergroup relations. The turbulent history of the country had resulted in severely-strained relations between the Black African, White, Coloured and Indian communities in the country. In SASAS respondents were asked if they agreed that people of different racial groups will never really trust each other. In each year surveyed, a majority of adult South Africans agreed with the statement with only small minorities disagreeing. The evidence presented above indicates a disturbing level of interracial distrust in the country. To look at this level of distrust more closely, **Figure 15** examines responses to this question across the country's four major population groups during the period 2003-2015. White and Coloured South Africans tended to have a more negative view of race relations than their Black African and Indian counterparts. It is interestingly to note that Black African responses to this question remain relatively stagnant, showing little variation over the period. On the other hand, the attitudinal responses of the country's racial minorities showed significant degrees of fluctuation between 2003 and 2015. This suggests that the attitudinal responses of racial minorities are influences by external events.

The advent of majoritarian democracy in South Africa resulted in a moderate improvement in race relations has been observed since the late 1990s. An emerging black middle-class has migrated out of urban peripheral and rural areas into affluent former whites-only neighbourhoods, increasing interracial contact. However interracial relations remain strained in the country as can be observed in **Figure 15**. The results presented here are not unanticipated given the substantive body of research acquired during the apartheid and post-apartheid periods on interracial relations (Bornman 2011 provides a review of this research). The reaction of many white South Africans to racial desegregation has been to migrate to even more exclusive fortified suburbs –the so-called gated communities (Breetzke et al. 2014). Such communities are justified in terms of risk assessments and fear related to crime but act as barrier to deeper intergroup relations in the country.

The ownership of land is a flashpoint in the debate on post-apartheid transformation. As a result of colonial dispossession, about 87% of the land in South Africa was owned by the white minority in 1994. Post-apartheid land reform has been slow and data shows that only eight million hectares of arable land have been transferred to the Black African majority (which is only 9.8 % of the 82 million hectares of arable land in South Africa) in 2016. In the figure below we look at rural South Africans' level of dissatisfaction with the government's handling of land reform in their area. The results show that levels of dissatisfaction were high in 2003 when 54% of rural residents said that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction levels fell to about 40% in 2004 and remained relatively stagnant throughout the period although spikes in dissatisfaction were observed in 2008 and 2009. The results indicate that many rural dwellers are concerned that the government is not doing enough to address their concerns about land reform.

Figure 16: Attitudes towards Government's Handling of Land Reform amongst Rural Residents, 2003-2015

Indicate the extent to which you dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the government's handling of land reform?


Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

One of the main mechanisms to correct racial inequalities in the South African labour market is a policy of affirmative action outline in the government's employment equity policies. However, the efficacy of the nation's current labour market affirmative action programme has come under scrutiny. According to the 17th Commission for Employment Equity Report from the Department of Labour, members of the white minority continue to dominate top management positions in the country's labour market. But the slow pace of change has not eroded public support for such policies as SASAS has shown. Starting in 2003, SASAS

respondents were asked if they agreed that there should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment (Figure 17). In 2003, 66% of the adult population supported the proposition and this level of support has remained essentially stagnant over the period. This result demonstrates the continued support given the general public to the government employment equity policies.

Figure 17: Public Support for Affirmative Action in Employment, 2003-2015

To what extent do you agree that there should be preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment?

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

Figure 18: Overall perceptions of foreigners in South Africa, 2003-2015

Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa…

Sources: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015

73

The section closes by considering attitudes towards foreign nationals. Since the start of the survey, SASAS respondents have been asked the following question: "Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa… (i) All immigrants; (ii) Some immigrants; and (iii) No immigrants". Results for the period 2003-2015 are presented in **Figure 18** and indicate that many view the migrant community in very negative terms. In 2015, 33% of the South African adult (16 years and older) population said that they would welcome all immigrants, 41% would welcome some immigrants and the remainder (26%) would welcome none. The proportion of the adult public that would be prepared to welcome foreigners has tended to fluctuate within a narrow band over the period 2003-2015. But, from 2010 onwards, there has been a decline in the share who said they welcomed all international migrants. Since 2009 the portion who indicated that they would only welcome 'some' foreigners has grown appreciably.

The observed level of anti-immigrant sentiment can be better understood if we look at subgroup differences. Gordon (2016) provides an analysis of the patterns of change in these attitudes over the decade between 2003 and 2012. He shows that the proportion of the adult public that would be prepared to welcome foreigners only varies moderately by socio-economic status. No gender variations were noted. If we look at data on socio-economic groups' anti-immigrant attitudes, we find that 24% of the High LSM group said that they welcomed no foreigners compared to 35% and 31% of the Low and Middle LSM groups respectively. If we look at data from 2013-2015, we can observe that socio-economic differences had declined over the period. Building on Gordon's work, we can examine ethnic group differences in how attitudes towards international migrants vary between the country's major ethnic groups. To understand ethnic group differences we look at attitudes disaggregated by population group and home language in Table 9.

Table 9: Attitudes towards Foreign Nationals by Ethnicity, 2015

		All Immigrants	Some immigrants	No immigrants	(Don't Know)
Black African	Sesotho	29	44	28	0
	Setswana	36	40	22	2
	Sepedi	31	33	34	2
	IsiXhosa	30	43	26	1
	IsiZulu	37	38	23	2
	Other	36	42	22	0
Coloured	Afrikaans	26	45	26	4
	English	43	37	18	1
Indian	English	38	37	24	1
White	Afrikaans	25	38	35	2
	English	29	54	17	1

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey 2015

From the table, we can observe that differences between Black African language groups were not as considerable as one may have expected. It is interesting to note that the Black African isiZulu and Setswana speakers were more likely to say they would welcome all

immigrants than their isiXhosa, Sesotho and Sepedi counterparts. The Black African group that demonstrated the strongest anti-immigrant attitudes in the table above were Sepedi speakers -34% of this group said they would welcome no foreigners. If we look at racial minorities, then some interesting subgroup differences become apparent. Afrikaans speakers amongst the Coloured and White minorities were more likely to oppose international migrants than their English-speaking counterparts. In the White adult population group, for instance, 35% of Afrikaans speakers said that they would welcome no foreigners compared to only 17% of English speakers. Of all the groups listed in Table 9, Indian and Coloured English-speaking adults were the most positive in their statements about international migrants.

The data displayed in **Figure 18** could lead a reader to ask if South Africans are a xenophobic people. It is important to remember that the term 'xenophobia' refers to an antagonistic attitude (or set therefore) towards a group labelled foreign. Despite its name, xenophobia was never thought of as a medical disorder like agoraphobia or claustrophobia. If we want to link xenophobia with certain actions –say, for example, a violent riot – it is essential for the reader to remain cognizant of the fact that an individual's prejudicial attitudes may result in an action or it may not (Ajzen & Fishbein 2005). Although attitudes can influence behaviour, the correlation between attitudes and behaviour is mediated by internal and external factors. The relationship attitude-behaviour relationship is assumed to be moderated by factors related to the characteristics of the attitude itself, the individual performing the behaviour and the environment within which it is performed (also see Fishbein & Ajzen 2011). There is no simple relationship between attitudes and behaviour.

Chapter 4

WHERE WE WANT TO BE

1. Introduction

South Africa's future should be a socially cohesive society with acceptance of a common vision and the notion of a united nation with the following characteristics:

- **Equal enjoyment of political and civil rights**: citizens equally enjoy individual freedoms without state infringement, discrimination or repression;

- **Non-racist society**: respect for the dignity of the 'other' and an absence of hate crimes prevail;

- **Sharp reduction in inequality**: a declining Gini coefficient, and living standards that are significantly above minimum;

- **Common perception of the nation**: the primary self-identification is the nation;

- **Trust in institutions**: high levels of trust in institutions;

- **Integrated human settlements**: increasing progress in the elimination of the apartheid spatial legacy;

- **Gender equality**: all forms of gender and LGBTI discrimination are eliminated;

- **Equal enjoyment of socio-economic rights**: discrimination in enjoyment of socio-economic rights is prohibited and the state does all in its power to ensure equal enjoyment of these rights.

These goals are set out in Figure X below.

Figure: Characteristics of a social cohesive and united South Africa

2. Characteristics of a socially cohesive and united South Africa

2.1. Equal enjoyment of political and civil rights

Citizens equally enjoy individual freedoms without state infringement, discrimination or repression: This involves not only the three branches of the State passing and effectively implementing laws, abiding to court decisions and executive directives meant to protect equal enjoyment of political and civil rights. It also pertains even more basically to the development of literate and otherwise aware and active citizens organized and mobilized to keep the State accountable, ethical, and proactive in identifying and protecting such and other human rights.

2.2. Non-racist society

Respect for the dignity of the 'other' and an absence of hate crimes prevail: This is only the initial foundation of what it means to live in a non-racist society. It also means the development of citizenry in all places—communities, institutions, social systems, and in public and private spheres of life who go beyond mere tolerance. The non-racist society is one in which citizens and residents embrace the humanity of all and through that we all recover and sustain our personal humanity and that of all others regardless of their ancestry

and how it is constructed into the dangerous mythologies of race that only we human beings make for the dehumanization of Others and therefore in doing so dehumanize ourselves. This the non-racist society is one in which we all become and remain rehumanized through learning to embrace those we have been taught for generations are superior or inferior rather than merely human beings with a vast array of personalities, values, abilities, life beliefs , and all other qualities with the diversity of what it means to be human.

2.3. *Sharp reduction in inequality*

A declining Gini coefficient, and living standards that are significantly above minimum: With this said comes the awareness and utilization of global best practices which need to be tailored for relevance in the nation-state to effectively bring people together to live at decent cost for all and to live and work in places which are healthy and raises rather than decline senses of self-worth.

2.4. *Common perception of the nation*

The primary self-identification is the nation: This requires more effective government of all branches and levels and the same with civil society working together to bring into the societal fold all citizens of all demographic backgrounds, especially those which have disengaged. Such authentic cohesion of citizens of all backgrounds engaged with a State which listens, cares, and acts for the public good will bring about a common perception amongst citizens of a nation which appreciates them and respects them and their life beliefs in a genuine rather than merely ideological rainbow nation with no real substance. This is to say, a State cannot expect a common good perception of citizens if it is not doing good things for and to them in a democracy.

2.5. *Trust in institutions*

High levels of trust in institutions: Highly trustworthy institutions, like individuals, must prove they deserve to be believed. This means institutions must be fair, honest, and have impeccable ethical integrity. They must take care of business above board without a hint of corruption. Trustworthy institutions practice time management, are consistent in policy implementations, and value customer service practices. Trustworthy institutions stand for what is right and reform when they are outdated or in other ways dysfunctional.

2.6. *Integrated human settlements*

Increasing progress in the elimination of the apartheid spatial legacy: Integrated human settlements are not merely spaces for different kinds of ancestries to reside. They must also be places of residences in which people connect deeply and emotionally in many positive ways and levels. Otherwise the emotional isolationism generated by integration without

emotional inclusion on the part of any one no matter ancestry or socioeconomic status in human settlements is a tormenting form of degradation no one deserves to suffer.

2.7.   *Gender equality*

All forms of gender and LGBTI discrimination are eliminated: Every human being, no matter who they are, deserves to be treated with respect and fairness. It is important to understand how all forms of gender and LGBTI identities and life experiences are independent as well as synchronized with other statuses such as racialized ethnicity, socioeconomic status, disability and age to design and effectively implement policies which eliminate discrimination and deep daily patterns of gender and LGBTI prejudice. A situation prevails where there is 'fair distribution of resources between men and women, the redistribution of power and care responsibilities, and freedom from gender-based violence'. Women are empowered to become 'active agents in the transformation of their own lives and that of society as a whole' (ANC, 2012: 5).

2.8.   *Equal enjoyment of socio-economic rights*

Discrimination in enjoyment of socio-economic rights is prohibited and the state does all in its power to ensure equal enjoyment of these rights. As in the case of gender, socioeconomic rights in South Africa must be considered in the context of the historical formation and transformation of a society in which the mythologies of race are made tragically real with dire dehumanizing consequences for all citizens. For required school and university curricula and for workplaces, media, and residential communities, the State needs to generate sophisticated understanding of the realities of racial mythologies and how they relate to the formation of different kinds of intersectional and synchronic and encourage citizen mobilization to push back against and eliminate socio-economic rights discrimination independent of and in intersection or synchronism with racial status, gender, and disability.

3.   Various scenarios or visions of how we get there

3.1.   *Dinokeng Scenarios*

- Scenario 1: Walk apart – Cronyism and corruption; delivery of social services deteriorate; increasing rift between government and citizens, and between different sectors of society; protests spiral; decrease in citizen engagement. In this scenario, the state becomes increasingly weak and ineffective. A disengaged and self-protective citizenry eventually loses patience and erupts into protest and unrest. The state, driven by its inability to meet citizens' demands and expectations, responds brutally and a spiral of resistance and repression is unleashed. The message of Walk Apart is that if we fail to address our critical challenges, if we fail to build state

capacity, and if citizens do not organise to engage government constructively, we will experience rapid disintegration and decline (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 68).

- Scenario 2: Walk behind – Widespread discontent and protest; government cracks down; increasing state control creates citizen dependency. In this scenario the state becomes increasingly strong and directive, both enabled by and enabling a civil society that is increasingly dependent and compliant. The state grows in its confidence to lead and direct development. However, it does not by itself have the capacity to address our critical challenges effectively. The demands of socio-economic development and redistributive justice amid a global and domestic economic crisis place strain on the state's capacity to deliver to all and to be all. These strains are most evident in the declining ratio between revenue and expenditure. In the worst case, the state over-reaches and is forced to borrow from multi-lateral financial institutions. As a result, South Africa loses the ability to determine its own social spending agenda. The message of Walk Behind is that state-led development cannot succeed if state capacity is seriously lacking. In addition, a state that intervenes pervasively and that dominates all other sectors will crowd out private initiative by business and civil society and create a complacent and dependent citizenry (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 68-9).

- Scenario 3: Walk together – Improvements in service delivery; a formal 'social pact' emerges; citizens work with government to monitor education, health, crime; citizens lobby for more accountability from politicians. This scenario tells the story of a state that becomes increasingly catalytic and collaborative; of an enabling state that listens to its citizens and leaders from different sectors; a state that engages with critical voices, that consults and shares authority in the interest of long term sustainability. This is also a story of an engaged citizenry that takes leadership and holds government accountable, a citizenry that shares responsibility for policy outcomes and development. This is not an easy path: the outcomes are open and are vulnerable to manipulation by stronger actors, and the alliances, pacts and partnerships required to address our challenges could be too slow and weak to be effective. The message of Walk Together is that we can address our critical challenges only if citizens' groups, business, labour and broader civil society actively and effectively engage with the state to improve delivery and enforce an accountable government. This scenario can only be successful if all three of the present trends identified in our diagnosis can be reversed: if citizens re-engage; if the capacity of the state is strengthened; and if leaders from all sectors rise above their narrow self-interests and contribute purposefully to building our nation (The Dinokeng Scenarios, nd: 69).

3.2. NDP Vision

The National Development Plan envisages 'a society where opportunity is not determined by race or birth-right; where citizens accept that they have both rights and responsibilities. Most critically, we seek a united, prosperous, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa'. It proposed the following set of actions to reach this goal:

- At school assembly the Preamble of the Constitution to be read in language of choice.
- Bill of responsibilities to be used at schools and prominently displayed in each work place.
- Sustained campaigns against racism, sexism, homophobia and xenophobia.
- The Commission of Gender Equality and the ministry should audit and deal with gaps in legislation and develop joint targets, indicators and timelines for monitoring and evaluating progress towards gender equality.
- Employment Equity to continue and new models of BEE to de explored to improve the efficacy of the programme. Clear targets should be set for broadening economic participation, enhancing predictability for economic actors.
- Improving public services and spaces as well as building integrated housing and sport facilities in communities to ensure sharing of common spaces across race and class.
- Incentivising the production and distribution of all art forms that facilitate healing, nation building and dialogue.
- All South Africans to learn at least one indigenous language, business to encourage and reward employees who do so.
- Promote citizen participation in forums such as Integrated Development Plans, Ward Committees, School Governing Boards and Community Policing Forums.
- Work towards a social compact for growth, employment and equity.

3.3. The Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection

In a research report on nation formation and social cohesion developed by a team of researchers from the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (2014: 10-13), it is noted that:

> ...the future development of South African society depends on the peeling off of fear and mistrust of 'the other', and the cultivation of a deeper sense of belonging and inclusion. This can only come about as historical, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, educational, religious, social, economic and spatial inequalities identified ... are progressively eliminated at all levels of society.

This team identified a number of 'areas that require co-ordinated attention' in order to promote nation formation and social cohesion.

- **Vision and its pursuit:** It is critical to ensure that South Africans embrace and act out a common socio-economic vision which calls for the attainment of decent conditions of life for all. Pursuing a common vision requires new forms of civic-mindedness and enhanced citizen activism, which means that leaders of various sectors of society and their constituencies should be prepared to contribute to, and to sacrifice for, the realisation of the common interest. The public services at all levels need to be re-oriented towards direct and sustained partnerships with civic society in matters related to social cohesion at a sub-national level, informed by an understanding of the relationship of this task to nation formation.

- **Decent standard of living:** A genuine sense of belonging – which is fundamental to both nation formation and social cohesion – is to a large extent dependent on whether the material conditions of all South Africans, especially the poor, are in fact improving. This would require a minimal level of unity and cohesion – undergirded at least by a common vision and common aspirations – for a united pursuit of such a vision. A decent standard of living would include, among others, the absorption of the majority of the population into economic activity, improvements in the quality, reliability and timeous provision of services in local communities, access to assets such as housing, and acceleration of land redistribution coupled with resources, skills and capacities to grow the farming population, reducing the cost of living of especially the poor, and providing quality primary and general health care services.

- **Building a common humanity and eliminating social barriers:** The content of the education system and broader civic education should include the development of a broader humanity based on human self-worth, respect for others and empathy for the most vulnerable in society. Eliminating spatial and physical barriers on which racial segregation was founded is also critical to promoting nation formation and social cohesion. Building relations across racial and ethnic lines should also include the promotion of multi-lingualism which must incorporate understanding of cultures and the encouragement of friendships outside the classroom and the workplace.

- **Value System:** The value system on which the new cohesive society can be built includes human self-worth, respect for others and empathy for the most vulnerable in society, combatting the habit of (negatively) 'othering' those who are not South African, Combating the manifestations and tendencies towards corruption in the public and private domains and discouraging approaches to self-advancement, the public and private sectors at all levels pursuing non-racialism, inclusivity, corrective action and skills development, and promoting both political and cultural inclusivity in the observation of designated national (holi)days and sport events.

4. Who we shall become

- ***Accepting all peoples, cultures, languages and generations***: This means breaking down and breaking out of centuries of societal norms of racialized ethnic, class, and gendered demographic degradation and fragmentation which has characterized the formation of South Africa since colonial times. A fractured deeply hierarchical society South Africa past and present has been with its well institutionalized comfort zones of deep spatial and emotional separation of others where loyalty ends at the mouth of the fractured racialized ethnic, class, and gender demographics caves. It means breaking out and breaking down the dual insularities amongst and between gendered and racialized ethnic populations composing the nation state and between the society and the rest of the region, continent, and world. Thus because listening to each other beyond our caves and beyond our national boundaries tends to be dismissed through our exceptionalist sense of nation hood, we always it seems develop in opposite directions of where the continent and the rest of the world is going. When the post-World War II world was gearing up for anti-colonial and racial civil rights movements, South Africa was becoming an apartheid state. When post-apartheid Black Majority rule took power, anti-immigrant sentiments from visa policies to street riots has marked this era while the rest of the continent and world has nations welcoming immigrants to contribute to their economies and are not capturing their States with corruption now robbing South Africans of the 1994 hope of becoming the leader country on the continent and one of the most well respected nations in the world. Somehow and quickly, government and civil society—all citizens must push back from the historical habit of insularity breeding dynamics which inhibits rather than facilitates a wide open country for all here and those who wish to come.

- ***Respecting the freedom of expression and movement of all***: This is to understand that basic to any democracy is the freedom to say what you want and to go where you please. It speaks of having a strong free transparent national broadcasting, online, and print media and a government which respects and encourages freedom of expression. It means having government and civil society institutions such as education, businesses, faith, cultural, health, legal, and medical which not only profess but practice freedom of expression without retaliation. Freedom of movement means being able to live where one wants and can afford. It means being able to enjoy timeless and spaceless mobility for personal well-being and for the well-being of my loved ones.

- ***Active citizens for justice for all***: It means a well-organized and vibrant civil society always active in keeping government and civil society institutions of all levels and branches accountable, transparent, and pro-active for the public good for all.

- ***Giving to our loved ones, neighbours, and the nation***: Developing a society premised on sacrifice for others rather than on personal aggrandizement is the only way other areas of societal development positively move forward and effectively struggles against poverty and all other forms of inequality and mass and individual forms of human suffering.

- ***A nation with declining poverty and inequality***: This can only occur when we value ourselves as each other's brothers 'and sisters' keepers in which governments tax the rich like the not so rich and the poor; where all youth can go to the same quality schools and become gainfully employed at the same rates; where females are allowed to do the same thing as males; and when resources are so equally allocated that all have decent housing, clean air, and live in crimeless rural and urban communities without barbed wired fenced walls with killer dogs inside.

- ***A nation with common purpose of doing good in the world***: It is high time that South Africa sheds its exceptionalism and joins the nations of the continent as equal African nations all needing much more global respect and access to circles of global influence in a world radically shifting from West to East and from North to South. One of the ways post-apartheid South Africa needs to do this is to embrace rather than turn their backs on other Southern African countries, many of which supported the ANC in its darkest liberation struggles hours. Rather than being hostile to the millions of Black immigrants from surrounding countries running so much their service industries and providing significant professional services, find ways of welcoming them and rewarding them and encouraging citizens to be appreciative of them. Rather than fighting battles with each other or being disengaged from each other, South Africans need to find ways to come together as one country doing all they can to be of service to the world using at their disposal the growing wealth of many in need to be encouraged to think and act in altruistic philanthropic fashions.

5. How we get there

We get there through civil society and government working collaboratively to harnessing best practices gleaned nationally, continent wide, and from the rest of the world and tailor them for South African contexts to accomplish the following feats essential for the making and sustainability of an inclusive – and not merely integrative – post-apartheid democracy.

- ***A robust diversified economy with full and decent employment*** which thus provides subsistence, material security and sense of self-worth for all citizens and immigrants.

- ***A dynamic inclusive civil society with good governance*** in which citizens and immigrants actively engage government in all branches and levels insisting on transparency, honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and justice and peace for everyone.

- *A commitment to solving quality of life problems for all its people*, meaning no demographic population, be it ancestral, age, class, disability, gender, religious, or linguistic, is left behind and all have their challenges resolved in a society which cares for everyone.

- *Inclusive and social investment-oriented businesses* which recognize the growing presence in South Africa and in Africa in general of emerging generations of socially conscious corporate leaders who are receptive to giving back to society in key areas such as education, health, peace, justice, and environmental justice. This is not only because social stability breeds economic stability and thus corporate profit making, but also due to the growth of new generations of corporate leaders that accept that giving to society to resolve social challenges is the moral right thing to do.

- *Inclusive, concerned and committed media* which does not generate and feed on conflict to sell copies, but is concerned about news-making that heals communities, institutions, and the general society.

- *Inclusive educating and employing institutions* means education which includes the histories and concerns of all and prepares students to effectively compete in labour markets of all kinds irrespectively of who they are demographically.

- *Sustaining restorative justice practices in local, provincial and national civil society and government* in recognition of the deep emotional scars of race which built this nation from degrading colonial scratch, which must be acknowledged and dealt with through restitutional and reparation means prefaced with safe venues for discussing alternative historical interpretations, confessions, apologies, forgiveness, and reconciliations. This is to be a post-TRC restorative justice movement in which government synchronizes with civil society in all institutions and communities to confront and destroy the monster of race and the dehumanizing lived experience it generates for all South Africans. Race needs to be destroyed rather than denied, and transformed into local and national cultures of authentic inclusion rather than merely politically correct cosmetics, at best, and, at worst, festering anger of those deep in their demographic caves with occasional blistering outbursts of violence.

- *A national government and civil society positively active as leaders in solving continental and global problems* which means bursting the insular South African bubble of exceptionalism and entitlement and moving forward as a caring and leading nation.

- *Quality access for all people to the state and civil society, built and natural environments, education, employment, health and wellness, law and law enforcement, media, public services, and social services* is vital because strong democracies only come into being when all citizens and residents, including

immigrants, have equal means to become empowered, well educated, gainfully employed and socially and emotionally taken care as of members of South Africa society.

Appendix A: Economic Domain indicators

Economic Domain:		Source(s)
Economic indicators	*Survey questions used to construct indicators*	
➢ Employment status	What is your current employment status?	SASAS 2009
➢ Total monthly household income	What is the total monthly household income before tax and other deductions?	SASAS 2009
➢ Health status	How would you rate your health at present?	SASAS 2009
➢ Education	What is your highest level of education?	SASAS 2009
➢ Household Needs Index (HNI)	Are the following inadequate, just adequate or more than adequate for your households needs: Your… ➢ Household's housing ➢ Household's access to transport ➢ Household's health care ➢ Households clothing ➢ The amount of food your household had over the last month.	SASAS 2009
Redress indicators		
➢ Redress of Basic Services Index (RBSI)	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way government is handling the following matters in your neighbourhood? ➢ Supply of water ➢ Providing electricity ➢ Removal of refuse ➢ Affordable housing ➢ Access to health care.	SASAS 2009
➢ Government Responsibility Index (GRI) *(Class-base redress measures)*	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following? ➢ The government should spend more money to create jobs even if it has to increase taxes ➢ The government should spend more money on social grants for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes ➢ The government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to university.	SASAS 2009
➢ Health redress	To what extent do you agree or disagree that it… ➢ Is it right or wrong for people with higher incomes to buy better health care than people with lower incomes?	SASAS 2009
➢ Education redress	To what extent do you agree or disagree that it… ➢ Is it right or wrong for people with higher incomes to buy better education than people with lower incomes?	SASAS 2009
➢ Socio-Economic Conflict Index (SECI)	To what extent do you agree or disagree that there is.. ➢ Conflict between poor people and rich people. ➢ Conflict between the working class and the middle class. ➢ Conflict between management and workers. ➢ Conflict between people at the top of society and people at the bottom.	SASAS 2009
➢ Labour Market Redress Action Index (LMRAI)	To what extent do you agree or disagree that government should.. ➢ Redistribute land to black South Africans. ➢ Preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment. ➢ Preferential hiring and promotion of women in employment.	SASAS 2009
➢ Affirmative Action Index (AAI)	To what extent do you agree or disagree that... ➢ Affirmative Action policy in South Africa is contributing to a more skilled workforce. ➢ Affirmative Action policy in South Africa is creating a society that is more unified	SASAS 2009

Appendix B: Civic cohesion indicators

Civic domain		
Indicators	**Survey questions used to construct various sub-domain indicators**	**Source(s)**
National identities	➢ Intensity of feelings of national pride	SASAS/ WVS/ Afrobarometer/ GCIS
Evaluations of Regime Performance	Satisfaction with the way that the government is handling: ➢ supply of water and sanitation ;providing electricity; affordable housing; access to health care; treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS; job creating; land reform providing social grants and education Satisfaction in democracy and government: ➢ satisfaction with the way democracy works ➢ Batho Pele Index – self-rated performance of municipalities against the Batho Pele (People First) principles	SASAS 2009
Confidence in Regime Institutions	Level of trust in: ➢ national government; local government; courts; Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); the SABC; the police; parliament; traditional authorities/leaders; churches; defence force	SASAS 2009
Approval of Incumbent office-holders	➢ The President ➢ Premier of your province ➢ Elected local government councillor	Afrobarometer
Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics? On average how often do you: ➢ read the political content of newspaper? ➢ watch political news on TV? ➢ listen to political news on the radio? ➢ use the internet to obtain political news or information?	SASAS 2009
Citizenship norms	"To be a good citizen, how important is it for a person to… ➢ …support people who are worse off than themselves? ➢ … vote in elections? (all elections are meant.) ➢ … always obey laws and regulations? ➢ …form their own opinion, independently of others? ➢ …be active in voluntary organisations? ➢ … be active in politics? (In the sense of active in any political or lobby groups, not just in party organisations.)	ESS, 2002 – CID module; ISSP 2004 citizenship module

Appendix C: Socio-cultural domain indicators

Socio-Cultural Domain:		Source(s)
Indicators	*Survey questions used to construct indicators*	
➢ Social network	Indicate if anyone in your household belongs to any of the following groups: 　　Stokvel; Burial Society; Community Garden Group; Farmers Association; Sewing Group; Sports Group; Study Group; Singing or music Group; HIV/AIDS Group; Youth Group; Informal Trader's Group; Men's Association; Women's Association; Religious Group; School Governing Body; Community Safety/development Group; Water Committee; Development Committee; Tribal Authority; Trade Union; Political Party.	SASAS 2010
➢ Discrimination	Would you describe yourself as a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country? If yes, on what ground is your group discriminated against	SASAS 2010
➢ Racial tolerance	How often do you feel racially discriminated against?	SASAS 2010
➢ Tolerance towards same sex partners	Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations? Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.	SASAS 2010
➢ Tolerance towards immigrants:	I generally welcome all immigrants/some immigrants/no immigrants to South Africa.	SASAS 2010
➢ Interracial contact	How many …(black, coloured, Indian, White) people do you know at least as acquaintances How many acquaintances do you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country?	SASAS 2010
➢ Crime	➢ Fear of crime	SASAS 2010
➢ Personal Well-Being Index (PWI)	How satisfied are you with your…? ➢ life as a whole ➢ standard of living ➢ health ➢ what you have achieved in life ➢ personal relationships ➢ personal safety ➢ feeling part of a community ➢ future financial security ➢ spirituality or religion	SASAS 2010

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