

Land reform in the Xhalanga district, Eastern Cape

(A case study appended to the report on land redistribution)

A research report commissioned by the High Level Panel of Parliament

Prof Lungisile Ntsebeza and Dr Fani Ncapayi

9/1/2016

Introduction

We begin our report by laying the historical and contextual background of land reform in the Xhalanga district. The period covered starts with the establishment of the Xhalanga district and its people in the nineteenth century up to the demise of apartheid and the introduction of a constitutional democracy in South Africa in 1994. The key focus throughout is land tenure. The second section deals with the post-1994 period and the manner in which land reform was introduced and the extent to which it has been implemented in Xhalanga.

About Xhalanga and its people up to the beginning of the Gun War in 1880

Xhalanga was one of two districts that formed what became known as Emigrant Thembuland in the Transkei part of the then Cape colony. The other district was

Southeyville. The term “Emigrant Thembuland’ was used to describe the area of land that as allocated to four chiefs who left Glen Grey in 1865 (see map).




Figure 1 Map of the Glen Grey area

The people who moved from Glen Grey in 1865 were descendants of abaThembu who moved northwards in the 1830s as a result of the Tshaka-led *Mfecane*ⁱ in the 1820s and subsequent wars with amaBhaca and amaMpondo.ⁱⁱ Prior to this, abaThembu had occupied the piece of land between the Bashee and Umzimvubu Rivers.ⁱⁱⁱ The Cape colonial government eventually settled abaThembu who moved northwards in the Glen Grey and Indwe districts. Colonialists dubbed this area ‘Tambokie Location’. This was in 1852.

A feature of the population of Xhalanga was its diversity. By 1872, it divided not only along social lines, between the `school' and `red' people, but also along clan lines, for example, amaGcina and amaMfengu. However, it is social division that became dominant and more prominent were division between the `school' and `red' people, irrespective of clan affiliation. In the terminology of colonial administrators, the "school" people were dubbed "civilized natives". Here is what Magistrate Cumming said of these "natives in 1879:

These men had grown up under the care of the late Mr Warner, and are pleasing examples of what the native may become under judicious training. ... They were located on farms, and the right of occupation was secured to them so long as they remained in the country. ... There is a vast difference between the condition of these native farmers, and that of the people who were left unreservedly under the control of the chiefs. Being virtually independent of the chiefs, and freed by their early training from the trammels which custom and tradition have imposed on other natives, they have advanced in wealth and material prosperity, and as regards their civilization, it admits of being represented as consisting in something more than the possession of a plough and a suit of European clothes ... they are loyal in the true sense of the term; they are better clothed, better fed, and better housed, than any of the surrounding natives.^{iv}

Although Cumming's pre-occupation was to draw a contrast between the few `civilized natives' and the majority `red' people, the above quotation draws attention to a class differentiation in Xhalanga. In this context, class is defined in terms of access to farms with some official recognition. The `school' people, as Cumming pointed out, were granted farms, with "the right of occupation ... secured to them so long as they remained in the country", while the bulk of the `red' people were not granted any farms. The class division coincided with the division between `school' and `red' people, with the class of landholders largely drawn from the school people.

It is these `native farmers', amongst others, that are central to Colin Bundy's work titled *The Rise and Fall of the Peasantry in South Africa* (1979). Bundy was particularly commenting about the remarkable manner they adapted to new challenges presented by colonial market conditions and how they transformed themselves into progressive "peasants" who competed favourably with their counterparts: white farmers.

Before the arrival of amaMfengu in Emigrant Thembuland in 1872, land was under the control of the chief and he was responsible for its allocation.^v The inhabitants were allocated land without any formal survey of land. This system of allocating land started to change with the arrival of amaMfengu. Some amaMfengu were, with the approval of the British Agent, E. Warner, allocated small farms.^{vi} Beacons were pointed out to them. In his testimony to the Thembuland Commission of 1883, chief Gecelo of Xhalanga pointed out

that he thought it wise to demarcate the boundaries of the land given to amaMfengu in order “to save quarrelling” between his people and amaMfengu.^{vii} Gecelo claimed that magistrate Levey, who succeeded Warner as British Agent, and the then assistant magistrate Cumming were kept informed about these transactions.^{viii} Gecelo was adamant that demarcating small farms did not mean that the landholders could sell it. According to him: “It was still my ground, and even the Magistrate said the ground belonged to me”.^{ix} In Gecelo’s mind, the land would revert to him in the event an iMfengu were to vacate the land. In this regard, Gecelo was drawing from the principle of reversion which was the hallmark of the pre-colonial land tenure system. At issue, though, is who the land reverted to: the chief or the clan.

Levey’s account to the same Commission was that when he assumed office in Thembuland in 1875, land had been granted “indiscriminately”. Consistent with his civilising mission, and his attempts to establish a class of African farmers, Levey expressed his dissatisfaction to Gecelo and pointed out that “natives” should get small farms “where they were thoroughly civilized men”. He recommended to Government that it was “very desirable to build up a class of civilized men who would leaven the rest of the tribe”. With the approval of the government, Levey visited the various farms that were demarcated. According to him, he found that some were unoccupied and unattended to. Consequently, he set up conditions and requirements to be met within a period of two years for the acquisition of the farms. These requirements were to “erect a house of the value of not less than 50 pounds, to plant a fruit garden and to make general improvements, such as making dams and other improvements in civilization”. Personal occupation was also required.

After the two years had expired (this must have been around 1877), nine farmers in Xhalanga and five in Southeyville (Stokwe’s territory) met Levey’s requirements.^x They each, according to Levey, obtained certificates “under authority of the Government”. Levey pointed to the Commissioners, however, that subsequently more farmers made worthy improvements, but were not granted certificates.^{xi}

It is interesting to note how Levey’s testimony dovetails with Cumming’s report of 1879 quoted above. It is clear from these two accounts that establishing a class of African farmers was high on their agenda. Both were also keen to draw a division amongst Africans, including divisions between chiefs and the landholders. By 1879, Cumming saw these landholders as being “virtually independent of the chiefs”, and loyal to their colonial masters.

The Gun War and redefining the boundaries of Xhalanga: 1880 - 1884

The outbreak of the ‘Gun War’ in 1880-81 gave colonialists a justification to redefine the boundaries of the district of Xhalanga. It also marked the abolition of chieftainship in Emigrant Thembuland. Very briefly, when the Peace Preservation Act was implemented in

Basotoland in 1880, there was active rebellion against it. At its height, a magistrate by the name of Hope, and two other British officials were killed in Qumbu on 23 October 1880. Worth noting is that chiefs Gecelo in Xhalanga and Stokwe in Southeyville were involved in the war.^{xii} In his reminiscences, Stanford has remarked that Gecelo “was a waverer” who, in the final analysis reluctantly participated in the war. On the other hand, Stokwe led his forces in the Lady Frere and Indwe areas. After various skirmishes,^{xiii} chiefs Gecelo and Stokwe were defeated. Stokwe was severely wounded and killed in a skirmish with Colonel Wavell on 13 November 1880 at the valley of the river of Indwe. To this day, the story of Stokwe’s death and his grave are not fully known. With the death of Stokwe and the surrender of Gecelo, the war in Emigrant Thembuland came to an end. The ‘Gun War’ ended in early 1881 with a victory by the colonial forces.

Soon after the Gun War, colonialists declared the part of Emigrant Thembuland that went to war a conquered territory. In its session of 1882, the Cape parliament discussed the Gun War and decided to refer to a select committee the question about the future of the conquered territory. The committee subsequently submitted a report in which it recommended, amongst others, that Gecelo be dispossessed of his portion of Xhalanga and that this portion be allotted to white farmers. The committee also sought the consent of the imperial government in the granting of individual titles, in the remaining portion of Xhalanga and Stokwe’s Southeyville. These titles would be granted to Africans, irrespective of tribal background (Theal 1919: 149). Lastly, the committee further recommended that a commission of inquiry be appointed to look into the matter. Parliament accepted the committee’s report, including the appointment of the commission of inquiry.

A Thembuland Commission was established in 1882 “to consider and report upon the question of the permanent occupation of the country lately occupied by the Rebel Emigrant Tembus, Maxongo’s Hoek, and the vacant lands in the Gatberg district”.^{xiv} In 1883, the Commission issued a report with recommendations. On 7 February 1883, Commission chairman, John Hemming told a group of “loyal native farmers in the Southeyville District, and native farmers who propose(d) coming into the District”:

I want to tell you about this land belonging to the chiefs who went into rebellion; that land goes to the Government; it does not belong to the chiefs any longer. But the Government says it does not want to take the land away from the Kafir people, except a small strip under the big mountain – the Drakensberg.^{xv}

It is thus this Commission that redrew the boundaries of Emigrant Thembuland and established a new Xhalanga district that existed from 1883 to the official end of apartheid in 1994 and indeed the re-demarcation of boundaries in 2000. Titles based on individual land tenure were also issued to Africans, irrespective of their tribal affiliations.

In arriving at the new boundaries, the Commission argued that it was in the interests of “the European” and “the country at large” to have as neighbours “honest, loyal men of proved character” in order “to minimize thefts and to place as little cause for friction between the two sections of the community as possible”. Parts of the district of Southeyville were amalgamated with the remainder of Xhalanga. In 1884, the village township of Cala, which was occupied mainly by “Europeans”, was also added. Cala was the seat of the magistracy, with Charles J. Levey, the former British Agent, as the first Resident Magistrate of the new Xhalanga district. In 1887, two years after the annexation of Emigrant Thembuland to the Colony of the Cape, Cala was constituted as a municipality under provisions of the Municipal Act of 1882.^{xvi} This completed the process of establishing a new Xhalanga district.^{xvii}

The Commission also recommended that “loyalists” should be rewarded with “a fair amount of arable land with commonage rights, to be secured to them in the first instance by the fixing of beacons, and registration in some permanent form of their rights, on payment of a quitrent of 5s (R3.00) per morgen of arable land per annum”. With regard to the size of the farms, the Commission recommended that the holdings should not exceed 15 morgen, “with grazing rights in the proportion of not more than 15 morgen of commonage to 1 morgen of arable land”.

On the vital issue of land tenure, the Commission pointed out that there were “loyal natives” who are anxious and prepared to pay for their land at once and obtain their title deeds”. Following a system that applied to white farmers, the African landholders indicated that they were prepared “to capitalize the rent by paying down for twenty years”, after which the land would be theirs. The Commission, however, explained to them “that they would have to pay the expenses of survey and title deed” (see Carstens 1981). The Commission strongly recommended that the wishes of the “loyal natives” be met.^{xviii}

The Commission’s recommendations are a good example of the ambiguity in the Cape colonial policy towards ‘the natives’. On the one hand, the Commissioners believed that “as the Natives see the advantage of individual title, they will gradually fall into European ideas as to the ownership of land, and lasting peace and contentment as far as land matters are concerned will be secured”.^{xix} However, by recommending a new demarcation of boundaries that would separate blacks and whites, the Commissioners presented themselves as adherents of segregation. The tension between assimilation and segregation in the recommendations of the Commission was thus symptomatic of a wider tension in the Cape colonial government policy. The colonial strategy of divide and rule in the Cape seemed to have revolved around dividing Africans along social and class lines, rather than “indirect rule” through chiefs. In this strategy, benefits in land were closely tied to the question of loyalty.

Although the government did not accept all the recommendations of the Thembuland Commission, however, it did accept the one giving “loyalists” arable land on a quitrent basis. This clearly meant that, at least in the eyes of the government, Xhalanga would no longer be established as a tribal area, under chiefs, as was anticipated when Emigrant Tembuland was established. People who were in occupation of land before the war, and remained loyal, qualified for access to land. The Commission submitted a list of people whom it recommended should be settled in Xhalanga - see Table 1 below for details of the people.

Table 1: List of people allocated land after the Thembuland Commission

Name of farmer	Farm sizes in 1870s	Location of farms pre-1883	Farm sizes post-1883
1. Timothy Makiwane	350	Mzwazwa	500
2. Khalipha (senior)	1250	Uziduli stream	500
3. Solomon Khalipha	872	Indwe River	500
4. Paulus Madliwa	740	Indwe River	500
5. Jonas Tiwani	1500	Xhalanga Mission Station	500
6. Jonas Mntengwane	Not indicated	Embokothwa	500
7. Solomon Mayongo	2635	Xhalanga Mission Station	500
8. Maya Bizwa	Not indicated	Luphaphasi	500
9. Morris Mxaku	1710	Luphaphasi	500
10. Jantjie Mgcodo	Not indicated	Near Xhalanga	500
11. Kasana	Not indicated	Tsomo River	500
12. W. Kanyana	Not indicated	Sifonondile	500
13. Samson Petini		Sifonondile	500
14. Mbali Ndabula	Not indicated	Sifonondile	500
15. W. Sambula	Not indicated	Isanzana ^{xx}	500
16. Jan Mlonzi	Not indicated	Isanzana	500
17. Fiklandt (Figlan)	Not indicated	Tsomo River	500
18. Luke Kohle	Not indicated	Xhalanga	500
19. Jafta Mvinjelwa	250	Mzwazwa	250
20. Jonas Nombewu	Not indicated	Leeuwkop	250
21. John Sigenu	Not indicated	Mbokotwa	250
22. William Sigenu	Not indicated	Mbenge	250
1. Zondika	833	Near Mayongo's farm	15
2. Qamata	Not indicated	Near Tiwana's farm	15
3. Saule	863	Near Morris Mxaku	15
4. Nyelika	561	Ziduli	15
5. J.L. Mama	1125	Ziduli	15
6. Bunyonyo	250	Mzwazwa	15
7. Fani	Not indicated	Near Luphaphasi	15
8. W.M. Krai	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
9. Duncan Makhohliso	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
10. Jikumlando	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
11. W. Krai (Junior)	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
12. D. Krai	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
13. Dawit (Daweti)	Not indicated	Unspecified	
14. Dalingozi	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
15. T. Khalipha	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
16. Cimizele	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
17. Maarman	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
18. Ganyaza	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
19. Tengiwe	Not indicated		15
20. Rasmene (Rasmeni)	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
21. Kafila	Not indicated	Unspecified	15
22. Mati	Not indicated	Unspecified	15

Land tenure in Xhalanga after the 1883 Commission

Consequent to the acceptance of the Thembuland Commission recommendation, a rough survey was made and individual arable plots demarcated. Certificates of occupation were then given to those who qualified for land based on the criteria of the Commission. The Commission left the Xhalanga landholders with the clear impression that, pending further clarification by the government, the survey and certificates of occupation were temporary measures until such time as the people could afford to pay for a complete survey, at which point appropriate titles would be issued.^{xxi}

However, the promulgation of the Glen Grey Act of 1894 had serious implications for the realisation of the promises of the Commission, particularly with respect to the issuing of freehold title deeds for those who could afford to pay for the survey. The tenure provision of the Glen Grey Act prescribed that one “man” was entitled to “one plot” of between four and five morgen. This clearly put the Xhalanga landholders at a disadvantage. As already noted, the Thembuland Commission had recommended that “loyalists” be granted land not exceeding 15 morgen, excluding grazing rights to the commonage. Indeed, landholders such as Solomon Khalipha and Mankayi Renqe were rewarded with large portions of land for supporting the colonialists.^{xxii} By restricting one man to one plot, the Glen Grey Act made it impossible for African farmers to accumulate land.

Following the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the government took decisive steps to address the land tenure problem that had arisen especially regarding granting freehold title deeds to the Xhalanga landholders. The Union government was guided by the 1909 constitution which was based on segregation between black and white. The publication of *Proclamation No. 241* of 1911 dashed all hopes that the Xhalanga landholders had of getting a freehold title to their land.

By 1911, the nature and composition of the population of Xhalanga was changing. Despite the intentions of the Thembuland Commission to limit the number of people in Xhalanga to those it recommended, the population in the district grew. Part of this growth was as a result of natural population growth. There were, however, other reasons for the growth. The holders of certificates of occupation had tenants and sharecroppers on their land. Some of them came during and after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.^{xxiii} They were often referred to as “loose people”^{xxiv} (*amalose*).

When the district was surveyed in terms of *Proclamation 241* of 1911, the surveyor classified the people of Xhalanga into three “classes”:

- The occupiers of allotments under the system of certificates of occupation, introduced in 1885-7, numbering 815, (called “occupiers”);
- Hut-tax payers who are cultivating lands but hold no form of title whatsoever;
- Applicants for land (a) who pay hut-tax but cultivate no land, (b) sons of “occupiers” living with their parents but paying no tax.^{xxv}

The main provision of *Proclamation No. 241* of 1911 was “the creation of locations and the granting of allotments within the District of Xhalanga in the Territory of Emigrant Tembuland”. The proclamation provided for two categories of titles for the people of Xhalanga, one for holders of the certificate of occupation, and the other for people who were not in possession of certificates of occupation. The *Proclamation* created two categories of landholders - proprietors and registered holders, each with its own form of title. According to the *Proclamation*, a proprietor, also a holder of a certificate of occupation “shall mean the holder of a quitrent title issued in terms of this Proclamation, and subject to the conditions set forth in Schedule A hereof”. These title-holders became known as ‘Schedule A’ holders. ‘Registered holders’ held title under ‘Schedule B’. Both titles had severe restrictions and conditions attached and were certainly not the same or similar to the *Embokotwa* title that was, after twenty years, convertible to freehold title. The main difference with the titles pertained to the forfeiture of the granted allotments. In the case of ‘Schedule A’ titles, the title holder would forfeit the land in the event of rebellion, while in the case of ‘Schedule B’ titles, the holder thereof could lose land in the event of failing to beneficially occupy the allotment for a period of three years, amongst other things (see also Carstens 1981:66).

The significance of this *Proclamation* was that it did not do away with the class divisions that were created when certificates of occupation were issued to landholders. Instead, it created categories of quitrent titles that had severe restrictions compared to the preferred freehold titles of the whites in neighbouring Embokotwa in the Elliot district. Otherwise, the land that was granted to the landholders was not taken away from them. If anything, more landholders were created under ‘Schedule B’.

No provision was made in 1911 for inhabitants who paid tax, but had no land to cultivate, such as the children of occupiers, on the one hand, and ‘loose’ people, who resided on the land of the landholders, on the other hand. This meant that the vast majority of the rural inhabitants would be left without any legal document conferring land rights on them. Notable is that resistance to the new measures on the part of the landholders, who had by this time been regarded as “rebels” and no longer “loyalists” were thwarted (see Ntsebeza 2006 for details).

The Betterment Scheme in Xhalanga

By the early 1930s, it was becoming evident that overcrowding and overgrazing were having serious environmental and conservation effects on land in the Xhalanga district. The issue of conservation became a subject of debate in the United Transkeian Territories General Council in the early 1930s. Notable is that it was Fred J. Kockott, the Chairman of the District Council of Xhalanga, who moved a "Notice of Motion" which read:

The Chairman, District Council, Xhalanga, to move:-

`That with a view to combating the evils of soil erosion in particular and also with a view to improving the grade of stock in the Native locations in these Territories and the pastoral conditions generally therein, the Government be respectfully requested to provide legislation:

- (1) imposing levies upon all classes of stock graduated according to number, with provision for exemption for minimum numbers:
- (2) making provision for the establishment of location bodies and the investment thereof with
 - (a) a measure of control of the funds accruing from such levies, and
 - (b) the management of their commonage' (Pim 1933:76).

Kockott's argument was based on the view that "all classes of stock are increasing at a rate which has already burdened the commonages, and further similar expansion of the numbers will be a calamity of the first importance". He concluded: "Unfortunately our grazing grounds have not increased and I will prove that to-day they are already carrying twice their capacity" (Pim 1933:77).

Only in 1865, when abaThembu settled in the area, Sir Walter Stanford (Macquarrie 1958:27) described Xhalanga in these terms:

It had never been overpopulated or over-stocked and its condition after the seven years' rest was superb.^{xxvi} The pasturage was luxuriant everywhere. The forests were beautiful and mimosa trees were abundant in many a valley. With the grass so thick as to retain the rain water as it fell and allow it slowly to distil towards the main river channels there were no erosions of the soil and running streams and fountains were abundant in every part. Game had multiplied.^{xxvii}

Yet, instead of recommending that additional land be made available for grazing, Kockott suggested that there should be stock limitation that entailed that "scrub" stock would be replaced with "quality" stock. While claiming, insultingly, that "it is characteristic of the Natives that they are happy-go-lucky; an admirable trait if not overdone", Kockott argued that there was a need to "frame legislation which would save the Natives" (Pim 1933:78-9).

The conversation measures, known as the Betterment Scheme, were formally introduced in Xhalanga on 23 November 1962, in terms of Government Gazette number

1910. It was not, however, until the late 1960s and 1970s that the scheme was actually implemented. A critical aspect of the scheme entailed the demarcation of land into grazing camps, residential plots and fields. In most cases, the demarcation entailed the removal of people from their areas of residence into new settlements. All those interviewed, including headmen and supporters of the apartheid government, pointed out how illogical the demarcation exercise was. They explained that before the Betterment demarcation, the residential sites divided the grazing camps from the fields. This meant that, despite the fact that grazing camps were not fenced, the risk of livestock destroying crops in the fields was limited by the fact that the residential sites acted as a buffer.^{xxviii} With the introduction of Betterment planning, residential sites were in most cases relocated away from the fields. Often, the fields were adjacent to grazing camps. This meant that fields could only be protected from animals for as long as there was effective fencing of grazing camps and close monitoring of gates. The Betterment Scheme promised the provision of fencing of grazing land and rangers were employed to monitor and maintain the fences and gates.

The people who were primarily affected by this kind of planning were the landholders (*oonomokolo*). These were the holders of the Schedule A and Schedule B quitrent titles discussed in chapter 4 of this study. Betterment planning affected landholders who were removed from their residential plots in another way. The new plots that they were allocated were smaller than the old plots. Headman Fani, who became headman when Betterment was being implemented, explained: “People were removed to new settlements. People who had bigger plots lost as the new plots were smaller. The law stipulated that measurements should be 50m x 50m. There was no compensation for land. Compensation was only for huts, and even then, it was the government who determined the amount”.^{xxix}

In order to illustrate the concrete implications of Betterment planning in Xhalanga, the following example from one of the landholders at Emnxe is presented. Lungiswa Muriel Mguli (hereafter Madeyi, her clan name) was, until 1998, a community health worker employed by HCT cited above. According to her, landholders (*oonomokolo*) at Emnxe wanted to use their land for agricultural purposes, but could not do so as a result of damage caused by the stock.^{xxx} She recalled that after the implementation of Betterment, fields (*amasimi*) were adjacent to grazing camps, and houses were far away at the foot of the hills (*eziingqaqeni*). “By the time you get to the fields”, explained Madeyi, “the cow has finished eating”. The fields, according to her, were not fenced, and there were no herd boys, as children were encouraged to go to school. When the landholders asked the headman to arrange for the fencing of the grazing land, they were, according to Madeyi, told that the government did not have the necessary resources. Madeyi recalled that landholders refused a suggestion by the headman that they should lease their fields to some white people who wanted land for agricultural purposes. According to her, their counter suggestion to the headman was that, given the failure by the government to provide fencing, the landholders

should be allowed to go back to their old sites (*kuzwedala*). Their argument, as Madeyi explained, was that they would be closer to their fields.

Notable is Madeyi's observation that the failure to use their fields productively was due to the fact that camps and fields were not fenced, with the result that stock damaged their crop. While this is undoubtedly a key factor, research in the area and other communal areas strongly suggests that there are a whole variety of other reasons preventing rural people from productively utilising their fields. There seem to be two major reasons. First, rural people do not have access to financial support that would make it possible for them to buy seeds, purchase or hire tractors and related implements, hire labour and buy fertilisers (for those who are not following natural and organic farming). The quitrent titles and PTOs are not recognised by financial institutions and thus cannot be used as collateral. Some may argue that rural people could continue to use cattle and manure for ploughing and fertilising, rather than modern technology. However, given current conditions, these methods are no longer feasible. Research on livestock production in Xhalanga showed that about 85 per cent of those interviewed owned between one and ten cattle, with 50 per cent of the respondents owning between one and five cattle. A cursory look at the figures in the Department of Agriculture in Cala seemed to confirm that the bulk of cattle owners in Xhalanga seem to own less than 30 cattle. In Cala Reserve, for example, one owner, who is also a ranger, had 83 cattle, but the rest owned between 1 and 22. A key factor for the decline in stock ownership seems to be overcrowded grazing fields and periodic droughts (Ntsebeza 2002a). Related to the above is the changing nature of rural life. Agriculture is not seen, particularly by the youth, as a viable means of livelihood, and formal education in its current form hardly orientates young people towards an agriculturally based livelihood. Consequently, a common complaint in rural areas is that youth are not interested in agriculture, leading to labour shortages.^{xxxii}

Attempts by Madeyi and her colleagues to take their case to Chief K.D. Matanzima revealed how vindictive a character Matanzima and his supporters at Qamata were. The occasion was used to belittle and vilify the people of Xhalanga presumably for the manner they resisted Tribal Authorities and Matanzima in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Xhalanga landholders had managed to secure an appointment with the Regional Authority at Qamata through the efforts of a lawyer who grew up at Emnxe, and was considered by the landholders as being close to Matanzima. The practice of going through people who were known by Matanzima, rather than following legal channels and procedures was, of course, standard practice in the corrupt Transkei under his rule. After all, Matanzima represented himself as the law in Transkei. According to Madeyi, after explaining to the Regional Authority what their problem was, the Chief in charge of the Regional Authority on that day berated the Xhalanga landholders: "Hey! You are groping in the dark (*Tyhini! Nifukuza nje emnyameni*). You don't even know chiefs. What does Mr Stofile (head of eQolombeni Tribal Authority) say?" When one of the men in the Emnxe delegation tried to

argue, he was abruptly told: “You don’t do that to a chief (*akwenjenjalo enkosini*). You are talking nonsense”. The Chief apparently even threatened to arrest (“*ukubopha*”) the delegate from Emnxe. With regard to the request to be returned to their pre-Betterment land, the Chief warned the Emnxe delegation that what they were saying would land them in prison for suggesting “that the person who did the demarcation was out of his mind (*wayengenangqondo ngokucanda olwahlobo*)”. It was quite clear that the Chief knew about the people of Emnxe and wanted to teach them a lesson. The landholders from Emnxe were finally told that they should make a formal application requesting that the camp next to their fields be demarcated for residential purposes. The letter that was subsequently written by the landholders had, by the early 1990s, according to Madeyi, not elicited any response, other than being told by the headman of Emnxe that legal processes take a long time (“*izinto zomthetho zihamba kade*”).

Madeyi’s account represents the specific position of those landholders who were relocated. Their problem was not landlessness, as such, but the fact that they were too far from their fields. Additionally, these landholders did not represent all the landholders at Emnxe, but only those who were removed. According to Madeyi, the landholders that she represented were eight in total.

The majority of the inhabitants of Emnxe and other administrative areas in Xhalanga had, however, a different set of land-related problems. Their problem was ‘land hunger’. Not only did they not have fields to grow their crops, they also did not have residential plots to build their houses. The composition of this landless group ranged from the grown-up children of landholders who wanted to establish their own independent existence, on the one hand, to newcomers, mostly people who were either evicted by neighbouring white farmers or voluntarily left the farms, on the other hand. Between 1960 and 1991, the population of the rural areas of Xhalanga had more than doubled, having grown from 24 360 in 1960, to 60 545 in 1991. By 1993, the rural population in this district was estimated at 63 754.^{xxxii} By contrast, the size of land had not expanded.

Sub-headman Dyantyi of Luphaphasi has pointed out that by the mid-1980s, it was difficult to get land. The plots that were demarcated in the 1960s had been fully allocated. There were delays in demarcating more sites. The practice was that the headman would call a meeting of (male) inhabitants where a grazing camp would be identified and a recommendation made to the Tribal Authority for the camp to be converted into a residential area. If approved by the Tribal Authority, the headman would contact the officials of the Department of Agriculture to do the planning and demarcation. This process was time-consuming and several people, like sub-headman Dyantyi, were forced to resort to claiming land without the approval of the Tribal Authority, as early as the 1980s.^{xxxiii} These measures, acts of despair under the repressive conditions of the 1980s, demonstrate the chronic shortage of land. In Dyantyi’s area, Luphaphasi, the shortage of land for both grazing and residential purposes was evident even at the time the area was declared a

betterment area in January 1963. Landholders in this area held about 782 morgen of the total land in this area of 2844. Of the 333 families in 1963, about 138 were landless and also did not own any stock. About 72 owned stock, but did not have land.^{xxxiv}

Lists of people who needed residential plots were compiled in many administrative areas of Xhalanga. Sub-headman and their committees compiled these lists in their villages.^{xxxv} The lists were ultimately forwarded to the office of the District Commissioner through the headman and Tribal Authorities. By the early 1990s, however, there had been no demarcation of land. The standard response was that legal processes take a long time.

Landholders who were forcibly moved found themselves in a position where they could not make any productive use of their land, largely due to destruction of their crops by livestock, but also due to other factors highlighted above, such as lack of access to financial resources. By the early 1990s, there was hardly any material difference between landholders, who had access to fields, and those who had no access. More than 50% of fields held under quitrent titles lay fallow and were effectively grazing land for livestock.

In sum, the situation in 1994 was that the rural population of Xhalanga was differentiated in terms of landholding. The following were the broad categories: individual farmers who were allocated land before the Thembuland Commission of 1883; landholders who had residential plots and fields for cultivation and residents who only had access to residential plots. Population growth created pressure on grazing land. At the same time, the failure of the betterment scheme to fence grazing land meant that fields for cultivation were gradually converted into grazing fields. Under these circumstances, livestock production became the main form agriculture took.

LAND REFORM PROGRAMME IN XHALANGA

Overview

By the end of the first five years of the introduction of the land reform programme in South Africa, the rural residents of Xhalanga who, as will be seen below, made their living partly out of land use, were not aware of the existence of the programme. Land reform in Xhalanga came about in 2000 as a result of a combination of academic research and use of this research by a local NGO. This NGO, Cala University Students Association (CALUSA), had been operating in Xhalanga since the early 1980s. Established in 1983, the NGO initially supported long distance learning students registered through the University of South Africa (UNISA). However, by the early 1990s, CALUSA had changed its focus to rural development, using a participatory development approach called People's Participatory Planning and Action (PPPA) that was popularised in Bangladesh. It set up community development committees (CDCs) to co-ordinate development processes in various localities. A range of projects were established, including crop production employing natural/organic farming methods, poultry, leatherworks and sewing.

Notable for this report is that most of the agricultural activity took place in communal gardens and residential plots. This is in line with the point made in the historical and background section about land shortage. In places such as Lumphashi, land hungry residents were often thwarted by the land owners who would not commit themselves to signing lease agreements or would threaten to take back their land at will (see Ncapayi, 2013).

As already indicated, academic research conducted on livestock in Xhalanga (Ntsebeza in Ainslie 2002) created conditions for the introduction of the land reform programme in Xhalanga and beyond. The academic research and its findings had a tremendous effect on how CALUSA would reconceptualise its role in rural development. In 2000, the Board of the NGO agreed that the land question, including the land reform programme would be the key focal area of CALUSA. A workshop attended by members of staff of CALUSA and the rural groups that CALUSA had been working with was organised at which Ntsebeza presented the findings of his research. Ntsebeza used the workshop to talk about the land reform programme and advised participants that people with land needs could obtain assistance from the government through the land reform programme (CALUSA, 2000). He further encouraged those interested in the land reform programme to approach CALUSA (CALUSA, 2000). This marked the beginning of land reform in Xhalanga.

In response to its new mandate, CALUSA embarked on two interlinked processes: development of the capacity of its personnel to deal with land reform and to support communities to engage the then Department of Land Affairs (DLA). Thus, from March to the

end of 2000 CALUSA focused on developing its personnel's understanding of the land reform programme through workshops and setting up reading groups (CALUSA, 2000). Furthermore, exposure visits to other land reform projects were organised, e.g. Gallawater next to Whittlesea.

From the beginning of 2001, CALUSA embarked on the process of assisting those rural residents interested in land by informing them about the programme and linking them with DLA. For instance, in their first visit in February 2001 to DLA in Queenstown, there were eight delegates from Cala Reserve and Lumphaphasi that CALUSA accompanied. The delegates were given information on how the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) operated. They were also informed about farms that were on the market in Indwe and Ugie. One of them was Thornhill Farm near Indwe, owned by Mr Etienne Cloete.^{xxxvi} The delegates became interested in the 2029 ha Thornhill Farm. Inclusive of equipment, the total price of the farm was R1.3 million, and without the equipment, it was R1.1 million (CALUSA, undated:2). CALUSA assisted in applying to the DLA for the LRAD grant. We are coming back to this farm when we deal with the case study.

From 2001 to 2008, there was a constant increase of communities that wanted land for production. The increase in the number of groups clearly showed that there was/is demand for agricultural land – see Table 2 below.

Table 2: Groups of land needy people in Xhalanga from 2001 to 2010						
Groups according to areas	Group size	2001	2003	2006	2008	2010
1. Delindlala	40	X	X	X	X	X
2. Funokuhle in Ida	11		X	X	X	X
3. Siyavela group in Cala Reserve	10		X	X	X	
4. Lukhanyo group in Lower Cala	10		X	X	X	X
5. Mongameli group in Cala town	15		X	X	X	
6. Sakhisizwe group in Cala town	15			X	X	
7. Salaita Farm worker group in Indwe	12		X	X	X	
8. Vukuzenzele group in Cala Reserve	30	X	X	X	X	
9. Imiche famers' group in Sifonondile	15			X	X	X
10. Masincedisane group in Cala town	15		X	X	X	
11. Mqondiso-Vukuzenzele in Cala Reserve	12		X	X	X	X
12. Shude family farm in Lumphaphasi	4		X	X	X	X
13. Chewu family group in Lumphaphasi	10				X	X
14. Siyafuya farmers' group in Lumphaphasi	5			X	X	X
15. Ilitha co-operative in Cala town	12				X	
16. Sisonke Thina in Lumphaphasi	20			X		
17. Limefuya farming group	7				X	
18. Siyalima farming group	6					X
19. Lutha farming group	6					

As can be seen in Table 2 above, there were only two groups of applicants in 2001, one from Lumphaphasi and the other Cala Reserve. In 2003, the number increased to ten and 14 in 2006. By 2010, there was a total of nineteen groups that had applied for land under the land reform programme. Also notable for purpose of this report is that the applicants were groups of more than 10 members, with Delindlala, our case study being the largest.

Of the 19 groups, nine were successful, which is just less than 50 per cent of the applicants – see Table 3 below:

Table 3 Groups that successfully acquired farms	
Group names	Group size
1. Delindlala	40
2. Funokuhle in Ida	11
3. Lukhanyo group in Lower Cala	2
4. Imiche famers' group in Sifonondile	44
5. Mqondiso-Vukuzenzele in Cala Reserve	12
6. Shude family farm in Lumphaphasi	4
7. Chewu family group in Lumphaphasi	10
8. Siyafuya farmers' group in Lumphaphasi	5

The introduction of the Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) in 2006 not only slackened the process but arguably dealt land reform in Xhalanga a death blow. Essentially, PLAS takes away the initiative from the communities to identify farms and to approach the department thereafter for grant assistance. In PLAS, the applicants enter their names in the department's data base for the government to consider when there are farms the department has acquired. Most applicants remain in the dark regarding their applications in this process, as there is no way of monitoring progress of the groups' applications. In a workshop CALUSA organised in 2010, an official from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) indicated that they had piles of applicants waiting for allocation of farms. We have not been able to get information about where things are in 2016.^{xxxvii} What we know is that the people from Xhalanga who were interested in acquiring land through the land reform programme have lost hope and all but given up.

We now turn to a case study to reflect on the impact of the land reform programme on social relations, specifically on whether or not land has a role to play in the struggle against inequalities and poverty in South Africa. Our overall argument is that access to land makes a positive difference in the lives of the beneficiaries (see Chitonge and Ntsebeza 2012). Additionally, we present this case study to show that large groups can successfully run big farms.

The example of Delindlala Communal Property Association

Delindlala Communal Property Association (hereafter Delindlala) is a group-based land reform project that is located about five kilometres from the small farm town of Indwe in the Emalahleni municipal area of the Eastern Cape (see map below).



Map of Emalahleni Local Municipality, Eastern Cape

Its membership at inception comprised 40 members. They registered themselves as a Communal Property Association (CPA). The size of the farm is 2,029 hectares. The name of the farm at the time of the application was Thornhill but was renamed Delindlala when the new owners took over in December 2001. The significance of the renaming will become apparent. CALUSA played a key role in the establishment of Delindlala. As already stated, it is academic research that informed the need for land in the Xhalanga district, including Lumphaphasi and inspired CALUSA to re-focus and put the land question high on its rural development activities. CALUSA simplified the results of the academic research and explained them to members of Delindlala. Both interventions, academic research and social facilitation, it must be emphasised, were necessary and the one could arguably not be successful without the other.

The next section deals with the establishment of Delindlala and the land acquisition process up to the end of 2001, when the new owners occupied the farm. This will be followed by an analysis of the activities on the farm in the period between 2001 and 2005, when both research and social facilitation were suspended. The final section is largely an update of developments between 2009 and 2016.

The establishment of Delindlala and the role of academic research and social facilitation

As already indicated, it is the findings of an academic research on livestock in Xhalanga in 1999, which were simplified and explain to rural residents by CALUSA that led to the introduction of land reform in the district. In Lumphaphasi, CALUSA mobilized members of the agricultural groups and income generating projects organized around CDCs. Once the applicants were identified and the process of setting up a CPA was underway, CALUSA ran a

series of planning workshops in preparation for the imminent take-over of the farm by the group. CALUSA also developed profiles of the applicants. Table 3 below provides details of the beneficiaries at the time they occupied the farm in December 2001:

Table 3: Details about the beneficiaries, including assets in 2001

Names of beneficiaries	Employment status	Cattle	Sheep	Size of land
1. Bengo Hazel	Ex-migrant worker	8	20	8.1 morgen ^{xxxviii}
2. Bengo Sizakele (Hazel's son)	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
3. Bomvana Nolinothi	Homemaker	4	25	Residential site
4. Bomvana Reuben (Ncedile)	Ex-migrant worker	4	25	Residential site
5. Chopiso Mistake	Ex-migrant worker	4	25	Residential site
6. Chopiso No-Andile	Homemaker	4	25	None
7. Dyantyi Isaac Zwelinzima	Ex-migrant worker	3	17	8 morgen
8. Dyantyi Nolusapho	Homemaker	0	25	None
9. Dyantyi Oliver T.	Ex-migrant worker	3	17	8 morgen
10. Dyantyi Nolist Kokoni	Homemaker	8	25	None
11. Dyantyi Siggibo Nelson	Ex-migrant worker	0	63	Residential site
12. Dyantyi Nowinas	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	None
13. Eleni Zalusile	Ex-migrant worker	3	15	8 morgen
14. Eleni Nosamkele	Ex-migrant worker	3	14	None
15. Eleni Ndoysisile	Ex-migrant worker	4	15	Residential site
16. Eleni Nosisi Bomvana	Homemaker	0	0	None
17. Khalipha Nowinara	Ex-migrant worker	16	6	Residential site
18. Kandisa Noforest Selina	Homemaker	6	0	Residential site
19. Kutshwa Sizakele	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
20. Kutshwa Nobuntu	Homemaker	0	0	None
21. Mabala David Ngqele	Ex-migrant worker	7	0	Residential site
22. Mabala Nobandla	Homemaker	7	0	None
23. Makamba Nosayinethe	Homemaker	14	0	4 morgen
24. Makatesi Nolikhaya	Homemaker	1	0	None
25. Makatesi Zinikele	Ex-migrant worker	3	0	Residential site
26. Mabadi Eunice Funiwe	Homemaker	1	8	Residential site
27. Mbungwana Zabedela	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
28. Mndini Fungile Swartbooi	Ex-migrant worker	0	7	Residential site
29. Mrawuli Tiki	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
30. Nqezo Nobonephi	Homemaker	9	0	Residential site
31. Nkomana Sindiswa	Homemaker	7	0	None
32. Ntshwenca Zithulele	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
33. Nyambali Victoria N.	Homemaker	3	0	Residential site
34. Nyambali Kanyisa	Migrant worker	0	0	None
35. Qayi Fuzile	Ex-migrant worker	8	0	Residential site
36. Qayi Nozolile	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	None
37. Qezu Tambiya Piet	Ex-migrant worker	0	0	Residential site
38. Sthoza Krokrelwa N.	Ex-migrant worker	3	7	Residential site
39. Yaso Tandeka	Homemaker	2	6	Residential site
40. Zaku Bhejile Johannes	Ex-migrant worker	3	0	Residential
Totals of livestock		154	345	

As can be seen, the group was highly differentiated. For example, 62.5 per cent of the applicants were either ex-migrant or migrant workers. About 12.5 per cent were descendants of the landholders who, as already stated, were targeted for development as African farmers in the 19th century. Almost half of the membership, 52.5 per cent, had no cattle, while 30 per cent had no sheep. In a nutshell, there were beneficiaries that had no assets.

The preparation also entailed a series of discussion around the rules relating to the management on the farm. In the final analysis, the following was agreed upon:

- a) Members would not relocate to the farm, but would take turns in running the farm.
- b) All the assets on the farm, including livestock would over time be owned by the group. However, given the reality that the livestock was owned by individual members, there was agreement that in the interim, each member would be allowed to keep a maximum of 10 cattle and 50 sheep. It was anticipated that as the livestock of the collective increased, stock owned on an individual basis would be gradually phased out until only livestock of the collective remained on the farm.
- c) Crop production would be done collectively on the farm.
- d) Each member would contribute R40 as joining fee that would assist in covering costs until the farm generated its own funds.
- e) Goats would not be allowed on the farm – there were fears that they would create problems with neighbours.

There were however, a couple of issues that emerged that are worth mentioning.

Group size

The size of the group was the first hurdle that the group had to overcome. As will be recalled, the application was made at the time the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) had changed its policy from SLAG to LRAD, the latter programme's main objective being to establish a class of black commercial farmers. The number of applicants when the first application was made consisted of 30 members from each of the villages of Cala Reserve Lumphaphasi. The leaders agreed to form a combined group of people involved in agricultural activities from both villages. The DLA officer and the farmer shot the idea down by arguing that the department would not approve the application because of the big number of the group. Instead, they advised that the farm be taken over by applicants from Delindlala because of the livestock they had. Members from Lumphaphasi accepted the suggestion. Thus, applicants from Cala Reserve were excluded; something that caused tensions between the two groups that required the intervention of CALUSA (CALUSA, 2001; Ncapayi, 2010). A co-ordinating committee of eight members consisting of representatives from both communities resolved to continue operating and collaborating despite the fallout among

the two communities (Ncapayi, 2010). In its mediation, CALUSA stressed the need for co-operation among the members of Lumphaphasi and Cala Reserve.

Following an advice from a DLA officer to apply as families rather than individuals, the number of the applicants again went up to 60 members. Although the District Screening Committee approved the application, the Provincial Director turned it down (Ncapayi, 2010) on the grounds that he felt that “the group was too big and the project did not illustrate that it would be able to employ people” (CALUSA, 2001:34). The department proposed the reduction of members of the group from 60 to 40. CALUSA took up the cause of the applicants. Writing on behalf of the group, Ncapayi had this to say:

It came as a surprise to us when we learnt that DLA was not happy with the size of the group. All the above actions were premised on the understanding that DLA accepted the business plan, CPA constitution, and was supportive of the whole process. On the 10 December 2001, Mr Sukula (DLA) visited CALUSA, to inform it that there were concerns about the size of the group. One of the issues he pointed out as DLA’s concerns was that the Department (DLA) doubted if the project would be able to employ all 60 members. DLA, thus, decided to reduce the group from 60 members (30 families) to 40 members.^{xxxix}

Ncapayi went on to point out that:

DLA assumes that the group intends employing itself on the farm. In the planning workshop of November, the group agreed that they will not employ anybody, instead they will work cooperatively on the farm, guided by the Management Committee.^{xl}

Note the department’s introduction of the concept of job creation through the land reform projects. Yet, there was no indication that the possibility of the project employing the beneficiaries was ever discussed by the applicants.

Members of Delindlala were equally frustrated by the process and the approach of the department. Nozolile Qayi’s comment captures the level of frustration and anger among the members:

LRAD is not meant for poor people like us. It excludes us from being beneficiaries because we do not have resources to match the government’s grant. The government still has to cater for us in its land reform programme. We need land for agriculture and livestock. We cannot develop within the village because of overcrowding (cited from Ncapayi, 2010:91).

In the final analysis, 20 members were excluded from the list, despite the protests, leaving the CPA with 40 members.

The fate of farm workers on the farm

Land reform which targets outsiders often leaves farm workers of the affected farm in a precarious position. Delindlala was no exception. The DLA officer had no clear strategy of dealing with the matter. Instead, he tried to persuade members of the group to include the families as members of the group. This is despite the fact that the same Department had complained that the Delindlala group was too big. Thus, the workers on the farm that was handed to the Delindlala CPA became the responsibility of the beneficiaries. At a planning workshop of the CPA on 29-30 January 2002 which was conducted by CALUSA, members reflected on what to do with the five families of farm workers (CALUSA, 2002:15). Although the Delindlala members were sympathetic, they were not happy with the DLA officer's proposal and in fact rejected it. Over time, the farm workers were phased out of the Delindlala farm.

Teething problems

Start-up capital was a major challenge members of the project were confronted with. They needed funds to cover basic running costs such as telephone, diesel, electricity and repair of equipment. To cover some of these costs, the members agreed to lease part of the farm to a Mr Burgess, a neighbour white farmer. They leased out 572 hectares of the farm at an annual rate of R23,530.00.^{xii} There was further agreement that all members of Delindlala should make monthly contributions of R30.00 towards costs of medication for livestock on the farm.

Group farming presented another major challenge. As noted above, this was a major concern for the DLA Provincial Director during the application process. Indeed, some members of Delindlala also had similar reservations. Not all the members of Delindlala were involved in the communal gardens, where some gained experience in team work. Further, it will be recalled that landholders in Xhalanga fought for individual landholding and for freehold title deeds. It is thus not surprising that some had reservations about the wisdom of group farming.

Notable is that it is members of CALUSA, who, as already stated, had worked with some of the members in establishing communal gardens in the villages, including Luphaphasi, that was confident that group farming could work. In the final analysis, through a series of workshops, members of the group resolved that "there should be equal share of benefits by everyone on the farm".^{xiii}

At its first meeting at the beginning of 2002, the Management Committee of Delindlala, together with CALUSA workers, discussed a plan of action for the year. Two major decisions were taken. Firstly, teams of members that would take turns in working on the farm, were set up. Every member was expected to go and work on the farm when it was

their turn. Members who were unable to go to the farm had an obligation to send their representatives after reporting to the management committee.

However, members who were involved in other businesses, such as transportation, argued that the period allocated to members to work on the farm be reduced to a week. They were worried that spending a month on the farm would mean a huge loss of income from their transport businesses. Other members highlighted the problem of transport costs from Lumphaphasi to the farm. They indicated that they did not have the means to travel to the farm. Despite this, members decided to continue with the original arrangement. For transport, it was agreed that Delindlala's vehicle be used to transport members from the village to the farm and back.^{xliii}

The second decision taken, which is critical to grasp in order to understand current (2016) dynamics on the farm, followed discussions around ownership of the assets on the farm, including livestock. It was easier to resolve the issue of the land and whatever equipment they found on it, such as old tractors and ploughs, etc. An issue that needed more thought and discussion was livestock. The CPA did not have livestock of its own, but not the members owned livestock – see table 3 above.

The discussion that arose regarding livestock revolved mainly around how those who did not own stock would benefit from working on the farm, which included looking after livestock. After all, they were not paid, yet, the livestock, including what the livestock produced was not theirs. Their situation was also exacerbated by the fact that no crops, which would be jointly owned, were at the time produced on the farm. The resolution taken was that livestock owners should contribute two litres of milk per day to the non-livestock owners. There were members who argued that “there should be equal share of benefits by everyone on the farm”.^{xliv} Importantly, the decision to share milk of individual livestock was seen by some to be in line with the group's objective of fighting poverty.

At the time, 80 per cent of the members were livestock owners, with 47 per cent owning more than ten cattle and sheep each. Sheep owners with more than ten sheep each constituted 40 per cent of the livestock owners. Only six per cent of the livestock owners had more than ten cattle each. The rest of the members (53 per cent) had fewer than ten sheep and cattle each. Women had the least livestock in the group.

Production on the farm

The activities of the CPA revolved around crop and livestock production. Important to note is that crop production was a collective efforts, from production to reaping the fruits thereof. Livestock, as has been shown, was characterised by individual ownership of both stock and produce. This report will deal with each of these two streams.

Crop production

Cabbage was identified as one of the crops that would be produced. In 2002, the first year of operation, 1,000 seedlings were planted. In 2003, about 5,000 cabbage seedlings had been planted. The other crops were maize, pumpkins and potatoes (CALUSA, 2002:19). By 2008, crop production had improved such that Delindlala began to enter competitions that were sponsored by the Eastern Cape Province, winning prizes. In 2008, the group planted 40,000 cabbage seedlings that were sold to formal markets, Lumphaphasi and the surrounding villages (CALUSA, 2008). The chairperson, Nozolile Qayi, explained:

There was an assessment of land reform projects in the Chris Hani District Municipality, which also involved extension officers. Central in the assessment was to look for projects that took the initiative and did not wait for support from the government. Delindlala was again chosen as the best project and received the first prize of R13,000.00.^{xlv}

The project went on to represent the district in the provincial farmer competition, where it won a second prize of R25,000.00.^{xlvi} Other prizes included an amount of R45 000 following an assessment by agricultural officials from Bisho and a journalist from the *Farmers Weekly* of all the participating projects. The assessors also visited Delindlala and took photos to verify the production.^{xlvii} In 2011, Delindlala further stepped up its crop production by increasing its cabbage production from 40,000 to 60,000. In the same year, the farm was chosen again as the best land reform project in the district and received a first prize of R20,000.00. It proceeded to, and won a second prize of R30,000.00 in, the provincial farmer competition.^{xlviii} According to Nozolile Qayi, the increase in production was influenced by the availability of the new markets mentioned previously.^{xlix} Apart from cabbage, the group produced potatoes. In 2008, they harvested thirty bags of potatoes, most of which were sold.

Members of Delindlala produced food to both feed themselves and sell to the market, targeting residents in nearby villages, including Lumphaphasi and the local businesses first. Regarding the latter, they were successfully assisted by extension officers to sell to local supermarkets such as Boxer Stores and KwikSpar.^l Targeting villages was seen by the members as their contribution to poverty alleviation in communities. They sold fresh produce at affordable prices. Those members who participated in weeding, harvesting and production of the produce also received shares from the produce.

By 2010, the project had developed a clear land use plan. Fourteen hectares were used for production of sorghum, four hectares for potatoes, one hectare for onions, while cabbages were planted on six hectares – up from just one hectare in 2009. Furthermore, the project's participation in farmer competitions was also a motivating factor.

However, when we (the authors) visited Delindlala towards the end of 2015, four years after Ncapayi completed his PhD fieldwork, crop production has significantly declined. We were told that the decline started in 2012. Drought was highlighted as the main cause. But there was also mention of guinea fowls that were destroying their crops, particularly seedlings. In a meeting with committee members of the project in 2015, they reported their decision to stop crop production on the farm. The fields are now only used for fodder and animal feed.

We now turn to livestock.

Livestock

As indicated, the first lot of livestock on the farm was owned by individuals. However, there was an understanding that over time, the group will acquire its own livestock which, as it grew would gradually displace the livestock owned by individuals. However, the issue of the relationship between members who owned livestock and those who did not was never satisfactorily resolved. It kept on cropping up and, as will be seen, is at the heart of current tensions within the group. In essence, the livestock owners tend to be individualistic and see the farm as an opportunity for them to get better land for grazing. This for them seems to be significance of the farm. Yet, for those without stock, collectivity is at the heart of the Delindlala project.

Indeed, conditions on the farm were far superior to what the stock owners encountered in the village. The stock owners immediately see this. For example, responding to a question from an extension officers in a meeting on 2 May 2003, Sunduza Nkomana – a member of the project – indicated that “there is a big difference in our livestock now. Good quality grazing land on the farm accounts for most of the improvement in livestock on the farm”. Another stock owner, a woman, confirmed: “(B)ecause livestock is well fed due to the improved grazing land on the farm, the cows mate while they still have calves”.^{li} Mistake Chophiso was even more specific about the improved reproductive rate of his cattle: “my cattle calves yearly”.^{lii} For Mistake Chophiso:

Even though I am unemployed, I am able to meet my commitments. For example, I used eight cows and some sheep to pay lobola for my son. My other son has just finished his university education. He graduated last month. Funds for his education also came from the livestock. I recently bought a vehicle and because I am unemployed, I sold almost 30 sheep for it. It cost me R60 000, which I paid cash.^{liii}

Table 4 below illustrates the growth in numbers of livestock for individual members.

Table 4 Livestock of individuals in Delindlala		
Years	Sheep	Cattle
2001	345	154
2006	969	262
2009	800	329

Table adapted from CALUSA Annual Report, 2010

As the table shows, sheep of individuals grew almost three times between 2001 and 2006. Although the cattle grew at a slower pace than sheep, it also almost doubled during the same period. The growth was accompanied by an improved quality of wool of the sheep.^{liv}

As the stock of individuals was growing, Delindlala, the CPA, was building its own stock. At the outset, members agreed that each member would contribute one sheep towards the collective. At the same time, Delindlala received support from a range of sources. Although erratic, extension officers visited the group, mainly to identify needs and problems of the project. For instance, at the end of January 2003, Mr Mnguni visited the group to introduce Mr Tokwe of Umthonyama, a training organisation, to talk about the training programmes the organisation provides.^{lv} At the beginning of May 2003, Delindlala members had a meeting with extension officers, to discuss training needs of the group. During the meeting, the extension officers were impressed by the manner in which the project planned its work.^{lvi} This was proof that some members of the group had begun to take greater responsibility for processes on the farm. From 2005 the Department of Agriculture provided more support and linked the project with other institutions for support. The Department gave the project more attention and support than in previous years. According to the chairperson, Nozolile Qayi:

We got support from CASP^{lvii} to renew the farm's boundary fence and the camps. The previous owner had done away with crop production and, as a result, had converted arable land into camps. The Department of Agriculture assisted in fencing the arable lands to enable us to plough them. The department also installed an irrigation system to fifteen hectares of the fields. The total costs for this work was R300,000.^{lviii}

Furthermore, funding from the National Development Agency (NDA) for the establishment of a dairy in Delindlala encouraged members of the group to discuss introducing dairy cattle for the collective. NDA transferred R75,000 in June 2005.^{lix} In pursuance of the idea of the dairy, in August, members of Delindlala resolved to purchase a cooler for the dairy from the

funds. NDA also gave Delindlala further funding for the purchase of Friesland cows, which were the first dairy cows on the farm. The group has also received assistance through the government's Recapitalisation Programme.

Currently, the project has more than 57 dairy cows. This figure excludes heifers and calves whose figures could not be verified before printing the report. The dairy delivers milk daily to Indwe for the villagers, local people in town. The group also has 100 Bonsmara stock with 45 calves; 48 mixed breed cattle; and 180 sheep with 32 lambs.

Despite these strides in building the resources of the group, the tension between the individual stock owners and those committed to building the resources of the collective persists. Various claims and counter claims are made and there seems to be deep distrust between stock owners, who, as already indicated are men and non-stock owners, the majority of whom are women. This is a matter we, the authors are picking up as we continue with this round of research beginning towards the end of 2015 as indicated earlier. More research should be done on this matter and we are in the middle of it.

There are other challenges that face livestock, whether individual or group owned. From the outset, the people in the neighbouring villages constantly destroy the boundary fence. In a meeting of the group on 3 April 2002, it was reported that the farm's boundary fence was either loosened or cut. Linked to this problem was the fact that there were villagers who trespassed on the farm for game hunting. In the same meeting members discussed ways of dealing with the problems. The following proposals were made:

- that Delindlala should request that the headmen of these two villages;
- allow members of Delindlala to address these communities;
- that there be patrols on the farm; and
- the management committee should report this problem to the police in Lady Frere and Indwe.^{ix}

None of the above problems seems to have been adequately solved. For example, the police, despite promises, are not acting on, say, people who trespass on the farm and hunt wild animals.

Livestock owners also had problems with receiving extension services from the Department of Agriculture. This was particularly the case in the first two to three years of operations. The absence of a prompt response and very erratic extension support from the Department of Agriculture worsened the situation for the project's stockowners. Lack of funds was cited as the reason for the failure of extension services. CALUSA contracted at own costs the services of an independent farmer-trainer in Cala, to provide stock management training and support to the livestock owners in the project (CALUSA, 2003:20). In addition, through its partnership with the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Dr Thembela Kepe organised funds to purchase medication for the livestock. Furthermore, Dr Kepe assisted in exerting pressure on the veterinary services of the

Department of Agriculture to vaccinate the livestock. The intervention helped to curb further disease-related stock losses.^{lxi} This is confirmed by Mistake Chophiso, one of the stock owners explains: “My cattle died then because it needed vaccination. After the vaccination, I had no further deaths of cattle”.^{lxii}

Management of Delindlala

Women have emerged as a powerful force in the management of the farm. This is not surprising given that the majority of men are stock owners who care more about their stock than the other aspects of the farm. This is reminiscent of the role women played and continue to play in the village where their husbands and sons are migrant workers. They ended and end up running the household. However, unlike most women in the village, whose labour is barely openly recognized and men take the credit, the women of Delindlala began, by the beginning of 2004 to push for recognition of initially their labour. Consequently, there was agreement to pay those who worked on the farm a monthly stipend. One of them, Nozolile Qayi, who was initially elected deputy chairperson and is now the chairperson of Delindlala, was insisted that “members who fail to commit their labour to activities of the group should be called to order immediately” (*umntu ongafuni kwenzanto eyenziwa ngabantu simxoxise ngelo xesha*). She raised this in view of discussions about the need for weeding in the fields.^{lxiii} Women also pushed for the revival of sub-committees, through which members participated in the project’s activities.^{lxiv} The following sub-committees were then re-established: assets management, the management of fields, livestock management, and the farmhouse care.

It is under the leadership of women that the dairy was established in 2005, with funds amounting to R752,540.00 coming from the National Development Agency (NDA) (CALUSA, 2005). They were/are also credited for targeting the youth, in the form of their children to be members of CPA with the aim of eventually taking over from them – some kind of succession plan. As Ncapayi’s (2013) study shows, leaders such as Nozolile Qayi welcomed the changes because they felt that “the old-guard delayed progress” (*abant’ abadala babambezel’ umnxilo*).^{lxv} One of the young men recruited, Thando Bengo, who unfortunately passed away in 2015, concurred, at the time, with Qayi, arguing that when in leadership, the elder guard refused the younger generation space to introduce new ideas on the farm. The old-guard was also very cautious and refused to spend money, hence the view that they delayed progress.^{lxvi}

Concluding remarks

This report is written at a time when an in-depth research on Delindlala and the extent to which they have fulfilled their dream of defying poverty (*Delindlala*) is being realized or not

has just begun. The research builds on Ncapayi's doctoral research whose field work ended in 2011. The initial focus of the current research is an update of developments since 2011.

Although it is too early to make findings and draw conclusions, it seems clear from the few visits Ncapayi and Ntsebeza have conducted that there are deep tensions between the Delindlala woman-led management and male-dominated live-stock owners around the implementation of the original agreement that livestock held on an individual basis was a temporal measure and that the target was to populate the farm with livestock owned by the collective. This is a sensitive issue that we, Ncapayi and I, do not want to deal with irresponsibly by jumping pre-maturely to conclusions. We are doing our best to understand the situation and ensuring that all those involved are interviewed and whatever they tell us followed through carefully.

One observation made so far is that there seems to be a difference in how tensions are handled during the early years of the establishment of Delindlala, when CALUSA and Ncapayi were actively involved, on the one hand and the period the state intervened with its programmes, particularly the recapitalization programme which made provision for the employment of a mentor. Indeed, there were tensions among the members from the outset. In the early days, CALUSA, as has been seen, ensured that whenever there were tensions and disagreements, meetings would be held and CALUSA would facilitate the discussions, ensuring that decisions were arrived at. CALUSA also monitored these decisions and would remind members about what they committed themselves to. This kind of facilitation was not available after 2005 largely due to the fact that CALUSA experienced funding problems, common among NGOs and also that there was no provision made for funding an NGO in the grants that were provided by the state. However, these are merely preliminary thought and the issue requires careful investigation before firm conclusions are arrived at.

With the above in mind, it is worth recalling the findings and conclusions of Ncapayi's doctoral thesis. This study, in our view, provides a solid foundation for the current period. Ncapayi had argued that the implementation of land reform through Delindlala has had an immense influence on social relations in Lumphaphasi. A new social group of farmers (*amafama*) in the village has emerged. However, these farmers claim to be committed to eradicating "hunger" (*indlala*). At the time Ncapayi completed his fieldwork, the Lumphaphasi residents expressed mixed views about the impact made by these new farmers. Some residents in the village saw members of Delindlala as playing a positive role in the village.

I see rapid increase in the number of livestock of the beneficiaries. Even the members who have brought their livestock back to the village, the livestock has increased.

There is certainly a change in their livestock. The other issue that I observe from the beneficiaries is that when we need something we buy from them. This is mutual because we support them and they support us. Thus, I regard the beneficiaries as farmers.^{lxvii}

Another observed: “[T]he land reform beneficiaries contribute a lot in Lumphaphasi. We purchase livestock from them for our social activities. They also provide us with milk”.^{lxviii}

On the other hand, some residents view the members as self-centred:

[t]he members of Delindlala know that we do not have jobs here in the village. As farmers, they should open up jobs and get people from the village to work on the farm. The beneficiaries should also realise that households are not the same. Some households are poor and have nothing to eat whilst others have the means. Local people should be the ones turning down job opportunities from Delindlala.^{lxix}

The above confirms how the land reform beneficiaries are viewed. They are viewed as farmers who, because of their social and economic status, should create jobs for, and provide produce to, the villagers.

Ncapayi also argued that academic research and social facilitation by development agents such as NGOs played an important role in whatever success Delindlala can be credited for. It is through an academic research exercise that the need for land in Xhalanga was identified, which led to the involvement of CALUSA. The latter used research, including Ncapayi’s doctoral study to empower its members who in turn facilitated the land acquisition process, especially the development plan.

Important for the current research project is an exploration of the impact of government intervention through its programmes at a time when the role of the NGO, dwindled from 2005 and no academic research was conducted since 2011.

-
- ⁱ Mafeje translates the term as 'free-booters' or 'marauders' (1963:34).
- ⁱⁱ Most of this account is taken from Mafeje (1963:31-34). For an interesting account of the various African groups, see Peires (1981, especially 84-89).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Mafeje argues that the "Nguni tribes" have been in South Africa for over 300 hundred years. He cites reports from the "survivors of the Stavenisse" in 1686 who state that they travelled through five kingdoms, interpreted by Mafeje as the amaXhosa, Griqua, Khoikhoi, abaThembu and abaMbo. It is, according to Mafeje, not clear where these "tribes" came from. He questions JH Soga's unsubstantiated claim that they came from Natal (1963:31).
- ^{iv} G.33 – 1879:91.
- ^v What follows with regard to land allocation in Xhalanga is extracted from the testimonies of Gecelo and his councillor, Jim, to the Thembuland Commission of 1882-83, G. 66 - '83, especially pp 22-30.
- ^{vi} CMT, 3/873.
- ^{vii} G. 66 - '83:23.
- ^{viii} E. Warner was the son of Joseph Warner; after he resigned as "Tambookie Agent", he continued to work in Emigrant Thembuland as a missionary (see footnote 114 – Saunders 1978: 16).
- ^{ix} G. 66 - '83:24. Note the relationship between chief and magistrate and the tacit concession by Gecelo that he did not have absolute control over what he regarded as his land.
- ^x It has not been possible for us to establish the size of the population in Xhalanga at the time so as to work out the percentage size of the African farmers. But it would be reasonable to say that they formed a tiny minority of the overall population.
- ^{xi} G. 66 - '83, pp 48-9. These certificates did not have the status of a freehold title.
- ^{xii} For details of the processes leading to the involvement of chiefs in Xhalanga in the Gun War, see Ntsebeza (2006).
- ^{xiii} See the reminiscences of Stanford for details (Macquarrie 1958, Volume One).
- ^{xiv} G. 66 - '83.
- ^{xv} G. 66 - '83:54-55.
- ^{xvi} CMT, 2/14:4; G. 3 – 1884:119-120; G. 2 – 1885:125.
- ^{xvii} The boundaries of this district remained, except for the inclusion of some farms to the Transkei after its independence in 1976, the same until the demarcation of boundaries in 2000, in post-1994 South Africa.
- ^{xviii} G. 66 – '83:2.
- ^{xix} G. 66 - '83:13-5.
- ^{xx} It has not been possible to determine what Isanzana refers to. I could not find it in the map that was produced in March 1883.
- ^{xxi} CMT, 3/873.
- ^{xxii} Before the Commission, Khalipha's land was 872 morgen, and after it, it was reduced to 500 morgen. It has not been possible to get information about Rengqe.
- ^{xxiii} The post-1994 terminology refers to this as the South African War.
- ^{xxiv} CMT, 3/188.
- ^{xxv} CMT, 3/873.
- ^{xxvi} This refers to the period between the defeat of Sarhili in 1858 and the resettlement of abaThembu in 1865.
- ^{xxvii} The other areas covered by this description were the Fingoland districts of Butterworth, Nqamakwe, Tsomo and St Marks.

-
- xxviii One of Matanzima's strong supporters, Mawonga Nkunkuma, even took me to one of the locations, Tsengiwe, to demonstrate what he meant.
- xxix Interview, Cala Reserve, 15 March 2000. It is worth noting that landholders, who were removed to new residential settlements, did not lose their fields.
- xxx Interview with Fani Ncapayi, Emnxe, 11 May 2000.
- xxxi I have benefited immensely from discussions with and notes from Miyuki Liyama, a Japanese Phd candidate doing fieldwork in Xhalanga. I am also indebted to Tim Wigley, a freelance trainer on the use of natural "organic" farming methods amongst various rural communities in Xhalanga.
- xxxii Source: Statistics South Africa – Republic of Transkei, Population Figures, Table VII (26), District: CALA –26.
- xxxiii Interview, Luphaphasi, 15 November 1999.
- xxxiv Archives held at the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs in Cala, Lufaphasi Administrative area
- xxxv Madeyi was a member of the committee in her area.
- xxxvi Mr. Etienne Cloete was the provincial executive member of Agri-Eastern Cape – an organisation of white commercial farmers. Agri-Eastern Cape is an affiliate of Agri-South Africa, the national organisation of white commercial farmers.
- xxxvii See letter Fani Ncapayi wrote to Alfred Thoka of the DRDLR
- xxxviii Land was historically measured in morgen. One morgen is equivalent to 0.8567 hectares.
- xxxix See an "External Memo" from Fani Ncapayi to Mike Kenyon, Provincial Director, DLA. The document is in a file on "Land Access issues" in CALUSA offices.
- xl *ibid.*
- xli See Minutes of Management Committee Meeting of 7/1/2002. Delindlala minute book. Delindlala offices.
- xlii See notes taken in the workshop of 30/1/2002. Delindlala minute book, in Delindlala farm.
- xliii See Minutes of the meeting of general members of Delindlala on 1/3/2002. Delindlala minute book.
- xliv *ibid.*
- xlv Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.
- xlvi Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala with extension officers on the farm on 2/5/2003. Delindlala minute book.
- xlvii Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011
- xlviii Nozolile Qayi interviewed in Delindlala, 3/02/2011. She also confirmed this in her speech during the celebration of Delindlala's achievements on 16/05/2012.
- xliv *ibid.*
- l Nozolile Qayi interview at Delindlala, 03/02/2011. See also See also Minutes of the management committee meeting of Delindlala and representatives of RuLIV, 21/8/2009. Delindlala minute book.
- li MamQwathi Mrhawuli interview in Delindlala, 21/5/2005.
- lii Mistake Chophiso interview in Delindlala, 6/5/2005.
- liii *ibid.*
- liv Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala with extension officers on the farm on 2/5/2003. Delindlala minute book.
- lv Minutes of a meeting of Delindlala and the Department of Agriculture (undated – possibly in late January 2003)
- lvi See minutes of a meeting of Delindlala and Mr Martins and other agricultural officers, 2/5/2003.
- lvii CASP is the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme by the Department of Agriculture.
- lviii Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.
- lix See minutes of the general meeting of Delindlala on 27/6/2005.
- lx See Minutes of the meeting of Delindlala on 3/4/2002. Delindlala minute book.

^{lxi} CALUSA Annual Report 2003.

^{lxii} Mistake Chophiso interview in Delindlala, 6/5/2005.

^{lxiii} Minutes of the Management Committee meeting of Delindlala on 5/1/2004. Delindlala minute book, Delindlala office.

^{lxiv} Minutes of the Management Committee meeting of Delindlala on 5/1/2004. Delindlala minute book, Delindlala office.

^{lxv} Nozolile Qayi interview in Delindlala, 3/02/2011.

^{lxvi} Conversation between Fani Ncapayi and Thando Bengo on the way from Cala to Delindlala on 16 October 2010.

^{lxvii} Mdumiseni Duda interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 17/02/2009.

^{lxviii} Rosemary Mndini interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 11/02/2009.

^{lxix} Mongezi Khalipha interviewed in Lumphaphasi, 10/02/2010.